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PREFACE
“If human society were so organized that all aspects of life
flowed within coextensive spheres the problems studied in
this book could never arise. In primitive societies
economic, political, and social activity was probably for all
practical purposes so confined; the tribe, family, or village
furnished the basic – and almost the exclusively relevant –
unit for all aspects of human activity. Life was simple in
that the motivations and the principles affecting human
conduct had an essentially unitary source and were largely
viewed from a single perspective. In the contemporary
world, on the other hand, many groupings affect human
activity; moreover, a single course of conduct may be
viewed from various perspectives – for example, in
economic, social, and political terms – for each of which a
different community can be relevant. How then should our
contemporary world handle problems in which the persons
concerned with more than one community? What happens
when a problem arises between or among individuals or
groups in some measure owing their allegiance to, and
living their lives in, different communities?”1
Almost forty years later, I revisit some of the same questions raised by Von
Meheren and Trautman.
When I first started this research project in December, 2000, there seemed to be a
sense of euphoria in the air as to the prospects of reaching an agreement with respect to
the creation of a new international convention on the recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments under the auspices of the Hague Conference on Private International
Law. The negotiations were at their peak, and a new draft was offered as a basis for
discussion. Today, three years later, this promising and ambitious project is far from
conclusion. The initial proposal shrunk substantially to a very modest and narrow
proposal for a convention on choice of court agreements.
1
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Unplanned, this was a real-time, live, micro-cosmos experiment regarding the
dynamics involved in the solving of the problems associated with recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments. This experiment resulted in the resurfacing of the very
same problems that had been occupying the private international law world for hundreds
of years. As The Hague judgments project fades away, the same old questions that lead to
its initiation over a decade ago once again reemerge. This failed attempt simply reiterated
and emphasized that these problems still exist and never went away. This was not the
first attempt to address this issue from an international perspective, and most likely not
the last one.
More than three years later, I conclude that fundamental mistakes were made in
the previous attempts to create an international treaty regulating this issue. In this
dissertation, I try to address these mistakes in order to avoid repeating them in the future.
The path that I have chosen is to look at the past, so that I can learn for the future.
The first chapter of my work serves as an introduction and reviews the various
problems and questions that I intend to address in this essay. I look into the basic
questions of the private international field of law and the changes we are facing as a
result of the digital revolution we have been undergoing. I also consider the question,
why recognition of foreign judgments is necessary, and discuss the underlying policies
and doctrines used to justify the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. This
work is specifically oriented towards intellectual property rights. The fact that these
rights are territorial in nature is responsible for many of the problems we encounter.
Therefore, the fifth part of the first chapter is dedicated to the territoriality issue, the
extraterritorial adjudication of these rights, and the implications the territoriality issue has
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on the recognition and enforcement problem. In order to better understand the problems
that are the very essence of my research, I conclude this chapter by actually explaining
the process for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. I do that by using
the United States legal system as a model. To complete the picture, I conducted an
empirical research that attempts to look into the question whether American courts
enforce foreign intellectual property judgments and in the cases that they do not, what
were the reasons for not doing so.
When we talk about recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, a question
is often asked about the remedy sought by the plaintiff. There are very significant
differences between the recognition and enforcement of money judgments and that of
injunctions and other provisional measures with respect to intellectual property rights.
The second chapter addresses this point. It seems that money judgments are much easier
to enforce than injunctions or other equitable remedies, especially in light of the fact that
some legal systems do not even recognize injunctions as a potential remedy, so they find
it difficult to enforce an injunction rendered by a foreign court. Furthermore, there is a
growing phenomenon, especially in Europe, of extraterritorial injunctions that has drawn
substantial criticism from scholars. There are solutions to these problems and I will
discuss them later on.
The greatest obstacle for the free flow and international recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments in the modern world is the major difference in
substantive law between different countries. These differences have many faces,
including differences in the characteristics of the rights, the remedies that are provided,
and the elements of protection. This is the central point in the third chapter. Some have
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argued that a potential solution to the problem discussed in this work is to harmonize
substantive intellectual property law. In other words, some believe that if we eliminate
the differences in substantive laws, there will be no reason for one court to refuse to
recognize a foreign judgment because they both adhere to similar laws. In order to
determine the merits of such an argument, I look into the harmonization process the
world of intellectual property has been undergoing during the last one hundred and
twenty years with respect to patents, copyrights and trademarks. I conclude that despite
the very extensive efforts, there is still a long way to go until complete harmonization is
achieved, and the prospects of this happening anytime soon are slim if not nonexistent. I
then argue that even if complete harmonization is ever achieved, as unreasonable as this
may sound, this would still not solve the underlying problem addressed in my work due
to the elements of territoriality and independence.
After I conclude that harmonization is not a viable solution to the problem, I turn
in the fourth chapter to the “old” potential solution of international regulation through the
adoption of international conventions. Interestingly, there were quite a few attempts to
regulate this issue and most of them have failed to achieve their goal. In this chapter, I
look into most of the important regional and multinational attempts to create such an
instrument, and try to find the reasons for their failure in order to avoid repeating similar
mistakes in my proposal. The fascinating conclusion that I draw is that the main reason
for the failure of these attempts is the fact that most of them were drafted as a “double” or
“mixed” convention. In other words, they attempt to address not just the issue of
recognition and enforcement of judgments, but also the issue of jurisdiction. The problem
is that these countries are having great difficulties agreeing on the issue of jurisdiction
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and therefore, the prospect of ever adopting an instrument based on these two models is
not very good.
Even though the jurisdiction issue is not the center of my research, I believe it is
important to understand what potential difficulties are created, including the various
elements and changes that the Internet has introduced. This will be discussed in the fifth
chapter.
The sixth chapter introduces my proposed guidelines for a solution to the
problem. I propose to adopt an international convention that contains certain unique
characteristics that, based on my previous conclusions, has better prospects of being
adopted by the international community. My proposal is based on a simple convention
model that promotes a “presumption of enforceability” rule with very broad exceptions
such as public policy, due process of law, and jurisdiction. The convention does not deal
directly with the issue of jurisdiction, but rather addresses this issue indirectly as an
exception to the general rule. By creating the convention within the framework of the
TRIPS Agreement,2 it is expected to enjoy some of the elements that are only contained
in this Agreement, including issues of due process, public policy, and international
dispute settlement. In the long run, I also propose to complement the convention with an
international court system that may be created especially for this purpose, or alternatively
be based on one of the already existing systems. An international court system, however,

2
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Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 33 I.L.M. 1197. (1994)
(hereinafter “TRIPS Agreement”).
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should not be part of the initial proposal since it may scare some of the potential
participants, thus creating an artificial barrier to its adoption.
It should be noted that if my proposal is successfully adopted and implemented, in
the long run, it could be broadened in scope to also apply to other fields of law. In other
words, my proposal potentially has broader implications and if it is successful in bringing
stability and creating confidence and trust among potential member countries, it could be
applied to other subject matters and serve as the basis for a broader international solution.
In other words, despite the fact that this dissertation only addresses intellectual property
related judgments, it can be potentially broadened in the future to cover other judgments
as well.
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I. INTRODUCTION TO THE PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW PROBLEM
1.

The Questions Involved
The development of the private international field of law results from the fact that

there are many situations where international elements are involved in the litigation of a
dispute between adverse parties. These international elements are varied and almost
unlimited. For example, if the defendant and the plaintiff are citizens of two different
countries, an international element is involved. Similarly, a case where the two parties
live in the same country, but the disputed event, such as the signing of the contract, or the
tortious act took place in a different country also contains an international element. Most
interesting to us is a situation where a final judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff
in one country, but the defendant resides, lives or is domiciled in a different country, or
has assets that are located in a different country. In such an event, the plaintiff is faced
with the problem of having a favoring judgment granting her legal rights that she is
unable to enforce in the rendering jurisdiction. This is true both with respect to money
judgments and equitable remedies, such as injunctions or temporary restraining orders.
The need to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment is not limited to situations where
the plaintiff is requesting the court to do so. There are many situations where the
defendant is the one to ask the foreign court to recognize a judgment rendered in another
jurisdiction as a defense to allegations made by the plaintiff in the new proceedings.
These can be situations where certain parts of the dispute have already been decided by a
foreign court in favor of the defendant, and the plaintiff attempts to circumvent this
decision by raising the issue again. We should note that any attempt to resolve the issues
and problems that result from the need to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment
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outside the rendering jurisdiction should be made very carefully, because any decision
with respect to the international regulation of recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments has “a strong potential to chill certain activities and encourage others, because
of fears of risks, or even certainties, about lawsuits.”3
Three principle questions are involved in the private international law debate. The
first one is the question of jurisdiction; the second is the question of conflict of laws; and
the third is the question of recognition and enforcement of the judgment. From a practical
perspective these three questions are inherently connected, and should be introduced in
this chronological order. They are all part of one single process of enforcing the
substantive rights of the plaintiff over the defendant. This process is the same in nearly
every legal system, but it may become more complicated when foreign or international
elements are involved.4
In international litigation involving monetary compensation there is, however, one
preliminary practical question that needs to be addressed, which sets the direction of the
entire process. This is the question of where the defendant has assets.5 This is the first
3

Jonathan A. Franklin & Roberta J. Morris, International Jurisdiction and Enforcement of

Judgments in the Era of Global Networks: Irrelevance of, Goals for, and Comments on the
Current Proposals, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1213, 1217 (2002).
4

For general discussion see, JANE C. GINSBURG, THE PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF

COPYRIGHT IN AN ERA OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE, 273 RECUEIL DES COURS OF THE HAGUE
ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 239 (1998). See also, LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS:
FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS (Boston 1991).
5

See WILLIAM D. PARK & STEPHEN JH. CROMIE, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LITIGATION

459 (1990).
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question that each plaintiff must answer before engaging in any litigation process. All of
the other questions will be irrelevant if, at the end of the day, it turns out that no assets
exist to satisfy the obtained judgment. This lies at the heart of the debate. There is really
no point in engaging in a long, time consuming, and expensive litigation process if we
cannot successfully enforce the final judgment against the defendant. Only if assets do
exist and we can locate them, is there a point in starting the litigation; then, we move to
address the three private international law questions. Furthermore, the answer to this
preliminary question will set the course for the entire litigation process, as it provides
guidance with respect to many other questions.
Many times a claim can be filed in more than one country or jurisdiction.
Consider the following example. An American company and a German company sign an
agreement in Germany with respect to the utilization of a German patent and the payment
of royalties in the U.S. The American company is very active in both countries. The
German company can file a claim against the American company in Germany where the
agreement was signed and the patent is registered or in the U.S. where the utilization of
the patent or the breach of agreement took place. There are different considerations that
the German company must take into account when making the decision where to file the
complaint. Litigating the case in Germany would probably be easier for the German
company due to its familiarity with this legal system and would likely be less expensive.
On the other hand, if the American company has no assets in Germany, even if it wins,
the German company will be unable to collect the judgment and must look for other
options such as enforcing the German judgment in the U.S. This is the kind of issue that
bothers many companies and individuals that engage in international trade.
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In the introduction to the second edition of his 1884 book Francis T. Piggott
writes:
“The subject of Foreign Judgments forms the most practical
if not the most important chapter in Private International
Law; for it involves the consequence and practical
application of the principles which that law expounds. It is
the last chapter, in which the results arrived at in all the
earlier chapters reappear. As a practical matter it is evident
that principles of International law must be worth little
unless universally recognized and acted on; if they are
universally recognized, then when a decision is given in
one country in which any of those principles are acted on
there can be little hesitation in predicting the universal
recognition of the decision itself. The importance and
magnitude of the subject can only be gauged by the
importance and variety of the question on which it touches:
these questions extend over the whole range of law.”6
In this work, I concentrate on the third question of private international law,
namely the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. I will address the first two
questions of jurisdiction and conflict of laws only to the extent that it serves my research
and conclusions.
2.

The Implications of the Digital Era
The problem of the enforcement and recognition of foreign judgments is by no

means a new one. It has been known for many years and may be traced back to the
industrial revolution and to a smaller extent even before then.7 This is no surprise. As
6

FRANCIS T. PIGGOTT, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

RELATING TO FOREIGN JUDGMENTS AND PARTIES OUT OF THE JURISDICTION (2nd ed., London
1884).
7

See, e.g., the decision of the United Sates Supreme Court in the case of Hilton et al v. Guyot et

al., 159 U.S. 113, 16 S.Ct. 139 (1895).
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long as borders are open and transfers of people and goods take place, controversies and
disputes arise and there is a growing need to address them. One must wonder what
created the renewed sudden interest in this issue. A frequent answer to this question is the
growing usage of the Internet since the late 1980s.8 For many years, commercial
transactions meant the simple exchange of physical property for currency, some kind of a
commercial paper, cash or other merchandise. People met face to face, saw the
merchandise they wished to buy, paid for it and took it with them after paying
consideration. In this reality, the chances that something were to go wrong were slim and
the attention paid to questions of jurisdiction, applicable law and enforcement of
judgments were rarely addressed, simply because there was no need to address them.
They simply relied on their short physical proximity to address these issues.9 This has
changed significantly and is no longer necessarily true. The unique characteristics of the
Internet and the information society in which we currently live make a substantial
difference.10
As one author has recently put it:
“The Internet’s challenge to traditional concepts of
jurisdiction and governance is multifaceted, but really boils
down to two factors. First when you’re online, you’re both
everywhere and nowhere at once. Ubiquity is perhaps the
defining characteristics of this remarkable new “borderless”
medium. There are no passports on the Internet; you travel
8

FRANKLIN & MORRIS, supra note 3, at 1218.

9

Yvonne Chau, Protecting Intellectual property Rights in the International Marketplace: New

International Boundaries, 621 PLI/PAT 255, 259 (2000).
10

For more on the “Information Society,” see generally, JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE,
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freely from one destination to another at the click of a
button. And geography is a remarkably meaningless
concept for Internet denizens. . . Second, no single entity or
country owns or controls the Internet. Persons of this socalled ‘network of networks’ are owned by private
companies, organizations, or even governments, but it is
impossible to point to any specific ‘owner’ of the Net writ
large.”11
This is not to say of course that international commerce did not exist until now.
The volume of this commerce (especially e-commerce), however, was substantially less
significant than what it is today.
New methods of communications such as the fax machine, e-mail, satellite phones
and the Internet created a new reality in which information can be transferred from one
point to another on the face of the earth within seconds and billion-dollar deals can be
concluded without the parties ever meeting each other face to face. Even if the parties do
need to personally meet before concluding the transaction, modern aviation makes it easy
for them to cross a continent within hours for a very reasonable price and enjoy all the
facilities and luxuries that a modern businessman enjoys.
The new technologies helped introduce new ways to conduct business. Online
commerce was not heard of twenty years ago. For example, purchasing airline e-tickets
from Travelocity.com, Orbitz.com, or Hotwire.com reduced the number of travel agents
and has become a daily routine for millions of people around the globe. Similarly, buying
books online from Amazon.com or making bids on eBay is nothing special these days
and the volume of these activities is only expected to grow. In addition, the Internet has
substantially revised the ways commerce is conducted in the wholesale market – the

11
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ability to purchase raw materials, such as chemicals, in a faster and more efficient
manner.
These differences in methods of communications have changed the way of
conducting business only partly. In many other ways, we conduct business in the same
manner as it had been done over one hundred years ago. People today frequently still
have their lawyers exchange drafts of contracts and engage in the art of negotiation. What
has mainly changed is the fact that everything now is much easier to accomplish. The
periods of time are shorter, and most importantly, geographical and political borders are
less of an issue due to the increasing use of digital, rather than physical, distribution of
goods. Consequently, people today are exposed to more litigation outside their home
country.12
These changes in the business environment have two significant consequences.
First, the number of transactions that are conducted has increased in volume beyond
imagination. The second is the fact that these transactions are not necessarily conducted
within a certain country or territory, but rather expand to other countries as well, beyond
political or geographical borders.
This phenomenon cannot be solely attributed to improvements in communications
technology. One additional important contributing factor to this changing reality is the
signing of international agreements such as the GATT13 and the creation of the World
Trade Organization (“WTO”). These changes have made it easier for merchandise to
cross oceans and continents by reducing artificial barriers for trade, such as customs and
12

FRANKLIN & MORRIS, supra note 3, at 1219.
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General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 33 I.L.M. 1154 (Sept. 1994).
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tariffs, resulting in the free flow of merchandise between different countries. Another
example is the signing of bilateral and multilateral treaties establishing free trade areas
and exchanges of merchandise.14 The immediate result of these changes is the increase of
potential markets and the establishment of competition. Theoretically, every industrial
producer increases its number of potential customers to a great extent since it is no longer
limited only to those located in the territory in which it operates.
These changes did not skip the world of intellectual property. Modern products
contain numerous new inventions, which are patented and protected. The same goes for
works that are copyrighted and transferred between consumers such as musical and video
works, not to mention famous corporations such as the Coca-Cola Company and
McDonald’s that operate around the world using their famous trade-marks and tradenames. Many companies who own intellectual property rights have changed their
business models and seek new opportunities in new markets hoping to increase their
profitability. People around the world travel more and are thus exposed to developments
that take place in other countries. They demand enjoying them when they return home
and vice versa, they seek to enjoy the comforts of home while they are traveling.
The nature of business relations is that sometimes they result in business disputes
that require the parties to engage in extensive litigation. Since intellectual property issues
such as the ownership, registration, infringement, validity, and licensing of patents,
trademarks and copyrights are an integral part of these disputes, they are also subject to
litigation. Things get more complicated when the transactions, and as a result, the
14

See, e.g., the North American Free Trade Agreement, signed Dec. 17, 1992, Can. – Mex. –
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litigation is not limited to the borders of one jurisdiction, but involve international
elements. Cross-border transactions have the tendency to complicate things simply due to
the fact that the judgment, for various reasons, cannot always be satisfied in the
jurisdiction which rendered it, and the winning party must seek enforcement and
recognition in other jurisdictions. I will have more to say about this issue when I discuss
the unique characteristics of intellectual property rights.
Interestingly, one of the findings of the empirical research that I will discuss later
in detail is that in light of these changes, the number of cases in which the issue of
recognition and enforcement of foreign intellectual property judgments is discussed in the
United States has grown overwhelmingly in the last twenty years, as reflected in Figure 1
below.

20

THE GROWING RECOGNITION AND
ENFORCEMENT PROBLEM
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3.

The Underlying Policies

A question arises as to why it is so important to allow, or even require one country
to recognize or enforce a judgment rendered in another country. Is it really a good thing
to allow one country to intervene in the internal affairs of another country by
extraterritorially applying its judgments? What are the benefits of such an approach?
Interestingly, a very broad, unscientific review of the scholastic writing on the issue of
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments reveals that most of them do not even
address this question. It appears that most of the writers simply assume that there are
benefits involved in such recognition and enforcement. The general, nearly axiomatic
assumption is that recognizing and enforcing foreign judgments is a good thing, with
substantial advantages, and that only in rare situations should we refrain from doing so.
One may attempt to advance the opposing argument that the general norm should
be that of self-government and democracy, and that the exception should be that of
extraterritorial application of the foreign judgment. Arguably, the advantages of such an
arrangement would be the advancement of security and trust among citizens that would
know that any dispute would be governed by the laws of the country in which they live
and interpreted by such county’s legal institutions. In addition, commercial entities would
allegedly be able to use contractual mechanisms to circumvent the problem by using
arbitration and choice of law and court provisions, or by creating industry specific
substantive standards.
One must take into consideration in advancing such an argument, however, that
full security to one party in such a case necessarily means insecurity to the other. What
would we do in a world where there is no general rule of extraterritorial application of
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foreign judgments, and both parties insist that the laws of their country apply to the
dispute, and that this should be the only forum in which the litigation can take place. It
seems that this is a perfect recipe for a disaster, as the parties are in a collision course,
and insistence on this point may endanger the possibility of closing the transaction.
From an economic perspective, the problem is that this may raise the price of the
transaction for both parties. The uncertainty stemming from the fear that winning the
legal proceedings may not guarantee the enforcement of the award comes with a price tag
– in economic terms this translates into a higher transaction price. The suffering party
would most likely be the end-consumer, who would have to absorb the growing cost. The
other option is that the price of this uncertainty would be so high that the parties would
not go forward with the transaction, and in an extreme situation cross-border/international
commerce would be shut down.
In addition, the fact that commercial entities and sophisticated parties can contract
around the problem by choosing arbitration or inserting choice of court and law
provisions into their agreements can only solve the problem to a very limited extent. The
introduction of the Internet has initiated a process in which the number of international
transactions between private parties, or between private parties and commercial
companies, is growing substantially. Thus, it is reasonable to predict that the relative part
of these transactions in international commerce will only grow in the coming years, and
as a result, these alternative solutions may become irrelevant.
To a great extent, the historical development of the private international
law/conflict of laws body of law and the general rule of extraterritorial application of
judgments was dictated by reality and necessity. There is some evidence for the existence
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of the same problems and issues that are addressed here as far in the past as the Greek era
in the fifth century B.C.15 Creation of new great empires, such as the Roman Empire and
the development of international trade as a result, amplified this necessity of new
solutions to the newly created problems. Similarly, “[b]y the 17th century, the leadership
of conflicts literature moved to the Netherlands which by that time was one of the major
trading nations in the world.”16
One must also ask the question, what is the theoretical basis for the recognition
and enforcement of the foreign judgment? The answer to this question is extremely
complex and cannot be answered based on a single theory. “The theories typically
advanced to explain recognition practice contribute little to any real understanding of
what should control.”17 It seems, however, that the main answer to this question is
practicability.
“Perhaps the ultimate justification for some degree of
recognition is that if in a highly complex and interrelated
world each community exhausted every possibility of
insisting on its parochial interests, injustice would result
and the normal patterns of life would be disrupted. A full
articulation of relevant policies would reflect the
implications of varying attitudes toward the preclusive
effects to be accorded domestic judgments; the significance
of differing attitudes and techniques in the fields of choice
of law and of jurisdiction to adjudicate in the international
sense; and the degree to which a given community holds,
for historical, political, and economic reasons, the
15
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conviction that a viable international order is desirable and
obtainable.”18
To put it differently, we cannot satisfy the will of all the people, all the time.
In the modern world, the litigation process is more protracted and expensive. Both
parties incur significant costs during this process, such as the hiring of attorneys, costs
relating to the reimbursement of witnesses, travel expenses and mandatory court fees. In
addition, legal proceedings in many countries last for a substantial length of time, from
the filing date of the complaint until all appeal options are exhausted and enforcement of
the judgment is allowed. As a result, refusal to recognize or enforce a foreign judgment
may result in injustice to the original plaintiff, as she will not hurry to repeat her
monetary and time investment required to re-litigate the case from the beginning in a new
forum. This economic justification is frequently used in the U.S. Furthermore; refusal to
recognize or enforce a foreign judgment creates an additional artificial barrier to the
achievement of justice – one that was not introduced by the legal system rendering the
judgment. This result may have a significant effect on the conducting of business and
commerce. Assuming that the rendering court litigated the case in a decent and just
manner, the refusal to enforce the foreign judgment means that the party in violation of
the rights of another is the real winner, not because she is right or because of a legitimate
reason, but rather because of a technicality or simply because she has more money. The
consequence of such an approach is that paying your debt, or keeping your contractual
obligations would not always be the right thing to do from an economic perspective. The
effect that such a developing custom may have on international commerce and business
relations between nationals and citizens of different countries could be very significant.
18
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Money and time are not the only justifications for encouraging the enforcement of
foreign judgments. Another consideration is the policy against forcing the plaintiff to
make a decision on where to initiate the litigation based on the chances of future
enforcement of the judgment. We want to reach a point where the plaintiff can choose the
location of where to file the complaint while knowing that such location shall not affect
her ability to enforce it. Conversely, we also want to avoid providing the plaintiff with an
additional option to select a forum for further litigation, in case she is unsuccessful on the
first time.19 If the plaintiff selected a certain forum to file her claim and she loses, we do
not want to enable her to file an identical claim in a different forum, which does not
recognize the defendant’s request to recognize the original judgment rendered.
A third consideration is the interest in promoting stability, unity, predictability
and uniformity in the global marketplace in the modern world, since globalization has
created a reality where our lives are no longer confined to designated borders.20 This
consideration is gaining substantial significance as the world is becoming more united
from an economic perspective, and e-commerce is occupying a larger volume of
international commerce. As one court has put it:
“The primary reason for giving effect to the rulings of foreign
tribunals is that such recognition factors international
cooperation and encourages reciprocity. Thus, comity promotes
predictability and stability in legal expectations, two critical
components of successful international commercial enterprises.
It also encourages the rule of law, which is especially important

19

See Id. at 835.

20

See Id.

26

because as trade expands across international borders, the
necessity for cooperation among nations increases as well.”21
A fourth consideration is the wish to protect a successful opponent from further
harassment by its former unsuccessful opponent by utilizing evasive tactics.22
The fifth consideration, and a very important one, is based on the notion that we
should encourage litigation in the forum that is the most appropriate one to litigate the
case because it is the most convenient one, or since it has the greatest stakes in the
outcome of the litigation, or for any other reason that justifies this court rendering a
judgment on the merits.23
The weight given to each of these considerations may differ from one jurisdiction
to another and from one set of cases to another. The globalization process the world has
been undergoing during the last several decades has created a reality where international
borders no longer play a substantial role. We must realize that international transactions
today are similar in characteristics to local transactions fifty years ago, and the same
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policies, which guided us then with respect to enforcement of judgments rendered by
other jurisdictions in the same country, should also guide us now.
Needless to say that for each of the reasons provided in support of the need for
international recognition and enforcement of judgments, the other party against whom the
judgment is enforced, would fiercely object.
4.

The Basis for the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
Courts throughout the world troubled themselves for decades with the question:

upon what principles are they allowed or obligated to enforce a judgment rendered by a
foreign court? The two old and basic theories to address this issue originate in 19th
century England. These are the theories of “Comity of Nations” and the doctrine of
“Obligation.”
A.

Comity of Nations Doctrine
As a general rule, laws have no effect or force beyond the political borders of the

sovereignty from which their authority derives. For many years, it has been agreed that
“comity” is the basis for allowing a judgment deriving from the sovereignty of one legal
system to be enforced in other countries. The Comity of Nations Doctrine, in the words of
Lord Blackburn, is based on the idea that it is an “admitted principle of the law of nations
that a state is bound to enforce within its territories the judgment of a foreign tribunal.”24
This British doctrine was adopted and is still in full effect in the U.S., as I will later
explain.
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This concept was developed mostly in the Netherlands by Ulrich Huber in the last
quarter of the 17th century in an attempt to mediate between the needs of international
commerce and territorial sovereignty.25 Today, however, there are other reasons used to
justify this practice, such as the saving of money and resources, as previously discussed.
B.

Legal Obligation Doctrine
The doctrine of “Legal Obligation” rejects altogether the comity idea. It simply

states that if a legal obligation is created by a foreign judgment, it must be enforced or
obeyed everywhere. This means that unlike in other countries, in the British common law
system enforcement and recognition of foreign judgments are not based on reciprocity or
the existence of a treaty requiring the courts to enforce a foreign judgment. This doctrine
was first introduced in 1845 in the British case of Russell v. Smyth, where the court held
that “[t]he principle in this case is, that where a competent court has adjudicated a certain
sum to be due, a legal obligation arises to pay that sum, and an action of debt to enforce
the judgment may be maintained. It is in this way that the judgments of foreign and
colonial courts may be supported and enforced.”26
The difference between the two doctrines is significant. Under the Comity
Doctrine, we enforce foreign judgments because we are engaged in a civilized world, and
therefore, we are obligated to adopt public international rules that require respecting
behavior and obligations created by fellow nations. On the other hand, if we follow the
Obligation Theory, we enforce the foreign judgment simply because it created a private
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obligation on the part of the losing party before the court, and such obligations should be
honored. One ramification of the application of this theory is that everything that might
negate the existence of the obligation, or excuses its performance can serve as a good
defense against its enforcement.27 A different distinction between the two theories is that
the Comity Doctrine exists in the sphere of public international law whereas the
Obligation Theory exists in the private international law one.
There are, of course, other theories that have been developed throughout the years
to justify recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, as I discussed with respect
to the underlying theories.
Up to this point, I have explored the underlying policies and the bases for
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. One may argue that in light of these
different approaches taken by various jurisdictions and courts, before attempting to
continue and solve the problems addressed in this dissertation, we must first prioritize
them. There may be various views as to which of the underlying policies and doctrines
previously discussed are the most important ones. One country, for example, may view
the goal of saving money and resources as its justification for a need for a solution,
whereas another country may view the need for predictability and certainty as the basis.
The question, however, is whether it is really necessary to do so.
I argue that it is not. If we prioritize the five underlying policies previously
mentioned and try to advance a solution that addresses one policy at the expense of other
policies, those who view the other policies as the more important ones are going to be
more reluctant to join such a solution, since it does not address the policies important to
27
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them. Every solution will need to be comprehensive and broad enough to make it
comfortable for as many jurisdictions as possible to participate. In other words, the
question why they sit at the table is less important than the fact that they actually do. The
success of every potential solution is directly linked to the question: how many
jurisdictions participate? A solution involving two, three or four jurisdictions is not a real
solution. We need to make sure that as many jurisdictions as possible join, and the only
way to do that is to try and avoid preferring one policy to the other. Sitting at the table for
the wrong reason (and none of the above is really a wrong reason) is better than not
sitting at all.
5.

The Unique Characteristics of Intellectual Property Rights
After discussing the general underlying policies and the prevailing doctrines, I

now turn to the unique characteristics of intellectual property rights, which are the center
of this dissertation.
A.

Territoriality
For many years, intellectual property rights were considered to be territorial in

nature.28 Cornish mention four different characteristics of the territorial nature of
intellectual property rights. These include the following: “(1) the effects of the
intellectual property right in each country are determined by the law of that country; (2)
the intellectual property right only affects activities in the territory for which it is granted;
(3) the right may be asserted only by nationals of the country for which it is granted, and
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others given similar status by law; (4) the right may be asserted or challenged only in the
courts of the country for which it is granted.”29
There is no such thing as uniform intellectual property law that binds all
countries, and there is no such thing as an international patent, copyright or trademark.30
Each country has its own intellectual property laws and these laws grant intellectual
property rights that have an effect only within the political borders of the country that
granted them. Thus, for example, if one has patent rights that are registered in one
country, everyone else can use the very same patent outside the country of registration
without receiving any permission from the right holder and without paying her any
royalties, unless the right holder took the necessary steps to guarantee separate protection
to these rights in other countries as well.
These are separate national systems that adhere to the same international norms
(i.e. national treatment and minimum standards) as they are codified in the Berne
Convention,31 the Paris Convention,32 and the TRIPS Agreement. Though all the
29
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Members of TRIPS are required to adhere to the minimum standard rule in terms of
protecting minimum subject matter and providing minimum rights, many see this as “a
bundle of national, territorially defined, rights.”33 Others, on the other hand, are arguing
that the new public international instruments, by imposing many new substantive norms
on Member states, are creating a de-facto international or multinational code.34
Many see the national treatment principle found in international instruments, such
as the TRIPS Agreement, as the basis for the view that intellectual property rights are
indeed territorial. The fact that an author or inventor is always subject to the rules and
laws of the country where protection to the work is sought indicates that the rights are
limited to the territory which granted them, and once out of this territory, new protection
should be sought based on the laws of the new territory. “It implies that it is for each
contracting state to define the availability and effects of intellectual property rights within
its territory – subject to whatever minimum standards may be set by the relevant
convention – and to afford equal protection to its own nationals and the nationals of other
contracting states.”35
B.

Extraterritorial Application of Intellectual Property Legislation
So far, I have concentrated on the basic scenario in which a court in one country is

asked to recognize or enforce a foreign judgment rendered in another country, and the
activities addressed by the rendering court having taken place within its own jurisdiction.
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There may, however, be a twist to this scenario, which can complicate things
significantly. What would happen if the enforcing court realizes that the rendering court
asserted its jurisdiction and applied its laws extraterritorially and decided to regulate
activities taking place in a different forum?
Consider the following example. A company has similar patents registered in
three European countries. One of its competitors routinely violates the patents in all the
countries where the patent is registered. The patent holder decides to consolidate all the
claims against its competitor in one of the three countries asking the court to adjudicate
the three claims against the defendant and issue an injunction that prohibits the violation
and use of the patent in all three countries. In other words, the court is asked to issue an
extraterritorial injunction with respect to at least two of the countries involved. The
plaintiff then asks the court in one of the two other countries to enforce the foreign
injunction. As I will later discuss, such an injunction may be enforced by the foreign
court by utilizing a contempt of court mechanism, as done in the U.S. or other common
law countries, or by using other mechanisms such as astreintes as done in France and
other civil law countries.
The problems that arise from this example are clear. The enforcing court is asked
to enforce a foreign judgment, rendered by a foreign court that addressed patent
violations taking place within the enforcing court’s territory. This is likely to raise
substantial antagonism on the part of the enforcing court for intervention in occurrences
that took place within its jurisdiction.
Let us stretch this example one step further for the sake of argument. Imagine that
before filing the consolidated claim in the rendering court, the patent holder tried to get
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an injunction in the enforcing court and failed. Only then, the patent holder filed a
consolidated claim that granted the extraterritorial injunction that prohibited the patent
infringement in the rendering jurisdiction, as well as the enforcing jurisdiction. Such a
chain of events puts the patent holder in a better position if the patent infringement suit is
brought in a foreign court then if it were brought in the country where the right is
registered – an obviously unjust result. As imaginary as this example may sound, in
today’s world this is a reality.
In the last decade of the twentieth century, courts in the Netherlands started to
express their willingness to issue extraterritorial injunctions against infringement of
foreign patents in foreign countries. This means that the court will not only order a Dutch
national to refrain from infringing a foreign patent in a foreign country, but also intervene
in the sovereignty of foreign countries by issuing a cross-border injunction that prohibits,
for example, a German national from violating a German registered patent in Germany
exactly as described in the previous example.
The Dutch courts’ decisions were rendered in a procedure by the name kort
geding. These proceedings usually involve the request for a domestic or extraterritorial
relief in the shape of a prohibitory injunction, as well as other relief such as mandatory
injunctions and recall of infringing products.36 It is the Dutch courts’ view that the
assertion of jurisdiction in foreign infringement cases may be based on the combination
of Articles 2 and 6(1) of the Brussels Convention when a Pan-European right is involved,
and also that extraterritorial preliminary injunctions are consistent with Article 16 of the
36
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Brussels Convention. In fact, these courts held that if they can assert jurisdiction over the
foreign defendant under international instruments, it is their duty to grant an
extraterritorial relief if the patent appeared to be valid and infringed.
This approach in my view is the first step down a very dangerous slippery slope.
The result of this approach, if further developed, would be that if jurisdiction may be
asserted by a foreign court, this court could potentially adjudicate any intellectual
property infringement claim taking place in a foreign country, even if no connection
exists between the rendering court and the country where the violation took place.
Theoretically, under this approach the plaintiff may decide to file the claim in a foreign
forum simply because it is more favorable, even though there is no real relation between
the rendering court and the infringement at issue. Many may and are viewing this
approach as a very crude interference with the sovereignty of foreign countries. It would
be very hard to believe that foreign courts would be eager to recognize or enforce such a
judgment involving intervention in their jurisdiction.
The question then is does this mean that there is a transition in the intellectual
property field from territoriality to extraterritoriality? I would say that the answer is no.
Even in light of the recent developments, the territorial nature of intellectual property
laws has not changed. What has changed is only the extraterritorial adjudication of
intellectual property rights. The fact that a court agrees to issue an injunction under the
laws of another country, with effects in the other country, does not mean that the right is
no longer territorial because the effect of the right is still limited to the territory where it
is registered or granted. The infringement in the foreign country is tested under the laws
of the foreign country by a local court, rather than by extraterritorial application of the
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local laws to an infringement abroad. All that has changed is the fourth element, which
addresses the identity of the court in which the rights are being challenged. In sum,
“[t]here has been widespread confusion between the proposition that intellectual property
laws are not extraterritorial, and quite the separate proposition that they are not justiciable
in foreign courts.”37
There is another angle to the extraterritoriality problem. There are cases where
courts decide to assert their jurisdiction over activities taking place in other countries, but
unlike in my prior example, they find a way to justify applying their own laws to the
dispute. This problem is expected to be more crucial with globalization and the rapid
increase in digital accessibility and communication. American courts, as I will show, are
not always eager to assert their jurisdiction and apply their laws to violations of
intellectual property rights that take place outside the borders of the United States. As a
general rule, the U.S. has a strict territorial presumption that federal laws should not be
interpreted to apply to conduct abroad absent a clear indication that Congress intended
them to be applied that way. This is known as the “presumption against
extraterritoriality.” However, in spite of this presumption there are still uncertainties as to
when this presumption should apply. There are some differences between the
extraterritoriality of patent and copyright laws, compared to that of trademark laws.
Under the American Patent Act38 it seems that patent protection is limited to the
United States Territory. Accordingly, “whoever without authority makes, uses or sells
any patented invention, within the United States during the term of the patent therefore,
37
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infringes the patent.”39 The case law that preceded the enactment of this provision also
supports the claim that American patent protection is territorial in scope.40 As a result, an
American inventor who seeks protection for his invention in foreign countries should
probably seek protection, according to Congress’s intent and the language of the statute,
by registering a patent in the countries where the invention is being used.41
However, there are two situations in which American courts agreed to spread their
jurisdiction to the international arena, and made exceptions to the territoriality rule. The
first case relates to “contributory infringement.” If conduct abroad induces or contributes
to infringement that takes place within American territory, courts are more likely to agree
to implement American patent laws.42 The second exception to the territorial rule occurs
in cases where the infringing act took place in a U.S. territory, and the defendant made
profits from the exploitation of the infringed invention in a different country. In other
words, as long as the infringement of the American patent took place in the U.S., the
damages awarded to the plaintiff can include profits that were made as a result of the
infringement in other countries.43 It should be remembered that in both these exceptions,
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the actual infringement took place in American territory. Without an infringing act within
U.S. territory, there is no infringement of American Patent law.44
British courts object to extraterritorial application of patent law and will not
recognize a judgment based on such application. In a famous case a British court held:
“Now an English patent is a species of English property of
the nature of a chose in action and peculiar in character. By
English law it confers certain monopoly rights, exercisable
in England, upon its proprietor. A person who has an
enforceable right to a license under an English patent
appears therefore to me to have at least some kind of
proprietary interest which it is the duty of our courts to
protect. And, certainly so far as the English patents are
concerned, it seems to me with all deference to His
Honour’s judgment, to be an assertion of an extraterritorial
jurisdiction which we do not recognize, for the American
courts to make orders which would destroy or qualify those
statutory rights belonging to an English national who is not
subject to the jurisdiction of the American courts.”45
Unlike the Patent Act, the Copyright Act does not limit the scope of copyright
protection only to American territory. However, American courts have held that
copyright laws, in general, are limited to U.S. territory.46 This attitude was reaffirmed in
the case of Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co.,47 where the court held
that the Copyright Act does not apply to activities that take place outside U.S. borders.48
The court based its ruling on its interpretation of Congress’ intention that the Act would
44
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be territorial and not extraterritorial.49 In this case, the court determined that the
“authorization” of a defendant in the U.S. to distribute videocassettes of the film Yellow
Submarine to offshore actors did not trigger the extraterritorial assertion of U.S.
copyright law. The court held that “authorization” alone in the U.S. is insufficient to
assert U.S. law. Many commentators criticized this approach.
Similar to the patent realm, in copyright as well we can find exceptions to the
general territorial rule in the image of contributory infringement50 and extraterritorial
profits.51 Another exception to the general rule that was recognized by American courts
relates to situations in which an infringement within U.S. territory permits an
infringement abroad.52 However, like in patent law, all of those exceptions depend on the
fact that the infringement took place in the United States.53
Unlike the situation with respect to patents and copyrights, trademark law does
not require an act of infringement inside U.S. territory.54 The U.S. Supreme Court has
already dealt with the question of the territoriality of the Lanham Act in the 1950’s, long
before the Internet age, in the case of Steele v. Bulova Watch Co.55 This case is a great
49
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example of how American courts decided to apply their own laws in an instance where
there had been hardly any connection between the physical activities of the defendant and
the U.S., and concluded that there had been trademark infringement. In this case, an
American citizen assembled watches made of parts purchased in the U.S. and
Switzerland, and sold them in Mexico, carrying the name Bulova. Bulova was a very
famous trademark that was registered in the U.S. and used to sell watches in this country.
The defendant was the owner of the same registered mark in Mexico. Though never sold
in U.S. territory, a few of the watches were purchased in Mexico and then leaked into
U.S. territory. Since the quality of the watches manufactured in Mexico was not as good
as that of the watches sold in the U.S., the plaintiff complained that this would adversely
affect the Bulova Watch Company’s reputation in markets cultivated by advertising in the
U.S. and abroad, and thus sought to enjoin the use of the Bulova mark on watches
assembled in Mexico.
Much like in the modern examples of Internet use in the digital age, where a
website located on an Internet server in one country infringes on a registered trademark in
another, the Bulova Court had to decide “whether a United States District Court has
jurisdiction to award relief to an American corporation against acts of trade-mark
infringement and unfair competition consummated in a foreign country by a resident of
the United States.”56
The Supreme Court was fully aware of the problem in applying the Lanham Act
to activities that took place outside U.S. borders. It concluded that American legislation
could not be applied beyond the borders of the U.S. “unless a contrary legislative intent
56
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appears.”57 Under the Lanham Act, commerce is defined as “all commerce which may be
lawfully regulated by Congress.”58 Article I, § 8 of the American Constitution includes
“Commerce with foreign Nations” as part of the commerce that can be regulated by
Congress, and most commentators seem to assume that this clause gives Congress a
broad power to regulate extraterritorial activities.59
It seems that the Court was worried about the international implications of a
decision that would broaden the scope of the Lanham Act beyond U.S. territory. The
American court took advantage of the fact that the defendant was an American citizen
and said that the U.S. cannot be prevented from governing the conduct of its citizens
outside its borders, as long as the rights of other nations and their nationals are not
violated. The decision is not based on international law, but rather on the obligation of
citizens to abide by the laws of their country. After giving the legal basis for its decision,
the Court concluded that the Lanham Act applied to the mentioned facts and turned to the
analysis of the Lanham Act.
Though the case was decided in 1952, prior to the 1988 Amendment to the
Lanham Act, the requirement of use of the trademark in commerce in order to prevail in
an infringement action was the same as today. The Court decided that trade practices
which result in unlawful consequences in the U.S. will not be immune simply because
they were initiated or consummated outside U.S. borders. “In such a case it is not
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material that the source of the forbidden effects upon commerce arises in one phase or
another of that program.”60
There are several ways in which we can interpret the Bulova decision. It is unclear
whether it is limited to the facts of this specific case, or perhaps has broader implications.
The Court does not deal with the question of whether there has been use of the trademark
in the U.S. per se, as required by the Lanham Act, but rather opted for the easier solution,
basing its opinion on the fact that the defendant was an American citizen, and thus has to
abide by its laws. There are still many questions that remain open after the Bulova case.
For example, it is unclear what would have been the result if the defendant had been a
foreign citizen rather than an American; what would have been the result if the parts were
not purchased in the U.S., or if no watches crossed the border to the U.S. In other words,
it is unclear whether the Court thought that American trademark law is territorial in
nature, as many consider intellectual property laws to be, or if the Court sought a more
expansive interpretation of the Lanham Act, finding it extraterritorial in scope. If we
adopt the territorial approach, we should read the decision as if it was saying that if we
take all the factors in the case together, all the activities by the defendant resulted in use
in commerce of the trademark in the U.S. (although hardly anything of substance took
place there). Another approach supposes that the Lanham Act also governs cases where
no actual use of the mark takes place in the U.S., as one might say in the situation of the
use of a mark on an out-of-state Internet server.
Indeed, later decisions of American courts read the Bulova decision in a narrow
way, limiting it to the specific facts of this case. In Vanity Fair v. T. Eaton Co.,61 the U.S.
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Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, concluded that a three factors test was relevant
under Bulova for the determination of the extraterritoriality of the Lanham Act: (1)
whether the defendant is a U.S. citizen, (2) whether the defendant’s conduct had a
substantial effect on U.S. commerce, and (3) whether there is a conflict with trademark
rights established under foreign law.62 “[T]he absence of one of the above factors might
well be determinative and . . . the absence of both is certainly fatal.”63 It should be noted;
that the Vanity Fair Court held that infringement remedies under the Lanham Act would
not be applied to acts committed by a foreign national in his home country under a
presumably registered trademark in that country.64 In the Bulova case, the Court managed
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to avoid addressing this question because subsequent to the grant of certiorari by the U.S.
Supreme Court, a Mexican court nullified the registration of the mark in Mexico.
In sum, it may be said that patent and copyright law do not apply to conduct
abroad absent some act of infringement in the U.S., whereas such a requirement does not
apply to trademark law.65 Various commentators have criticized this erosion and
abandonment of the presumption against extraterritoriality by American courts. Most
notably, Professor Curtis Bradley argues that this presumption, though losing some of its
power during the years, is still viable and “impliedly mandated by, the international law
regime governing intellectual property rights.”66 This regime is based on the two
principles of national treatment and minimum standards, which arguably support a
territorial approach to intellectual property. In addition, Bradley concludes that the
presumption is supported by principles of separation of powers that have particular force
in the area of intellectual property rights. It is argued that from an American inner
perspective, the judicial branch has no authority to engage in decisions that may influence
American foreign policies and relations with international institutions. Braldey also offers
other options to reaching foreign conduct that affects activities or has consequences in the
U.S., without incurring many of the above-mentioned problems associated with the
extraterritorial application of U.S. law. This can be achieved by actions on the part of the
political branch that should engage in activities with other governments and international
institutions, by applying the contributory infringement doctrine, or by increasing the
receptivity to claims based on foreign intellectual property law.
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In light of the above, it is clear that the tendency of some courts to apply their
own laws extraterritorially to activities taking place in other countries may have serious
implications on the likelihood that such judgments be recognized and enforced abroad,
and only complicate the pursuit for a solution to the problems addressed in this work.
6.

The Practice of Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments
To be able to address better the problems associated with recognition and

enforcement of foreign judgments, we must first take a look from a practical perspective
at the way such foreign judgments are recognized and enforced in daily practice. I have
chosen as a model the American legal system. The reason for selecting the U.S. as a
model is because the U.S. is probably the most important player in the world of
intellectual property, and it is hard to assume that any global solution can be reached
without U.S. participation. Furthermore, it is interesting to learn whether from a practical
perspective the U.S. recognizes and enforces foreign intellectual property judgments, and
what are the reasons and criteria that are used by American courts in doing so.
A.

The U.S. Model
When we talk about the recognition and enforcement of judgments in the U.S., we

have to differentiate between recognition and enforcement between the Member States of
the Union (e.g. enforcement in Florida of a judgment rendered in New York), and
enforcement and recognition by an American court of a judgment that was rendered in a
foreign country (e.g. Germany). The enforcement and recognition of judgments among
the Member States of the Union is based on the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
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United States Constitution, which requires each State to give “Full Faith and Credit . . . to
the . . . Judicial Proceedings of every other state.”67
Since the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution is inapplicable to the
enforcement of foreign-country judgments, it remains “a matter of state choice rather than
federal compulsion.”68 As a result, the question as to what criteria should be applied by
the individual states in the enforcement of foreign judgments remains unanswered, and
we can identify several differences in the roads taken by American courts.69 The U.S. has
no one national law concerning recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, and is
not a member of any international treaty dealing with this subject.70 The development of
the recognition and enforcement concept in the U.S. is very interesting and has gone
through very significant changes.
1.

The Hilton v. Guyot Decision

Some view the 1895 Supreme Court case of Hilton v. Guyot as the landmark
decision with respect to recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in the U.S.,
and even today, it is still widely quoted and referred to by courts throughout the
country.71 In fact, most of the cases described in my following empirical research
67
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INTELL. PROP. L.J. 329, 380 (2001).
71
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mention this case as a source. This ruling, however, has been highly criticized and eroded
during the years. In this case, the Court concluded that foreign judgments were entitled to
recognition on the basis of comity. The court held:
“’[c]omity,’ in the legal sense, is neither a matter of
absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy
and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition
which one nation allows within its territory to the
legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation,
having due regard both to international duty and
convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other
persons who are under the protection of its laws.”72
Eventually, the Court in this case refused to recognize the foreign judgment based
on the fact that a parallel French court would have refused to enforce a similar American
judgment in a similar scenario. This is in fact a reciprocity requirement. Many scholars
and judges reject the reciprocity requirement73 and “to date most courts in the United
States have rejected the requirement of reciprocity.”74
In a later case, Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,75 the U.S. Supreme Court held that
the Constitution obliges the federal courts to apply both the substantive laws and the
conflict of laws rules of the State in which they sit in diversity cases. Since Hilton v.
Guyot was also a diversity jurisdiction case, many federal courts believe this indicates
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that the Hilton holding does not apply anymore,76 and in the absence of a federal statute
or treaty, recognition of foreign country judgments is a matter for state law.77 State courts
have also held that since Hilton v. Guyot enunciated a rule of federal common law, it is
not binding on the States.78
In many cases, proceedings for the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments in the U.S. are brought in federal courts as diversity of citizenship cases. When
these cases involve foreign intellectual property rights, they are not held to involve
federal questions and therefore, based on the Erie doctrine they are governed by state law
rather than federal law.79 The answer is different, however, if American intellectual
property rights are involved, as these are usually considered to be federally governed
rights.
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law (1987) (the “Restatement”)
summarizes the legal roots of this concept. The official comment provides:
“Since Erie v. Tompkins . . . it has been accepted that in the
absence of a federal statute or treaty or some other basis for
federal jurisdiction, such as admiralty, recognition and
enforcement of foreign country judgments is a matter of
State law, and an action to enforce a foreign country
judgment is not an action arising under the laws of the
United States. Thus, State courts, and federal courts
applying State law, recognize and enforce foreign country
judgments without reference to federal rules. Ordinarily, a
decision of a State court granting or denying recognition to
76
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a foreign judgments is not subject to review by the United
States Supreme Court, unless the decision raises questions
under the United States Constitution.”80
2.

The Issue Preclusion Doctrine and Intellectual Property

Not always an American court will agree to recognize a foreign judgment relating
to American intellectual property rights. The reason for such refusal would be the lack of
subject matter jurisdiction on the part of the rendering court, or because it contradicts
U.S. public policy.81 There are certain situations in which an American court may give
some effect to a foreign judgment with respect to intellectual property rights. This may be
done through the application of the doctrine of “issue preclusion” or “collateral estoppel,”
which may lead a court to decide not to re-litigate certain factual issues already fairly
decided by a foreign court. This doctrine forecloses litigants from contesting matters that
were actually litigated and decided in a previous action. For the doctrine to apply the
issues raised in the earlier and later proceedings must be identical and must have actually
been litigated and decided in the earlier proceeding. Furthermore, the party to be
estopped must have had full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues in earlier
proceeding, and the resolution of issues must have been necessary to support valid and
final judgment on the merits in the earlier proceeding.82 “Issue preclusion is made
available when it is sound to do so in light of the effects on the rate of error, the cost of
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litigation, and other instrumental considerations. When there are good reasons to allow
relitigation ... preclusion does not apply.”83
U.S. courts have held that the doctrine applies to decisions of courts of foreign
countries,84 and also applies in the field of international intellectual property law. For
example, in one case, a U.S. court deciding a trademark infringement case held that the
thorough consideration and determination of certain related issues in West Germany
courts required that the parties contesting the right to use U.S. trademarks be estopped
from re-litigating the same issues before U.S. courts.85 In Pony Express Records, Inc. v.
Springsteen,86 the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey held that the question
of ownership of a certain copyrighted work had already been decided by an English court
and therefore, this question could not be re-litigated in the U.S., based on the collateral
estoppel doctrine. Interestingly, the court reached this decision despite the fact that the
plaintiffs in the U.S. proceedings were not the defendants in the English case. The court
explained that the plaintiffs knew about the English proceedings, and a license agreement
gave them an opportunity to participate and control the suit, a right, which they neglected
to exercise. This is undoubtedly an extreme use of this doctrine.
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Similarly, in Leo Feist, Inc. v. Debmar Pub. Co.,87 the District Court for the
District of Pennsylvania recognized a British judgment, and held that the doctrine of
collateral estoppel was applicable and that defendants were entitled to a summary
judgment where an English court found as a matter of fact that there was neither
conscious nor subconscious copying in a copyright infringement case. The District Court
concluded that the English court, in making that finding, applied legal principles which,
if different at all, were only very slightly different from those which would have been
applied by an American court.
Another use of the issue preclusion doctrine was made in Northlake Marketing &
Supply, Inc. v. Glaverbel, S.A.88 In this case, the court recognized a finding of a Belgian
court in litigation between the two parties that a certain British document was not to be
viewed as “prior art” with respect to the patents at issue because it had not been
previously printed or published. The court, therefore, precluded the alleged patent
infringer'
s reference to the document as prior art for purpose of the argument that the
patents were invalid. The court justified its ruling by holding that the proceedings in the
Belgian court were fundamentally fair.
3.

The Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act

Since 1962, thirty-three jurisdictions have adopted with slight variations the
proposed Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act (hereinafter the
“UFMJRA”), which was drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws and adopted by the American Bar Association in 1964. The purpose
87
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of this proposed Act was to restate the rules of recognition of judgments that have been
recognized in the U.S., and to increase the likelihood that American judgments will be
recognized in foreign countries. It does not provide a uniform enforcement procedure, but
rather provides that a judgment entitled to recognition will be enforceable in the same
manner as the judgment of a court of a sister state, which is entitled to full faith and credit
under the U.S. Constitution.89
The official Prefatory Note explains the reasons for the creation of this new
proposed Act:
“In most states of the Union, the law on recognition of
judgments from foreign countries is not codified. In a large
number of civil law countries, grant of conclusive effect to
money-judgments from foreign courts is made dependent
upon reciprocity. Judgments rendered in the United States
have in many instances been refused recognition abroad
either because the foreign court was not satisfied that local
judgments would be recognized in the American
jurisdiction involved or because no certification of
existence of reciprocity could be obtained from the foreign
government in countries where existence of reciprocity
must be certified to the courts by the government.
Codification by a state of its rules on the recognition of
money-judgments rendered in a foreign court will make it
more likely that judgments rendered in the state will be
recognized abroad.”90
Some of the states that have adopted this Act added a requirement of reciprocity,
though the proposed Act does not include one. The Act applies to judgments for the
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recovery of money. This Act recognizes a public policy exception to such recognition and
enforcement.91
4.

The Restatement

The Restatement provides that a final judgment of a foreign court that grants or
denies the award of a sum of money, or determines interests in property, is conclusive
between the parties and is entitled to recognition by courts in the U.S.92 Like most of its
international counterparts, it also provides a list of grounds for refusal to recognize such
judgments, which leaves the final decision to the discretion of the enforcing court. The
list of mandatory grounds for refusal to recognize foreign judgments concentrates on
procedural aspects such as due process of law, lack of impartial tribunals, and personal
jurisdiction. It also provides for discretionary grounds for refusing to recognize foreign
judgments, such as repugnance to the public policy of the U.S., lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, and fraud. Interestingly, the reciprocity requirement is not a part of the
Restatement or the Uniform Money Judgments Act.
Under U.S. law, American courts can either enforce judgments relating to
intellectual property rights that were given in other countries or recognize such judgments
as a basis for additional litigation concerning the dispute. The reasons for this approach
are respect for other jurisdictions and avoidance of litigating the same case twice. The
modern approach in the U.S. with regards to the enforcement of intellectual property
judgments is that “the judgment of the foreign court having jurisdiction is, subject to the
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few exceptions . . . conclusive as to the rights of the plaintiff and obligations of the
defendant.”93
There are exceptions, however, to this general rule. American courts will not
enforce judgments that were given by courts that had no jurisdiction over the defendant,
or if they were obtained by fraud or related to revenue issues.94 Another reason for
refusing to enforce foreign judgments relating to intellectual property rights is if the
judgment is repugnant to U.S. public policy.95 For example, it is unlikely that an
American court would agree to assert its jurisdiction over a foreign entity that has a
branch in a U.S. territory, if it was asked to determine the rights of this entity to
intellectual property registered in its home country.96 A different reason for refusal of
enforcement of foreign judgments is when a court renders a judgment in the absence of
subject matter jurisdiction with regards to the dispute at issue.97 Many legal systems
consider a judgment that was given by a court that had no jurisdiction over the subject
matter to be void, and thus it cannot be recognized or enforced.
The British “estoppel” theory serves as a ground for refusing to re-litigate foreign
judgments. This is a de facto recognition of the previous foreign judgment. In these cases,
the courts recognize the previous judgment because they refuse to re-litigate a matter that
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had already been resolved in the previous case. In doing so, the courts hint that relitigation of the matter might end up with a more accurate result, but they refuse to do so
because they want to avoid additional expenses, inconsistent results, and also seek to
limit the number of cases they have to decide.98 This doctrine supports primarily the first
underlying policy, previously discussed, of avoiding unnecessary waste of resources (the
economical policy). Under U.S. law, in order for the doctrine to apply, several conditions
need to be met. First, the judgment had to be fully and fairly litigated; second, the
judgment had to be actually determined; and third, it had to be necessary for the result99.
5.

Conclusions

In sum, there is lack of uniformity in the U.S. with respect to the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments. This results in a situation in which one State may
refuse to recognize or enforce a judgment, even though a different Member of the Union
would have enforced it.100 A few of the States still require reciprocity in order to enforce
foreign judgments, while others base their rules on comity, yielding a lack of uniformity
with regards to the enforcement of these judgments. However, there has recently been a
change in the American approach, and recognition that enforcement of foreign judgments
should be regulated by legislation. This should be done in order to avoid situations where
(in foreign countries that base their laws on reciprocity), an American cannot enforce a
U.S. judgment given in her favor only because the U.S. does not officially enforce or
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recognize judgments rendered in that country, but will still have to face enforcement of a
judgment in the U.S. that was rendered against her in this different jurisdiction101
The absence of a federal statute dealing with this issue encouraged the American
Law Institute (“ALI”) to engage in a new project in 1998 aimed at creating new federal
legislation to regulate the issue. This project kept in mind the evolving Hague Draft, and
resulted in the understanding that two parallel legislation proposals should be introduced.
One assumed that an international treaty was to be created as a result of The Hague Draft
negotiations, and therefore some implementing legislation would be needed. The second
proposal assumed that these negotiations would fail, and thus tried to create a new statute
that would apply and regulate recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in the
U.S., even in the absence of an international instrument. In light of the stalling in The
Hague negotiations and their apparent failure, the ALI Council advised that the project
should continue as if no international treaty would be signed, and assume that only the
second proposal would survive. On March 29, 2002, the Council submitted its proposal
for new legislation that will regulate this issue in the U.S. The proposal uses as its starting
point the UFMJRA. However, the new proposal goes beyond the UFMJRA in the kind of
judgments that it covers, as well as other subjects, such as issue and claim preclusion, lis
pendens, injunctions, and provisional measure in aid of foreign proceedings.102 ALI
believes that federal legislation would be preferable to a uniform act that would apply
state rather than federal rules. In the ALI annual meeting in May 2003 in Chicago, the
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tentative draft was discussed with respect to its content and as to whether it should
continue to be presented as a proposed statute or maybe in some alternative format.
However, neither a dispositive motion nor a proposal to Congress was made.103
B.

An Empirical Research
In order to determine whether American courts, in fact, recognize and enforce

foreign judgments, I tried to gather all the judgments addressing this issue, and involving
disputes with respect to intellectual property rights. These include federal and state
courts. I accomplished this goal by running several computer databases searches. I
limited my research to those judgments where the subject matter was one of the three
major intellectual property rights, namely copyrights, patents and trademarks.
Since the number of cases that I managed to locate was quite limited and I wanted
the research to be reliable, I included in my list those judgments that not only addressed
the recognition and enforcement issue directly, but also those that did so in an indirect
way. For example, in order to prevail in a copyright infringement case the plaintiff must
first prove ownership of the relevant copyrights, which is an incidental question to the
infringement issue. Therefore, if an American court had to decide the question of
copyrights infringement, and during this process, it had to recognize a foreign judgment
already holding that plaintiff has or does not have title to the copyrights in the relevant
work as an incidental question, such a case would be included in my research.
It was clear that American courts, as a general rule, recognize and enforce foreign
judgments of other “western countries” such as England, the E.U., Australia, Canada, and
Israel, unless the court finds a good reason not to do so. Among the cases reviewed, over
103
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78% concluded that the foreign judgment at issue should be recognized or enforced based
on the Doctrine of Comity, as set forth in the Supreme Court’s decision in the Hilton v.
Guyot case, and the Restatement. See Figure 2 below. A more detailed review of the
findings of the empirical research can be found in Appendix A.104
104

Interestingly, the initial general computer searches for cases where American courts addressed

the issue of recognition and enforcement of judgments of courts of foreign countries, resulted in a
list of over 1,500 cases. However, when the searches were limited to those cases where the
subject matter was patents, copyrights, or trademarks disputes, the list was reduced substantially
to include only 23 cases. There were, however, two additional cases in which U.S. courts refused
to recognize a judgment rendered by a foreign court. The reason for the exclusion of these two
cases was the fact that the U.S. courts found that the foreign judgments were irrelevant to the
determination of the pending dispute, because they addressed different issues. In Calzaturificio
Rangoni S.p.A. v. U.S. Shoe Corp., 868 F.Supp. 1414 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), the court refused to
recognize an Italian judgment saying that trademark rights were territorial and therefore, the
Italian judgment had no effect in the U.S. The court explained that the Italian judgment, based on
Italian law, had no effect on the evaluation of the rights to use the mark in the U.S., and that when
trademark rights within the U.S. are being litigated in an American court, the decisions of foreign
courts concerning the respective trademark rights of the parties are irrelevant and inadmissible.
Similarly, in Noone v. Banner Talent Associates, Inc., 398 F.Supp. 260 (1975), a singer brought
an action under the Lanham Act and common law unfair competition, against other members of
his former group, asking to enjoin them from using a certain name in the U.S. Before the filing of
this suit, the defendants brought another suit in England asking the singer to stop using the same
name in England. The court ignored the British action saying that it was irrelevant to the
determination in this case, because determination of trademark rights within this country is not
affected by the determination of rights in the mark in a foreign jurisdiction. It should be noted that

59

RECOGNTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF
FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

Enforced
Not Enforced

Figure 2

even if we include these two cases in the list of cases in Appendix A, despite the courts’ holdings
that they were irrelevant, the percentage of foreign judgments recognized in the U.S. is still 72%.
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For example, in the 1879 case of Lea v. Deakin,105 a trademark infringement
claim was brought with respect to the famous Worcestershire sauce. A circuit judge held
that a decree rendered by the Master of the Rolls in England and not appealed, refusing
an injunction and dismissing a bill to restrain infringement of an alleged trademark, was a
complete bar to a suit in the U.S. for the same purpose, by the same parties, against the
agent of the defendant in the English case. In Reading & Bates Const. Co. v. Baker
Energy Resources Corp.,106 a Canadian patent holder filed an action in a Texas court
seeking recognition of a Canadian judgment, awarding him damages for patent
infringement, under the UFMJRA. The court concluded that there was no reason to refuse
recognition of the Canadian judgment. It found no reason to believe that a Canadian court
would automatically refuse to enforce a foreign country judgment on the sole basis that
the damages were excessive compared to Canadian standards. It, therefore, held that the
district court erred if it concluded as a matter of law that recognition of the Canadian
judgment should be denied based on lack of reciprocity under the UFMJRA.
There were, however, cases where U.S. courts refused to recognize and enforce
foreign judgments. As I will now show in the following discussion, the reasons for the
refusal of American courts to recognize and enforce foreign judgments in the cases I
analyzed vary significantly. It does seem to me, however, that in all of these cases, the
courts were just in their reasoning, the decision had legitimate basis, and it was not
arbitrary or capricious.
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At least in one case, the court refused to recognize a decision rendered by a Dutch
court based on the due process of law exception.107 In this case, the plaintiff in the
American proceedings was not part of the Dutch proceedings and was not given the
opportunity to be heard. The Dutch court approved the sale of assets of a company in
bankruptcy proceedings taking place in the Netherlands by the trustees. Some of the
assets that were sold by the trustees based on this order were allegedly trade secrets
protected by confidentiality clause in a licensing agreement, previously signed by the
company. The defendant in the American proceedings in a claim for misappropriation of
trade secrets argued that the Dutch order should be recognized as a defense based on
comity and therefore, there was no liability for misappropriation. The 3rd Circuit rejected
this argument based on two reasons. First, the Dutch order did not specifically cover the
sale of the trade secrets. The court held that “judgment of foreign court was not entitled to
conclusive effect via comity, when domestic litigation presented a different issue.” The
second reason was that the licensor, namely the plaintiff in the American proceedings,
had no notice of the Dutch proceedings and no opportunity to be heard and therefore,
there had been a violation of due process of law and the order could not violate the
plaintiff-licensor’s rights.
The idea of using due process of law as a basis for refusing to recognize and
enforce foreign judgments is not new. In fact, nearly every attempt to create an

107

Remington Rand Corporation-Delaware v. Business Systems Inc., 830 F.2d 1260 (1987).

62

international instrument addressing this issue contains a due process exception to the
general rule of recognition and enforcement.108
Another reason that American courts have been using to justify their refusal in
certain cases to recognize and enforce foreign judgments is that of a resulting violation of
constitutional rights. As well known, the American Constitution and the rights provided
therein override all other obligations, including international undertakings of the U.S.
government; therefore, American courts will always refuse to utilize the comity principle
to recognize or enforce a foreign judgment if there is some violation of constitutional
rights. In the U.S., international obligations are undertaken by the President and share the
same status as federal legislation. Both, however, are overridden by the Constitution.109
One should not forget, however, that from an international perspective, Constitutional
rights cannot be utilized to override U.S. international obligations. When undertaking
international obligations, the U.S. should deal with this problem and reconcile its law
with international law.
One famous example of such refusal is that found in the recent Yahoo case.110 In
this case, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California was asked to
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enforce an order of a French court requiring California Internet Service Provider (“ISP”)
to block access by French citizens to Nazi material displayed or offered for sale on a U.S.
web site, including Nazi memorabilia sold in an auction. The court refused to do so and
explained that allowing this would violate the First Amendment rights of the defendant
and therefore, the judgment could not be recognized in the U.S., even though it may be
legal under French law. The “speech” at issue in this case was Internet related and
therefore, took place simultaneously in the U.S. and France. The court held that
“[a]lthough France has the sovereign right to regulate what speech is permissible in
France, this Court may not enforce a foreign order that violates the protections of the
United States Constitution by chilling protected speech that occurs simultaneously within
[U.S.] borders.”111
The court’s result in the Yahoo! Case is very problematic, since the court literally
exports the United State’s First Amendment in one of its most extreme applications to
behavior that takes place outside U.S. borders (i.e. France). The U.S. court had no right to
extraterritorially apply U.S. law. It is true that the French court had no right to regulate
activity within the U.S. and in that respect the American court’s decision was correct;
however it had the right to block access to the U.S. website from France.
The rationale in this case from the court’s perspective is quite clear. Even though
based on comity, U.S. courts tend to recognize and enforce foreign judgments, there are
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certain situations such as when the fundamental right of free speech under the First
Amendment is involved that courts give priority to the latter over any other principle.112
The main reason for refusing to recognize or enforce foreign judgments is that
involving disagreement as to the right of the rendering court to assert jurisdiction. If the
rendering court had no right to assert jurisdiction, the judgment is invalid and is not
entitled to recognition and enforcement. There seems to be almost a consensus as to the
fact that for a judgment to be entitled to recognition or enforcement in a foreign country
the rendering court must have had jurisdiction. This principle is reflected in most
international instruments regulating this issue such as the Brussels Convention and the
Lugano Convention. On the other hand, as I will later discuss thoroughly, no one seems
to be able to agree on the question as to what should be the bases for the assertion of
jurisdiction when intellectual property rights are involved. In fact, the main reason for the
failure of The Hague judgments project negotiations is the inability of the negotiating
parties to agree on bases for jurisdiction.
In the case of Calzaturificio Rangoni S.p.A. v. U.S. Shoe Corp.,113 plaintiff in a
trademark infringement case requested that a previous judgment rendered by an Italian
court be enforced in the U.S. based on the principle of comity. The dispute was over the
right to use a certain mark in the distributing and selling of Italian shoes in the U.S. An
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Italian court held that the right of the American corporation (defendant) to use the mark
in the U.S. was based on an agreement between the parties, and once the agreement was
canceled, so were the rights to use the mark in the U.S. The District Court for the
Southern District of New York held that trademark rights are territorial and therefore, the
Italian judgment had no effect in the U.S. and could not regulate the ownership or the use
of the mark in the U.S. In other words, the Italian court had no jurisdiction to hear the
case. The New York court held that “[t]he Italian court'
s adjudication of the AMALFI
mark has no application in this action. The use of AMALFI in the United States is
governed solely by the trademark laws and decisions of this country. The Italian
Judgment, based on Italian law, has no effect on the evaluation of the rights to use
AMALFI in the United States.”114 In addition, the court thought that granting comity to
the Italian judgment would offend U.S. law because “it is well-settled law that ‘when
trademark rights within the United States are being litigated in an American court, the
decisions of foreign courts concerning the respective trademark rights of the parties are
irrelevant and inadmissible.’”115
It is clear that the American court was very sensitive as to the intervention of a
foreign court in the interpretation of substantive trademark rights that have their main
effect within U.S. territory. The U.S. court was not worried about the part of the decision
that the agreement was invalid, but rather concentrated on the part of the decision that
addressed the validity and use of the right within the U.S.
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In a somewhat similar case, a New York district court refused to recognize a
British judgment addressing the issue of trademark infringement.116 In this case, a singer
brought suit under the Lanham Act and the common law of unfair competition against
other members of his former group, requesting that they be enjoined from using a certain
name in the U.S. It turned out that before the filing of this suit in the U.S., the defendants
filed a similar suit against plaintiff in England, asking him to stop using the same name in
England. All defendants and plaintiff were British citizens. The U.S. court chose to
ignore the British action saying that it was irrelevant to the determination in this case.
The basis for this decision, the court explained, was that “[d]etermination of trademark
rights within this country is not affected by the determination of rights in the mark in a
foreign jurisdiction, especially since there is no registry, and each court is dealing with its
own secondary meanings.”117 A careful reading of this case indicates that the court based
its decision on the principle of territoriality, which means that intellectual property rights
are territorial in nature and therefore, infringement of the right in one country does not
necessarily mean infringement in another country.118 The common ground for the last two
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cases is the irrelevance of the decisions in the foreign courts to the resolution of the
disputes and happenings taking place in the U.S.
Another reason for refusing to recognize or enforce foreign judgments stems from
the relations that exist between foreign courts. It is widely recognized that the court first
seized of jurisdiction should be allowed to continue hearing the case without interference
by courts in other countries. A good example of the utilization of this principle can be
found in the Globalsantafe Corp. v. Globalsantafe.Com.119 This was a trademark case in
which the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia refused to enforce a foreign
judgment rendered by a Korean court. The Korean court issued an injunction ordering the
registrant of a domain name to refrain from transferring the domain name to the plaintiff.
The American court explained its refusal to recognize the foreign judgment and to extend
comity based on the fact that the Korean injunction was rendered after an American court
had already provided judgment on the very same dispute. The court explained that
“[h]ere, acquiescence to the order of a foreign court is particularly inappropriate, since
the foreign proceeding did not commence until the matter had been fully adjudicated [in
the U.S.]. Moreover, the Korean proceeding was obviously begun with the intent of
blocking the Judgment Order, which was already announced. Thus, in this case there is
no basis for ceding jurisdiction to the Korean court, or granting deference to its order
blocking the transfer of the domain name.”
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One additional principle reflected in American courts’ decisions, is that related to
preliminary injunctions, which are rendered in a very early stage of the litigation to
preserve the status quo.120 This also is a well-recognized principle in private international
law. In a 1993 case, the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania refused to
recognize a preliminary injunction rendered by an Israeli court ordering the plaintiff to
stop the publication of certain copyrighted works.121 the District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania refused to recognize a preliminary injunction rendered by an
Israeli court ordering the plaintiff to stop the publication of certain copyrighted works.
The defendant tried to use the preliminary injunction to justify a motion to dismiss the
case based on forum non-conveniens. The court explained that this was only a
preliminary injunction, and therefore, could not prevent the American court from hearing
the case. The court explained, that “it appears . . . that an executive order, a legislative
act, or a final judicial decree is implicit in the concept of comity. In the case presently
before [this court], it is . . . inaccurate for plaintiffs to describe the Israeli proceedings as
still being in its incipient stages. Nevertheless, [the court] would also disagree with
defendant that this court should extend comity to a preliminary order. Several cases
decided by district courts have concluded that when related cases are before two different
sovereigns, the appropriate procedure is to permit both jurisdictions to proceed, with any
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decision of one becoming res judicata on the other, assuming the applicable criteria
exists.”122
These findings clearly indicate that American courts are very welcoming and have
a strong tendency to recognize and enforce foreign judgments. Furthermore, the concept
of recognition and enforcement in the U.S. is sometimes regulated by statute. For
example, the U.S. Bankruptcy Code123 provides for ancillary enforcement of foreign
bankruptcies. These are cases where a foreign bankruptcy is pending in a foreign court
concerning a certain debtor who has assets in this country. “[T]he foreign representative
may file a petition under this section, which does not commence a full bankruptcy case,
in order to administer assets located in this country, to prevent dismemberment by local
creditors of assets located here, or for other appropriate relief.”124
There are, however, cases when recognition is not allowed. The reasons for
refusal to recognize and enforce foreign judgments can be roughly divided into two broad
categories. The first category is differences in substantive laws between the U.S. and the
rendering jurisdiction, and the second category is based on public policy issues (e.g. First
Amendment - free speech argument) or because of due process problems (e.g. the losing
party did not have his day in court). The basis for the recognition and enforcement in all
the cases I reviewed was either the holding of the Hilton v. Guyot decision that I
previously discussed, or the Restatement, which justifies such recognition and
enforcement based on the principle of comity.

122

Id. at 3.

123

11 U.S.C.A. § 304.

124

See Revision Notes and Legislative Reports of the Bankruptcy Code.

70

If indeed I am correct in my findings that most of the time American courts
recognize and enforce foreign judgments when intellectual property rights are involved, it
is entirely unclear why the U.S. government does not make more efforts to conclude and
finalize an international treaty regulating this issue. The U.S. has great interest in
finalizing such an instrument because it welcomes foreign-judgments recognition in its
territory, whereas its own judgments are not necessarily provided similar treatment in
foreign countries. In other words, the U.S. should promote the creation of an international
solution to assure that other countries provide judgments rendered by its courts with the
same treatment that it already provides foreign judgments, thus avoiding putting its own
citizens and nationals at a business disadvantage.
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II.

THE AVAILABLE REMEDIES

We continuously talk about recognition and enforcement of judgments, but until
now the term judgment has not been defined and it is not entirely clear what it means in
the intellectual property context. Each judgment represent a different remedy whether in
law (e.g. money judgment) or in equity (e.g. permanent injunction).
1.

Money Judgments
Money judgments are probably the easiest ones to address. These are judgments

in which the rendering court orders the defendant to pay the plaintiff a certain amount of
money as compensation for previous wrongdoing or in restitution for unjust enrichment.
In the intellectual property context this compensation may represent, for example,
damages for the unauthorized use of copyrights in an infringement case, compensation
for the unlawful use of a protected trademark, or royalties due to the plaintiff for using a
patent without the permission of the patent holder. Other examples can be easily
provided. In cases where money judgments are involved their enforcement should be
relatively easy. The rendered judgment creates a legal obligation that should be enforced
by the enforcing court. The litigation of the underlying case ends once the judgment is
rendered. The enforcing court has no reason or mandate to look into the merits of the
case, since it does not serve as an appellate court on the decision of the rendering court.
The enforcing court cannot refuse to enforce the money judgment simply because it is
under the belief that, if faced with a similar dispute, it would have reached a different
result. The cause of action based on the judgment can be viewed as independent from the
underlying cause of action that led to the litigation of the case, namely the copyright or
trademark infringement.
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Only in rare situations may the enforcing court refuse to execute a money
judgment; the judgment usually must be enforced almost automatically. This is true not
only with respect to intellectual property law, but with respect to other fields of law as
well. The most important example of courts’ refusal to enforce foreign money judgments
is that involving punitive or excessive damages. For many years, courts around the world
refused to enforce American punitive damages awards because they argued that it
contradicted their public policies.125 The underlying policies regarding torts in the U.S.
are sometimes different from those in other parts of the world. Whereas the purpose of
damages in Europe is to compensate the plaintiff for the damages suffered, the purpose of
the American policy is also, in certain cases, to punish the tortfeasor.126 These different
approaches are also relevant for the analysis when intellectual property rights are
involved. For example, the U.S. Patent Act allows a court to award damages in addition
to compensatory damages in cases of patent infringement. These damages may increase
the awarded damages to three times the award that would have been sufficient to
compensate the plaintiff for the real damages suffered as a result of this infringement.127
It is very unlikely that courts in other parts of the world will agree to recognize such
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judgments. This is, however, an extreme example that does not necessarily reflect on the
rest.
Also, monetary judgments have extremely limited influence on the public policies
of the enforcing jurisdiction. All that it provides for is the payment of money. It does not
interfere with free speech or similar underlying policies in the enforcing jurisdiction,
which usually serve as the basis and justification for refusal to recognize and enforce
foreign non-monetary judgments, such as injunctions.
In our context, the difference between money judgments and non-monetary
judgments concentrates on the impact it has in the enforcing jurisdiction. As a general
rule, it will not be unreasonable to argue and generalize that courts are reluctant to
recognize and enforce foreign judgments when by doing so they expose their territory to
substantial influence of foreign courts. To put it in a more simple way, courts often
recognize the significance of cooperation with foreign jurisdictions for the sake of world
order, as well as the well being of their own economies, but they are also very strict about
not having others tell them what to do. To a great extent, they are correct in the sense that
a legal system is like a harmony in which every rule and regulation serves as a note.
When new notes are introduced into the composition, the harmony does not always sound
melodious any more. A legal system consists of delicate checks and balances between the
different rules, and normally interference with these rules is not welcome. When
monetary judgments are at issue, the risk of foreign interference with this delicate balance
is small and negligible. If the enforcing court orders one of its domiciliary or citizens who
has assets in its territory to abide by a foreign judgment to pay monetary compensation,
the risk to the legal system and its underlying policies is not big. It only has influence on
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the parties involved. Obviously, this is more complicated when other remedies, such as
equitable remedies are involved. In sum, it could be argued that as long as the foreign
judgment does not interfere with the internal policies and business of the enforcing legal
system, as is the case with monetary judgments, there is a very weak incentive for the
recognizing and enforcing court to refrain from doing so. As a result, monetary
judgments should be almost automatically abided by, subject to very limited exceptions.
2.

Injunctions

A.

Injunctions as an Equitable Remedy
Injunction is a remedy, which is sometimes provided by courts when other

remedies at law are inapplicable. An injunction is aimed at protecting and preventing a
threatened wrong or setting right an already inflicted injury. It orders the defendant to
cease from doing something, which may cause the future injury, or order the defendant to
initiate a certain activity. There are different kinds of injunctions and they can be
classified in several ways. There is a mandatory injunction in which the defendant is
ordered to perform a certain act, usually to correct a wrong that has already been done.
More interesting to us is the negative injunction in which the defendant is ordered to stop
doing a certain act in order to prevent future harm or wrongdoing. Another distinction can
be drawn between interlocutory (temporary) and permanent injunctions. This distinction
has significant impact on the recognition and enforcement question at issue. The purpose
of the temporary injunction is to maintain the status quo between the parties until the
dispute is finally solved. It does not solve the allocation of rights between the litigating
parties. It simply prevents any permanent injury until final resolution of the dispute by the
presiding court. A permanent injunction, on the other hand, is rendered at the end of trial
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upon final determination of the dispute on the merits. This does not mean that the
injunction can never be modified or vacated. Upon change of circumstances the order
may be changed, vacated or replaced. A permanent injunction is usually in full force until
the rendering court has vacated it, or until it has been set-aside in an appellate procedure.
B.

Extraterritorial Injunctions
In many countries, injunctions are considered to be an equitable relief. They are

usually utilized when remedies in law (e.g. monetary compensation) are not enough to
return the injured party to its original position. Not every country provides injunctions as
a remedy or relief, and even those countries that do provide it; many differ in its
application. In the U.S., for example, there are several conditions that must first be met
before a court can award equitable relief. First, there is no remedy at law. Inadequacy of
remedy at law can happen in various situations, such as when the monetary damages
cannot make the plaintiff whole due to the uniqueness of the subject matter of the
litigation, when damages are speculative and uncertain, when the defendant is insolvent
so that a judgment at law may not be collected, or in cases where the conduct of the
defendant causes irreparable harm unable to be compensated by money.
Second, since the main purpose of the equitable order is to assure that the
defendant does, or refrains from doing, a certain activity, a court is likely to refuse to
award such a remedy in those cases where it is unable to assert personal jurisdiction over
the defendant. For many years, this has been a key issue when it comes to equitable relief.
However, as I will later show, in the intellectual property context, a certain level of
erosion of this approach can be detected and there are certain cases in which courts will
award equitable relieves based on “quasi in rem” jurisdiction.
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Third, and most importantly, equitable relief must be practicable. This means that
a court will not usually award equitable relief where it has no practical means to enforce
its judgment. The court must be convinced that it has the power to compel the defendant
to comply with the judgment. Many times, the only way the court can act is to hold the
defendant in contempt. The punishment that may be inflicted on the party in contempt of
court is a fine or imprisonment or both. Therefore, when the court cannot get a hold of the
defendant, it is less likely to act. In addition, a court is more likely to act in cases where
the court can determine by itself whether its instructions in the decree are indeed fulfilled.
For many years, equitable relief has been awarded only in cases where property
rights of various kinds, such as intellectual property rights, were involved. This rule,
however, changed dramatically and today courts may award such a remedy whenever
there is a protectable interest. An equitable award is discretionary and there is no absolute
right to be granted such an award. A judgment may contain both a remedy at law and
equitable remedy, such as a money judgment compensating for past activities, as well as
an equitable remedy such as an injunction for future behavior.
In most common law systems, the remedy for non-compliance with an injunction
is contempt of court, which may even result in imprisonment, and is clearly penal in
nature. This, however, may be different in other countries, which do not recognize the
concept of contempt of court. In most of the European continental countries, the concept
of contempt of court does not exist. They use other measures to enforce such judgments.
For example, civil courts in France have been using the remedy of astreintes (periodic
penalty payments) to enforce such judgments. These coercive measures are never
intended to be penal, but rather to encourage the non-complying party to do so. Similarly,
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the concept of astreintes is recognized in Luxemburg, the Netherlands, and Belgium.
Austrian law does allow “coercive sanctions, both pecuniary and custodial, to be imposed
in cases where a judgment lays down an obligation to act which is not enforceable by
third parties and the performance of which is dependent on the will of the person liable
(unvertretbare Handlung).”128 In Germany, for example, courts have held that the purpose
of these coercive sanctions is not to penalize the defendant, but rather to encourage him
to comply with the judgment.129
One may raise the question whether the absence of the contempt of court
mechanism in some countries changes the analysis. I believe that the answer is negative.
Whether the injunction is enforced by contempt of court, as used in common law
systems, or if it is enforced by other non-penal mechanisms, such as the case in some
Civil Law countries, as long as the goal of enforcing the judgment is accomplished, the
way in which this result was achieved does not really matter. Injunctions are traditionally
rendered in disputes involving intellectual property rights, including, patents, trademarks,
copyrights, trade secrets etc. In that respect, these are usually negative injunctions, which
try to prevent the defendant from utilizing and taking advantage of the rights belonging to
the plaintiff. For example, a plaintiff may file a claim in court arguing that her patented
technological invention is utilized in a device sold to the public by the defendant who has
no license to use the patent and has not been paying royalties for this use. The court may
issue an injunction ordering the defendant to stop selling to the public or distributing any
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more of these devices. Similarly, one can ask a court to order the defendant to stop the
distribution of a book containing copyrighted materials that were not authorized for such
distribution by the defendant-writer. An example for an injunction in the trademark field
can be when the defendant opens a restaurant and uses the trademarks of one of the major
food chains, resulting in a likelihood of consumers’ confusion as to the real identity of the
restaurant and the food it serves.
Despite the increasing tendency by courts to award equitable relief, it is still less
likely to award such relief when a duty to commit certain actions in other countries is
involved, or when free speech is at issue. Things may become significantly more
complicated when the injunctions may have effects outside the rendering court’s
jurisdiction. As previously mentioned, courts are not eager to provide injunctions
ordering the defendant to do something affirmatively, or to refrain from doing something,
when it has no control over whether the order is indeed followed and complied with by
the defendant. As long as the rendering court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant
and the latter can be found in the jurisdiction of this court, enforcement will be less of a
problem since the rendering court can still utilize its enforcing mechanisms (e.g.
contempt of court) to compel the defendant to follow its orders, even if the actual
activities are taking place outside the rendering court’s jurisdiction. In addition, a court
may refuse to grant an injunction if it believes that it may cause a conflict with the laws
of the second country.
One of the problems with respect to the enforcement of foreign injunctions is the
fact that the contempt of court remedy is not always available. Unlike what many believe,
U.S. courts do recognize and enforce foreign injunctions and do not limit themselves only
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to money judgments. Such enforcement of foreign injunctions takes place based on
comity, as long as the preliminary conditions for enforcement are met. In other words, as
long as the defendant had an opportunity to be heard, the foreign court had original
jurisdiction, and the foreign decree does not offend the public policy of U.S., the
judgment shall be enforced. For example, in a recent case, a Florida District Court of
Appeals determined that “the trial court erred in denying the Plaintiffs'Motion for
Recognition and enforcement of English injunction because it is clear from the Record
before [the court] that all of the foregoing elements for comity were satisfied.”130 In
another case, a court held that an injunction rendered by a Guatemala court is entitled to
comity, where the parties had an opportunity to be heard, the rendering court had original
jurisdiction, and the injunction does not offend the public policy of the State of Florida.131
This rule of enforcement of foreign injunctions applies to intellectual property rights as
well. For example, in a 1995 case the District Court for the Southern District of New
York held with respect to a copyright infringement claim brought by a British citizen
against the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and a wholly owned Delaware
subsidiary, that “an injunction issued by an English court will be enforceable in the
United States under the doctrine of comity, provided the English proceedings were
orderly, fair and consistent with United States policy.”132
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Injunctions with respect to intellectual property rights are not a new thing and it
can be expected that the frequency in which they are awarded in the international context
will grow. This assumption is to a great extent supported by the fact that the TRIPS
Agreement addresses this issue specifically.
The TRIPS Agreement provides in Article 44(1) the following:
“The judicial authorities shall have the authority to order a
party to desist from an infringement, inter alia to prevent
the entry into the channels of commerce in their jurisdiction
of imported goods that involve the infringement of an
intellectual property right, immediately after customs
clearance of such goods. Members are not obliged to
accord such authority in respect of protected subject matter
acquired or ordered by a person prior to knowing or having
reasonable grounds to know that dealing in such subject
matter would entail the infringement of an intellectual
property right.”
“[T]he injunctions which may be granted under Article 44 are grounded upon
infringing conduct.”133 The language of TRIPS makes it clear that it addresses only
negative injunctions, namely “to desist from an infringement.” It is relatively limited in
scope and defines infringement as the entering of imported goods that involve intellectual
property rights into the channels of commerce. There is no obligation under Article 41 to
provide such a remedy. Countries that do not regularly provide such remedies have no
obligation to create such a remedy merely because of their TRIPS obligations.
Furthermore, it is clear from the language of the TRIPS Agreement that it
specifically addresses injunctions that take effect in the jurisdiction of the rendering court
and do not address extraterritorial injunctions in which the defendant is ordered to refrain
133
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from doing something in another jurisdiction. A question arises, as to whether this
arrangement in the TRIPS Agreement can also be read as prohibiting the issuance of
extraterritorial injunctions. One may argue that by positively providing for the issuance of
injunctions within the territory of the judicial authorities, it was the intention of the
drafters of TRIPS to exclude the possibility of issuing extraterritorial injunctions. I
believe that the answer to this question is negative. As previously elaborated and
explained, this agreement does not intend to exhaust the means that protect intellectual
property rights. It simply provides minimum standards for the protection of intellectual
property rights, and the Member States can provide additional measures and remedies to
accomplish this goal. There is nothing in TRIPS to indicate that the remedies it provides
are exclusive. Article 44 should be read in a narrow way and interpreted to include only
the specific scenario described therein, namely that of preventing goods that infringe
intellectual property rights from entering the channels of commerce.
Recognizing and enforcing foreign injunctions is traditionally more complicated
than recognizing and enforcing foreign money judgments. The previous analysis with
respect to money judgments changes significantly when other remedies, such as
injunctive relief or strict contractual enforcement, enter the picture. The common ground
of all of these other remedies is that they have the potential to interfere with the
underlying policies of the enforcing jurisdiction. They require the court to do something
that it would not necessarily otherwise do. They require the recognizing or enforcing
court to follow the instructions of the rendering court regarding activities that take place
in the enforcing court’s jurisdiction. Most judges do not like having others tell them what
to do in their jurisdiction, and they like it even less when the one instructing them is a
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court presiding in another country. This problem has become significantly more
complicated with the introduction of the Internet. The Internet has enabled people to
engage in activities in one country that may have a significant impact on people in other
countries, without these other countries being able to control these activities or even
prevent them from happening, or without the people conducting these activities even
intending to have this impact in other countries. This is especially true with respect to
copyright infringement or trademark violations.
Consider the following example: an American Jeans manufacturer is the only one
in the world that has the trademark L.J.Jeans and she registers the mark in different
countries. However, when she turns to ICANN and requests the permission to register the
domain name <L.J.Jeans.com>, she realizes that this domain name has already been
registered by an Italian entity that operates a pornographic website using this domain
address. She fears that if customers would type the name <L.J.Jeans.com> into their
computers, for example in searching for store locations, they would find themselves
exposed to the porn site. They may be bothered by this association and might refrain from
buying jeans carrying this logo. This may tarnish the U.S. trademark and result in
trademark violation under U.S. law simply due to the fact that American consumers can
access this website from the U.S. Assuming that the a U.S. court can assert jurisdiction,
decides the case in favor of the American jeans manufacturer, and issues a permanent
injunction against the operator of the porn website, a question arises as to the likelihood
that such an injunction would be enforced in Italy, where the server is located. This
scenario is complicated especially in cases where the laws of the enforcing country are
more liberal and allow the operation of such websites.
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When asked to enforce an injunction rendered in another country ordering the
defendant to refrain from doing something that may have some impact in the rendering
jurisdiction, the enforcing court may face the problem that by doing so, it will also force
the defendant to refrain from doing things that it is entitled to do in the enforcing
jurisdiction. In such a case, the enforcing court is faced with the dilemma of either
following the orders of the injunction, thus limiting activities that are otherwise legitimate
in the enforcing jurisdiction, or refraining from doing so, thus risking potential retaliation
from the rendering jurisdiction in future cases.
This is the exact issue raised in the Yahoo! Case.134 This case involved a claim
filed against the Yahoo! Corporation which is the owner of the website yahoo.com. This
is an American Internet website that can be accessed from France. The French court
asserted jurisdiction and issued a preliminary injunction, ordering Yahoo! to take the
necessary steps to prevent access in France to its auction site, which sells Nazi
memorabilia or other items that support Nazism or deny the Holocaust. The basis for its
decision was the fact that selling such items in France was prohibited under the law. This
case drew so much attention because it involved an American corporation, which was
required to refrain from selling such merchandise using servers that are located out of
France. Yahoo! refused to declare that it agreed to comply with the judgment and
recognition and enforcement process by a U.S. court was required. Yahoo! did decide,
however, to remove the debated websites from its servers. This, however, was not the end
of Yahoo!’s battle.
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Recently, a U.S. District Court in California held that such a judgment is
unenforceable in the U.S.135 Not surprising, the main reasoning of the U.S. court was the
argument that recognizing or enforcing such judgment is a violation of the freedom of
speech right under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The result reached by
the American court is absurd and to a great extent outrageous, especially in light of the
facts presented in this case. The American court in effect, decided to apply its First
Amendment principle of free speech extraterritorially. If we look carefully at what the
American court did in this case, we learn that it took an arrogant approach in which it told
the French court what content the French citizens, who are directly subject to its
jurisdiction, should have access to on the Internet. It should be noted that the order of the
French court specifically indicated that its order is limited to the access to the Yahoo!
website from France, and does not limit simultaneous access to this site from other parts
of the world, including the U.S. In fact, it appears from the facts that the French court
consulted an expert in the field of technology and concluded that this was technically
possible.136 This means that the Yahoo! Corporation could have limited the access to this
website from France without limiting access from the U.S., so that access to the website
to French citizens could be limited while still preserving the free speech in the U.S. The
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85

American court, however, did not take this road and assumed the role of the guardian
angel of the French people, without invitation or permission.
Other courts in Italy and Australia followed the ruling of the French court in the
Yahoo! Case, asserting jurisdiction despite the fact that they knew that any injunction
they might issue was unlikely to be enforced abroad.137 Most interesting is a Canadian
case in which the Canadian Rights Tribunal ordered a former Canadian resident, who
now lives in the U.S., to remove any anti-Semitic hate speech from a website located in
the U.S.138 The court’s view is extremely interesting in the sense that even in the
adjudication stage, it was already aware of the slim chances that such an order would be
enforced in the U.S. The court, however, decided to go ahead despite this fact because it
believed that such order even if not enforced, may have symbolic value and ultimately a
larger preventive benefit that may only be achieved by public discussion of the issue.
In sum, we can see that there is a growing inclination by courts around the world
to provide personal, extraterritorial injunctions. As one British court said:
“[T]here is no doubt that it is competent for the courts of a
particular country, in a suit between persons who are either
nationals or subjects of that country or otherwise subject to
its jurisdiction, to make orders in personam against one
such party - directing it, for example, to do something or to
refrain from doing something in another country affecting
the other party to the action.”139
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3.

Provisional Measures
Things are different when provisional measures, such as preliminary injunctions,

are involved. The reason is that they are issued before a debate as to the merits of the case
has taken place, so there is not always economic justification to do so. These measures try
to prevent the status quo from changing until a final decision of the dispute on the merits
is reached.140
The TRIPS Agreement not only addresses the issue of injunctions, but also
provides in Article 50 for the availability of provisional measures. These provisional
measures try to prevent “infringement of any intellectual property right” from occurring
and to “preserve relevant evidence in regard to the alleged infringement.” Such
provisions may be rendered ex parte if “irreparable harm”141 to the right holder is likely
to result.
Providing provisional measures without previously conducting a thorough
investigation puts the defendant at great risk, which may result in significant damage. To
minimize such risk, TRIPS allows the relevant judicial authorities to require the right
holder, before granting such an order, to provide “any reasonably available evidence” to
satisfy the rendering court that the applicant is indeed the right holder and that its right is
already being infringed, or that the infringement is imminent. In addition, before
rendering such an order, the court may require the applicant to provide security, such as a
bond, to protect the defendant against whom the order is granted from damages it might
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suffer and to prevent abuse.142 The due process rights of the defendant are also upheld by
requiring that the affected parties be provided with notice as to the measures
implemented, which provides for a process of review of the decision where the defendant
has a right to be heard, as well as a means to request that the measure be “modified,
revoked or confirmed.”143 The defendant also has the right to request the cancellation and
revocation of such measures if proceedings leading to an actual decision on the merits of
the case are not initiated within the longer of 20 working days or thirty-one calendar
days.144 If the provisional measures are eventually revoked because of any act or
omission to act by the applicant or because there has been no infringement or threat of
infringement of such right, the rendering court may order the applicant to compensate the
defendant for the damages suffered.145
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III. HARMONIZING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AS A POSSIBLE
SOLUTION
It is now time to look into the possible solutions to the recognition and
enforcement problem. As indicated before, part of the reason for the refusal of many
courts to recognize and enforce foreign judgments stems from differences in substantive
intellectual property laws. In this chapter, I will try to determine whether harmonizing
substantive intellectual property law can serve to eliminate the currently existing barriers
for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments and, by doing so, provide for the
free flow of judgments between countries.
1.

The Differences in Substantive Law Problem
Recognition and enforcement of judgments from an international perspective

usually requires us to address two related but extremely different sets of issues. On one
side, we have technical and procedural issues that we have to follow and comply with in
order to have the foreign judgment eligible for recognition and enforcement in the
enforcing jurisdiction.146 On the other side, there is a complete set of problems that we
need to address that result from the differences in substantive law between the rendering
jurisdiction and the enforcing jurisdiction.
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enforcing jurisdiction.
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Surprisingly, as I will later show, for many years all of the efforts to establish an
international mechanism for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments
concentrated on the procedural aspects of the problem rather than the substantive
differences in the law. All previous attempts tried to create sets of rules that, if followed,
would make such recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments possible. There are
numerous examples that can be provided. All previous attempts to regulate this problem
mainly deal with issues of jurisdiction and the right of the rendering court to provide such
a judgment. They do not address differences in substantive law. Differences in
substantive law have different characteristics and elements and therefore, require
different solutions.
A.

Differences in the Characteristics of the Rights Granted
For the most part, different countries recognize the same basic types of

intellectual property rights. Intellectual property rights such as patents, trademarks and
copyrights are provided by most legal systems, even though the basic conditions for the
granting of such rights may differ. This is especially true with respect to those countries
that are Members of the TRIPS Agreement, which makes it mandatory for Member
countries to provide such basic rights.147 There are, however, certain types of intellectual
property rights that are recognized under the laws of one country, but not under the laws
of others. Maybe, the most commonly known example of this phenomenon is moral
rights. Moral rights are provided for in Article 6bis of the Berne Convention. These rights
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include two significant elements - the right of attribution148 and the right of integrity,149
which are separate from the author’s economic rights in his work. Not every country
recognizes such moral rights. For example, the U.S. has refused to recognize moral rights
for many years. Due to these differences in perspective, the TRIPS Agreement
specifically excludes moral rights from its scope.150 This fact creates a reality that may
have serious implications on the ability to recognize and enforce foreign judgments. For
example, how should an American court react when asked to enforce a French judgment
that prohibits an American citizen from violating the moral rights of a French citizen in a
picture or a statue? Can the American court be expected to grant a foreign citizen rights
that the American legal system refused to grant even to its own citizens for decades?
B.

Differences in Remedies Provided
Another problem that arises in our context is the fact that the remedies granted for

infringement of intellectual property rights may differ from one country to the other. The
best example in that respect, previously discussed at length, is the injunction. Injunction
is an equitable remedy widely recognized in the Anglo-American common law legal
systems such as England and the U.S. It allows courts, under certain conditions that may
vary, to order the defendant to desist from doing certain things or force the defendant to
do other things. For example, a court may order a defendant to refrain from using a
disputed trademark in newspaper advertisements or to remove certain software from an
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Internet website, which enables others to engage in the free downloading of copyrighted
works. What should a court do when asked to enforce an injunction against one of the
citizens in the forum, if such remedy does not exist in this specific legal system?
C.

Differences in Interpreting Elements of Protection
As previously mentioned, many countries recognize various intellectual property

rights such as patents, copyrights and trademarks under international agreements. Even
though these basic rights share the same name and many times try to address the same
issue or protect the same subject matter, there are many differences between them. These
international agreements require the participants to grant such rights in their legal
systems, but address only the minimum standards to be provided. These countries must,
at a minimum, provide the standards required by the agreement, but they may provide
more extensive protection.151 The fact that different countries share the same minimum
standards but may decide, at will, to provide more extensive protection has significant
effects in the recognition and enforcement of judgments context.
Consider the following example. A court in country X is asked to enforce a
judgment rendered in country Y. The judgment provides for the payment of royalties
resulting from the utilization of a patent registered in country X. When the court in
country X reviews the foreign judgment, it realizes that one of the issues the country Y
court looked into was whether the patent was valid under the laws of country X and
compatible with its non-obviousness requirement for the grant of a patent. Both countries
have a non-obviousness requirement, but it is interpreted differently in each country.
Should the court in country X enforce the foreign judgment rendered in country Y, if it
151
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concludes that it would have reached a different decision than the one reached by the
country Y court, if asked to decide the case?
D.

Differences in Enforcement Mechanisms
One of the most fundamental differences between the American legal system and

other systems is the great reliance of the former on “private attorney generals.”
“[T]he private attorney general is someone who sues ‘to
vindicate the public interest’ by representing collectively
those who individually could not afford the costs of
litigation; and, as every law student knows, our society
places extensive reliance upon such private attorneys
general to enforce the federal antitrust and securities laws,
to challenge corporate self-dealing in derivative actions,
and to protect a host of other statutory policies.”152
Private attorney generals use private enforcement to advance the public interest in
an efficient manner that is responsive to market forces.153 Similarly, private parties,
holding rights created and protected by law, have also long protected intellectual property
rights from piracy.154 This substantial difference in attitude between legal systems results
from various reasons, such as the complexity of the legislation structure, and the
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incompetence of certain administrative agencies to regulate and more importantly enforce
those areas of the law over which they are in charge. The public sometimes views them
as instruments of the very enterprises that they were created to regulate. Such profound
differences can affect not only the way intellectual property is administered and enforced,
but also how it is written within the framework of international intellectual property law.
One may argue that the need to use private attorney generals with respect to
intellectual property rights is not as substantial as with other fields of law, such as
antitrust or environmental law, because intellectual property rights are private property
rights, and therefore, fewer public policies are involved. This argument is only partly
correct, and since the introduction of the Internet has been substantially limited. It is
almost an “axiom” that governments and public organizations are incompetent in
regulating the Internet and copyright infringement therein. Assuming that we want to
advance the essence of intellectual property protection on the Internet,155 maybe the only
way to do so is by using private attorney generals like in the famous Napster litigation,156
155
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where the record companies took it upon themselves to fight the war against music file
sharing on the Internet.
2.

The Theoretical Potential Solution
Some believe that the real question underlying the issue of recognition and

enforcement of foreign judgments is that dealing with the differences in substantive law
rather than those issues involving procedure. The reason for this assumption is simple. As
long as “major” differences in substantive laws exist, the chances that a court in one
country would agree to recognize or enforce a judgment of a foreign country, even if all
procedural requirements are met, are not high. It is argued, that as a result of the
differences in substantive law, the enforcing court will always find a way to refrain from
recognizing or enforcing the foreign judgment. The enforcing court would presumably be
less eager to enforce a foreign judgment knowing that it would have reached a different
result if faced with a similar dispute. I use the term “major” only to indicate that complete
identity between the renderings and enforcing legal systems is not required and in no way
should even be expected. No legal system is identical to the other, and each emphasizes
those different aspects that it views as the most important. There must be, however, a
great deal of resemblance between the legal systems under this theory. Arguably, if we
can overcome the differences in substantive law, the issues of procedure can be easily
solved.
Theoretically, if the rendering forum and the enforcing forum share the same laws
and principles, the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments should be
significantly easier than what our current experiences indicate. Since the result reached
by the rendering court in its analysis should be similar to that of the enforcing court, if
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faced with a similar dispute because they both apply similar laws, there is really no
reason for the enforcing court to refuse doing so. In other words, “recognition of an
adjudication that applies the same regulating rule as would be applied by the recognizing
community involves fewer difficulties than recognition of an adjudication in which
another regulating rule has been applied.”157 This means that the plaintiff does not gain
any substantive advantages by deciding to file the claim in a certain forum, as the two
forums apply the same rule to solve a similar dispute.158
The underlying argument made by many scholars in that respect is that many of
the problems that arise when trying to enforce a foreign judgment involving intellectual
property rights shall be eliminated once the gaps in substantive laws are bridged.159 Paul
Berman argued that “[o]ne obvious response to the challenges of globalization and online
communication is to seek increased international harmonization of legal regimes. After
all, if a universal substantive law were applied around the world, many of the concerns
about borders, conflicting law, and impermissible extraterritorial regulation would
disappear.”160
What the proponents of this argument are trying to do is to solve private
international law problems by utilizing public international law mechanisms to harmonize
157
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substantive intellectual property law. They base this attempt on the notion that
“[t]reatment by public international law has the capacity to reduce the importance of
private international law,”161 because courts are more reluctant to interfere with
agreements and activities that are being addressed by governments, and also because by
reaching an understanding and agreement on the applicable standards of protection, it can
be expected that the number of disputes shall be reduced.162
The logic behind this argument is based on the assumption that if there are no
substantive differences between the legal system of the rendering court and that in which
the enforcing court sits, there is no reason for the enforcing court to refuse or refrain from
enforcing the underlying judgment. It would be much easier for the enforcing court to do
so if it knows that it would have rendered a similar judgment while faced with the same
set of facts. In addition, the rendering court will be less hesitant to apply foreign laws in
intellectual property infringement cases, if it has a reason to believe that the laws are
substantially harmonized.163
Furthermore, one may argue that we can gain the same benefits even if we do not
have a single worldwide intellectual property regime that governs all countries, as many
might have wished for as a utopian solution for many years, but rather, have only a set of
independent territorial rights that are all substantially similar.
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3.

Harmonization of Intellectual Property – An Overview
Imagine the following perfect world:
“A unified international legal system with trans - or
nonnational courts and a single set of substantive and
procedural laws and rules would have a high degree of
uniformity and predictability. Everyone would know what
to expect because all the world'
s legal disputes would be
tested by the same rule set. Borders would lose their
importance and national character would become
irrelevant.”164
Is this really a perfect world? It is not that certain. A harmonized world where

everyone shares the same ideas, and citizens have no say on issues of governance is far
from perfect and has never succeeded in the past. Self-determination, democracy and
self-governance are things most people have aspired for throughout history, and it is hard
to believe that they will easily give them up. Independence and self-government, political
or otherwise, is the result of the fact that people like to determine themselves in other
ways than others do. They want to determine themselves differently because they want to
advance other principles and other thoughts, and because they do not share the same
cultural, historical, economical and political heritage. Independence of thoughts and selfgovernment can probably be achieved only through local government, which is in direct
contradiction to the idea of harmonization.
Can we solve the recognition and enforcement problem by trying to eliminate and
bridge gaps of substantive intellectual property law?
In order to answer these questions we must first look into the attempts that were
made to harmonize substantive intellectual property law throughout the years, and
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analyze whether these attempts changed the way judgments in this field are recognized
and enforced today.
Ever since the 1880s, intellectual property law has been undergoing heavy
regulation in the public international sphere. Hardly any other field of law has so many
international treaties and other instruments regulating it. This is an attempt on the part of
different countries to assure international protection to their inventors, producers, and
authors outside their political borders. Most of these international treaties and agreements
have some kind of enforcement mechanisms that can be utilized to enforce the standards
set forth therein against any breaching country. These attempts, as I will discuss below,
advance in several directions. These include efforts to harmonize territorial intellectual
property laws, creation of international power to grant intellectual property rights, and
creation of systems aiming to uniform jurisdiction and choice of law rules.165
A.

Patents
Harmonization of patent laws finds its roots in the late nineteenth century, in the

adoption of the Paris Convention. This was the first global effort to address the protection
of industrial property from an international perspective by creating a Union for the
protection of patents, trademarks, service marks, designs and other industrial property.
This convention introduced two new terms that, as of that day, serve as
cornerstones for the development of the modern system and organization of international
intellectual property, namely “national treatment” and the “right of priority”.
Article 2(1) of the Paris Convention establishes the idea of national treatment by
providing:
165
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“Nationals of any country of the Union shall, as regards the
protection of industrial property, enjoy in all other
countries of the Union the advantages that their respective
laws now grant, or may hereafter grant, to nationals; all
without prejudice to the rights specially provided for by
this Convention. Consequently, they shall have the same
protection as the letter, and the same legal remedy against
any infringement of their rights, provided that the
conditions and formalities imposed upon nationals are
complied with.”
This means that each Member of the Union has to grant to all nationals of the
Members in the Union the same rights that they give to their own nationals. This
provision aims at creating a system under which every Member country shall protect
intellectual property rights without discrimination against foreign nationals.
Another feature contained in the Paris Convention, which aims at harmonizing
international industrial property law, is the “right of priority” provided for in Article 4.
Some consider this to be the most fundamental right in the Paris Convention.166 This right
provides a right holder with a grace period of one year in which she can apply for the
same patent in another Member state using the day of application in the first country as
the day of application in the second country as well. This means that it would be enough
to file for a patent or mark in one country in the Union in order to enjoy the same day in
other Member states during that year. This feature enables the right holder to utilize the
protection in the original country of application, during the grace period, for the purpose
of examining the economic benefits of the patent, and designing the patenting strategy
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before engaging in the expensive process of seeking similar patent protection in other
countries167.
The Paris Convention was only the first step in the harmonization process of
industrial property. Even though it provided nationals of Member states with the right of
priority and national treatment, it did not solve the problem of the need to apply for a
separate patent in each of the countries where protection is sought. Application for a
patent is an extremely expensive process, which can result in a significant waste of
resources. The Patent Cooperation Treaty168 (“PCT”) tried to solve the above problem by
creating a mechanism that enables an applicant to file for a patent one time, in one of few
designated patent offices, but still enjoy protection in several countries, according to what
she requested in the application. The declared purpose of this treaty was to “constitute a
Union for cooperation in the filing, searching, and examination, of applications for the
protection of inventions, and for rendering special technical services.”169
This treaty, however, only simplifies the application process. It does not simplify
the granting process, which is conducted separately in each patent office. Therefore, one
can file for a patent in several countries using one application, but the application will be
reviewed separately in the patent office of each of these countries, and upon approval will
be granted a separate patent in each of these countries. In addition, this treaty does not
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harmonize the rules under which the application is being reviewed in each Member state,
and most importantly, the requirements of patentability. As a result, the PCT, which
contains some substantive provisions regarding the international phase of an application
for an international patent, does not prevent its members from applying their own
substantive patent law provisions during the national phase of the international patent
application, or when they examine national applications for patents.
The real first attempt to create a system in which not only a uniform application
for patents process is created, but also a uniform review and granting process is
established, was made in the Convention on the Grant of European Patents170 (“EPC”).
This EPC provides for a centralized filing of patent applications in the European Patent
Office, and review and grant of a European Patent at the end of the process. This means
that if one desires to have a similar patent registered in more than one of the European
Members of the Convention, only one central application needs to be filed in the
European Patent Office. The staff in the office then reviews the application, reviews
whether the subject matter is patentable under the provisions of the Convention and
grants the patent. It should be emphasized that the name “European Patent” is somewhat
misleading because what the applicant receives is not a single European patent, but rather
separate but similar national independent patents in each of the requested countries.171
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National laws in each of the Member states govern questions regarding infringement of
the patent. “In other words the European Patent Convention provides for a unitary
procedure for patent application, patent granting and post-grant patent opposition and, to
a large extent, refers to the national law of the Contracting State for patent infringement
matters.”172
A significant implication of this Convention is the fact that it changes the
substantive requirements for the granting of a European Patent in comparison to the
requirements in national laws. The Convention provides that “European Patents shall be
granted for any inventions which are susceptible of industrial application, which are new
and which involve an inventive step.”173 In other words, the Convention requires the
proof of four elements: invention, novelty, inventive step or non-obviousness, and
industrial applicability. These requirements are different, to some extent, from the
requirements for patentability in each of the separate individual systems. The German
patent system, for example, also requires the proof of “technical progress.” The result is
that one can register a patent in Germany through the pipeline of the EPC that she may
not have been able to register if applied for the patent directly in Germany, because it
contains no technical progress.174
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The most important attempt to harmonize patent law is the TRIPS Agreement.
This agreement was adopted in 1994 as part of the creation of the World Trade
Organization (WTO).175
“As is now widely known, the TRIPS component of the
WTO Agreement represented a revolution in international
intellectual property law. Although it built on the Paris and
Berne conventions of 1883 and 1886, respectively, TRIPS
went well beyond the original anti-copying objectives of
the drafters. It imposed a comprehensive set of relatively
high international minimum standards governing
copyrighted literary and artistic works (including computer
programs), rights related to copyright law (including sound
recordings), patents, trademarks, geographical indications
of origin, trade secrets, industrial designs, integrated circuit
designs and even (indirectly) unfair competition. It does not
cover competition law, as such, although it touches on
related issues, especially licensing agreements.”176
TRIPS extended the minimum standards referred to in the Berne Convention and
the Paris Convention to other nations that became part of the WTO and were not
previously Members of these instruments. This means that “Members are not obliged to
implement in their laws, more extensive protection than is required by the TRIPS
Agreement.”177 Members, however, remain free to implement the provisions of TRIPS in
their own legal systems as they see fit. Unlike the Berne Convention and the Paris
Convention, TRIPS provides us with new mechanisms for the enforcement of patents and
copyrights. Though there is still much left for national consideration, the new
international standards and rules narrowed the place for national policy.
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The Patent Law Treaty178 (“PLT”) adopted at Geneva on June 1, 2000 was drafted
under the auspices of WIPO. This treaty concentrates mainly on harmonizing procedures
relating to regional and national patent applications, and maintenance of patents. This
includes obtaining a filing date, representation of applicants, electronic filing, and
extension of time limits.
“The PLT is designed to streamline and harmonize formal
requirements set by national or regional Patent Offices for
the filing of national or regional patent applications, the
maintenance of patents and certain additional requirements
related to patents or patent applications, as for example
communications, representation or recordation of changes
concerning patents and patent applications. Its provisions
refer as much as possible to the provisions of the Patent
Cooperation Treaty (PCT) and its Regulations in order to
keep the Treaty as simple as possible and to avoid creating
different international standards regarding patent
formalities with respect to national and to international
applications. The harmonization of procedures under
national laws is expected to result in easier access to
worldwide patent protection and cost reduction for
applicants in those procedures. It should also reduce the
administrative costs of Patent Offices of both industrialized
and developing countries, the benefit of which could be
passed on to applicants in the form of lower fees.”179
During the year 2001, Member States of WIPO started negotiating the possibility
of harmonizing substantive patent law. The goal was to create a basis for a more
predictable and cost-effective patent system.180 The first draft of the Substantive Patent
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Law Treaty (SPLT), discusses several of the main issues involved in the grant of a patent
such as, the definition of prior art, the novelty requirement, inventive step, otherwise
known as non-obviousness, industrial applicability (utility), sufficiency of disclosure, and
the structure of interpretation of claims. The current differences between the various
regimes resulted in a situation where one country will grant a patent to a certain
invention, while another country with a different patent regime will not grant a patent for
the exact same invention. Furthermore, the lack of harmonization is leading to a waste of
money and other resources, since the application for a patent needs to be duplicated.
This WIPO initiative is aimed at creating a more predictable, cost-effective and
uniform patent system.181 It adds to the already existing international instruments aimed
at doing so, such as the PLT and the PCT, which contain some substantive provisions
regarding the international phase of an application for an international patent, and do not
prevent its members from applying their own substantive patent law provisions during the
national phase of the international patent application, or when they examine national
applications for patents.
As of now, the Members agreed upon several issues. First, it was agreed to create
a seamless interface between the already existing PLT and PCT and the new substantive
treaty with respect to the filing, researching, examining and granting of a patent. The idea
is to integrate the provisions of the new SPLT with other international instruments.
Therefore, the contracting parties of the new treaty will have to comply with the formality
requirements of the PLT. Second, the contracting parties will have to comply with the
181
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provisions of the PCT with respect to claims, descriptions, drawings and abstracts of the
applications. This treaty is aimed at creating an international mechanism that will enable
people to file patent applications that will grant them patent protection in several
countries. This mechanism will generate significant cost savings for patent offices around
the world. The most recent draft of this proposed treaty was introduced by WIPO on
March 3, 2003.182
B.

Copyrights
Professor Ginsburg describes “international copyright law” as “a giant squid,

whose many national law tentacles emanate from but depend on a large common body of
international norms.”183
The Berne Convention was the first major international instrument that attempted
to harmonize the issue of the protection of literary and artistic works. It was the U.S.
decision to join the Berne Union that made it the cornerstone agreement in the field of the
protection of international copyright.184 This Convention advances the idea of “national
treatment,” which requires each of the Member States to grant to works originating in
other Member states the same copyright protection it provides to its own nationals.185
Furthermore, the Berne Convention establishes the concept of minimum standards, which
182
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require the Member States to provide minimum levels of protection. This was the actual
step that forced and triggered many countries to engage in the process of harmonizing
their copyright protection laws.
The Berne Convention protects literary and artistic works, including “production
in the literary, scientific and artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or form of its
expression.”186 The Convention provides a list of works that are protected such as books,
pamphlets, dramatic works, cinematographic works, paintings, and architecture. The
extent of protection under the Berne Convention includes the right of translation,
adaptation, public performance, public recitation, broadcasting and the film rights for the
work. The protection rendered under the Berne Convention is automatic with respect to
works originating in the Member States and no formalities are required as a prerequisite.
Protection under the Convention is granted for the life of the author plus fifty years, even
though Members may elect to provide for longer periods of protection.187 Anonymous are
protected for fifty years from the date of publication and works of applied art and
photographs are protected for at least twenty-five years.
Based on the territoriality concept, the Berne Convention provides its protection
based on the country of origin of the work, which is generally the country of first
publication. If a work is first published in one of the Member States, it is entitled to
protection in all other Member States. If the work is simultaneously published in a
Member State and a non-Member State, the date of publication in the Member State is the
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date of first publication, and if the author is a national of a Member State the work is
granted protection even if the work is first published outside the Berne Union.188
The Universal Copyright Convention189 was created after the conclusion of World
War II. It aimed at enabling the U.S. to participate in a multinational convention for the
protection of copyrights other than the Berne Convention. It protects literary, scientific
and artistic works,190 but does not include photographic works, sound recordings and
works of applied art. The Universal Copyright Convention also adheres to the doctrine of
national treatment,191 but provides a shorter list of minimum standards than the one
provided for by the Berne Convention by which the Member countries should comply.
The Convention requires the Members to provide a minimum term of protection of
twenty-five years from the death of the author or the first publication or registration of the
right.192 It protects the economic interests of the author, including the rights of
reproduction, public performance and broadcasting.193 Since the U.S. is a member of the
Convention it does not protect moral rights. It provides protection to works created by
nationals of the countries that are Members of this convention, and works that are
published in the Member States without consideration of the nationality of the author.194
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In order to eliminate the possibility that Members of the Universal Copyright
Convention, who are also Members of the Berne Convention, might decide to halt their
membership in the Berne Union since it provides for more extensive copyright protection
and more responsibilities on its Members, it was forbidden that these countries do so.
Therefore, a country that is a Member of the Universal Copyright Convention as well as
the Berne Convention, must comply with the requirements of the Berne Convention in its
relations with other Berne Members who are also Members of the Universal Copyright
Convention.195
The International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of
Phonograms, and Broadcasting Organizations196 (the “Rome Convention”) recognizes
international performance rights in sound recordings under a neighboring right regime. It
provides rights to performers, producers, and broadcasting organizations.197 The U.S.
decided not to join this Convention for several reasons. First, this Convention has not
been updated, and second, it lacks the ability to keep up with changes in modern
technology. Rights granted under this Convention are limited to reproduction, public
performance, and broadcasting.198 In addition, it was argued that the U.S. cannot be
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expected to revise its copyright law to meet the minimum standards of this Convention,
and thus it is unlikely that it will join it in the future.199
The Convention for the Protection of Producers and Phonograms against
Unauthorized Duplication of Phonograms200 (“Geneva Phonograms Convention”)
protects the producers of phonograms against the duplication of their works that were
distributed to the public.201 Since this is quite similar to U.S. copyright law, there was no
objection on its part to join the Convention. However, this Convention does not grant
performance or performers’ rights. It leaves the decision of whether to grant these rights
to the discretion of each of the Member States.202 It should be remembered that American
citizens are not granted any performance rights in sound recordings outside the borders of
the U.S. since, as mentioned above, the U.S. is not a member of the treaties that do
provide such protection.
The most important effort to harmonize copyright law was made in the drafting of
the TRIPS Agreement. The TRIPS accord, which was adopted as part of the creation of
the World Trade Organization (WTO), extended the minimum standards referred to in the
Berne Convention to other nations that became part of the WTO and were not previously
Members of the Berne Convention. TRIPS adheres to the principle of national treatment
199
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previously described and requires all its Members to comply with the provisions of the
Berne Convention, other than the protection of moral rights.203 There are two major
additions to the copyright part of TRIPS that had not previously appeared in the Berne
Convention. These are the protection of computer programs, whether in source or object
code, as literary works,204 and the protection of the selection and arrangements of data or
other materials in compilation. The TRIPS Agreement also introduces the notion of rental
rights (prevention of renting to others) for computer programs, sound recordings and,
under certain circumstances, cinematographic works.205
The TRIPS Agreement changes the period of protection under the Berne
Convention rendered for copyrighted works.206 A significant addition that TRIPS brings
with it is the protection through copyrights or neighboring rights given to performers
against unauthorized broadcast or unauthorized broadcast fixation of their live
performances, as well as protection to producers of sound recordings against
unauthorized reproduction.207 Finally, it provides broadcasters or owners of copyrights in
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broadcasts with protection against unauthorized fixation, reproduction and rebroadcast of
the protected work.208
This approach has been further reiterated by the new WIPO Copyright Treaty
(“WCT”),209 which has banned the circumvention of technological protection measures,
and the tampering with copyright management information.210 This treaty was
constructed as a protocol to the Berne Convention.211 The WCT has several purposes.
First, it recognizes the protection of computer programs “whatever may be the mode or
form of their expression.”212 Second, it recognizes broad public distribution rights for
copyright owners, and the right to control any copying of the works in digital form.213
Third, it acknowledges the exclusive right of the copyright owners to control the public
communication of their works including the Internet.214 Fourth, it makes it illegal to
interfere with the integrity of “rights management information”.215 Most importantly, it
requires member countries to provide “adequate legal protection and effective legal
remedies against the circumvention of effective technological measures”216 introduced to
208

See Article 14 (2) of the TRIPS Agreement.

209

The WIPO Copyright Treaty, Geneva, December 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. (1997).

210

See Article 12 of the WCT.

211

See Article 1 of the WCT.

212

Article 5 of the WCT.

213

See Article 6 of the WCT.

214

See Article 8 of the WCT.

215

Carolyn Anderpont, Digital Millennium Copyright Act: Copyright Protections for the Digital

Age, 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 397, 401-402 (1999).
216

Article 11 of the WCT.

113

protect copyright holders from infringements of their work. In addition, the WCT allows
its Members to continue to apply and even add new limitations and exceptions (e.g. fair
use) to the exclusive rights of the copyright holders.217
C.

Trademarks
International trademark regulation finds its origins in the Paris Convention. It

requires the Member States to provide nationals of other Member states with the same
level of trademark protection as they provide to their own nationals, based on the concept
of “national treatment.”218 Furthermore, nationals of non-Member States that are
domiciled or have real, effective industrial or commercial establishments in one of the
Member States are entitled to the same treatment as nationals of the Member states.219
The substantive standards that the Paris Convention provides with respect to trademarks
are fewer than those provided for patents. The Paris Convention requires its Members to
provide a registration system for trademarks, and requires its Member States to register
marks duly registered in other Member States where the applicant is a national,
domiciliary or maintains a business establishment. There are limited exceptions to this
general rule in cases where the newly registered mark infringes pre-existing trademarks,
when non-distinctive marks are involved, and in cases where the marks are immoral or
deceptive to the public.220
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The Paris Convention regulates the issue of the filing dates in the various
countries. Once a mark is registered in one of the Member countries, the owner of the
mark receives a priority as to this mark for a period of six months.221 This is otherwise
known as a “right of priority.” If the owner of the mark files additional applications in
other Member States within this six months period, he enjoys the same application date of
the original application. This would be extremely useful in those countries, which
adopted the “first to file” system, since it provides the applicant with an advantage over
domestic applicants who applied for a similar mark during the period between the
original filing date in the foreign country and the later local application by the same
applicant in the second country.
As is the case with patents and copyrights, the TRIPS Agreement also regulates
international law regarding trademarks. TRIPS requires all WTO Members to provide
registration for service marks and trademarks, publish the registered marks, and provide
an option for opponents to object to such registration.222 Infringement of trademarks
under TRIPS is based on international “likelihood of confusion” standard, and a
presumption of infringement is established if a mark is identical to another mark and used
with identical goods or services.223 It also provides remedies that should be provided in
intellectual property rights infringements, including trademarks. With respect to the
international registration of marks, the leading and most important elements are those of
the Madrid System (“Madrid System”). There are two treaties that govern the Madrid

221

See Article 4 (C) of the Paris Convention.

222

See Article 15 of the TRIPS Agreement.

223

See Article 16 of the TRIPS Agreement.

115

System: The Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks of
April 14, 1891224 and the Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the
International Registration of Marks of June 28, 1989.225 The Madrid System creates a
mechanism where persons or entities that are domiciled or are nationals of one of the
participating countries can enjoy trademark protection in several countries of the Madrid
Union by filing a single application. Under the Madrid System, the applicant files for
trademark protection in one trademark office (“Office of Origin”) and then enjoys similar
protection in other countries. After the Office of Origin presents an application for
international registration to the International Bureau and the mark is in compliance with
the applicable requirements, the mark is recorded and published in the WIPO Gazette of
International Marks.226
The advantages of the Madrid System are significant and obvious.
“After registering the mark, or filing an application for
registration, with the Office of origin, he has only to file
one application and pay fees to one office and in one
language, instead of filing separately in the trademark
Offices of the various Contracting Parties in different
languages, and paying a separate fee in each Office. Similar
advantages exist when the registration has to be renewed or
modified. . . International registration is also to the
advantage of trademark Offices. For example, they do not
need to examine for compliance with formal requirements,
224
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PROTOCOL,

available

at

or classify the goods or services, or publish the marks.
Moreover, part of the fees collected by the International
Bureau is transferred to the Contracting Parties in which
protection is sought. Furthermore, if the International
Registration Service closes its biennial accounts with a
profit, the proceeds are divided among the Contracting
Parties.”227
The U.S never adopted the two instruments establishing the Madrid System.
However, a major shift in that direction has taken place in the year 2002 when President
George W. Bush signed the implementing legislation to do so; as of November 2003,
U.S. corporations are authorized to file an international application and receive
simultaneous protection of their marks in over 55 States.228
4.

Conclusions
The above overview of the harmonization of international intellectual property

law provides us with some indication as to the different tendencies that characterize this
process. It is clear that the harmonization process has developed in different directions.
The different conventions attempt to determine the minimum standards for protection,
which require their Members to provide similar minimum levels of protection within their
political borders. These minimum standards not only define the specific rights granted to
the holder of the intellectual property right (e.g. rental rights), but also extend the scope
of protection by adding new subject matter (e.g. computer programs). Member states are
free to provide even more rights than required by these conventions, but in many cases
need to provide nationals of other Member States with similar protection based on the
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concept of national treatment. In short, the system tries to provide everyone with the
same minimum rights and welcomes the granting of even better protection. In that respect
it is interesting to see that the system, to a great extent, tries to adjust itself to new
technological developments as they arise and tries to answer newly arising questions. For
example, the WIPO Copyright Treaty attempts to solve problems that result from the
creation of new technologies that circumvent methods for the protection of copyrighted
works.
The current international system does not solely address the issue of substantive
intellectual property protection. Rather, most instruments regulate the registration of
intellectual property rights, such as patents and trademarks, in an attempt to enable one to
file an application for intellectual property rights in one territory, but still enjoy
protection in multiple jurisdictions, or even being able to file one application that would
provide the owner of the right with protection all around the world.
As I previously mentioned, there are some who argue that by harmonizing
substantive intellectual property laws we may be able to solve the problem of recognition
and enforcement of intellectual property judgments. They argue that under such a system
there shall be no substantive differences between the rights granted under the various
legal regimes and therefore, there shall be no justification for different results. In other
words, in such a system the enforcing court would have no objection to the recognition
and enforcement of the foreign judgments because the enforcing court would have
reached the same result as that provided by the rendering court if asked to decide the case
because they both apply the same standards. This theory, as tempting as it may sound, is
incorrect for several reasons.
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It is a fact that most of the relevant international treaties regulating this issue go a
long way to harmonizing intellectual property laws, and this process is expected to
continue. These instruments, however, only provide for minimum standards and there is
no indication of this changing any time soon. This means that each of the participating
countries is obligated to provide minimum protection as provided in the treaty, but is free
to provide additional or stronger protection. Therefore, even though all Member countries
presumably provide similar protection, significant differences in this protection still
remain.229 “These agreements impose minimum standards, not uniform law and,
therefore, do not prevent conflicting outcomes.”230 As a result, there may be situations
where a judgment that is rendered in one country, which recognizes very broad
protection, may not be enforced in another country, which provides narrower protection,
despite the fact that the latter is still in compliance with the minimum standards of the
relevant agreement.
Furthermore, some of these instruments leave different areas to the discretion of
the participating countries and allow them to implement their own cultural, economical
and social priorities and philosophies.231 These differences are sometimes so inherent in
the legal system at issue, that they can be traced back hundreds of years. For example, the
American legal system contains elements and features that simply do not exist in other
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legal systems such as discovery,232 depositions,233 allowing jury trial in civil cases,234
punitive damages235 and contempt of court.236 Similarly, as previously discussed, the U.S.
utilizes “private attorney generals” to enforce public policies that the governing
administrative agencies fail to enforce for various reasons.237 These substantial
differences in the administration of the law can, to a great extent, be explained by these
background and historical differences. Some of these features were simply created
because a need arose to resolve certain problems that were detected in these legal
systems. For example, one can explain some of the above features contained in the
American legal system by referring to the growing need to rely on private parties to
enforce rights under public law, when the public agencies initially intended to take this
role neglect to do so.238
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Despite the extensive attempts to harmonize intellectual property law, there are
still many issues that are left open and have not been harmonized yet: the system still has
a long way to go. For example, we still do not have a system for the registration and
granting of an international patent similar to the one available in Europe for the grant of a
European Patent under the EPT. It would not be unreasonable to predict that there is still
a long way to go until we will manage to completely harmonize intellectual property law.
The harmonization process has been continuing for over a hundred years and will
probably continue for many years to come. As a result, the prospects that complete
harmonization will be achieved in the near future is very unlikely, so that the basis for
this theory disappears.
I further argue that even if the differences between the various legal systems shall
be significantly reduced in many respects, or even completely disappear at one point,
thanks to harmonization, the problem will not be entirely solved due to the concept of
territoriality. The territoriality character of intellectual property rights is broader than
only limiting the effects of the right to the geographical territory or borders of the country
in which the right is granted or registered. Rather, it also includes the “principle of
independence.” This means that parallel rights (i.e. similar rights granted in different
territories and protecting the same subject matter), exist separately in these territories.
Therefore, changes (both in the language of the statute and in case law interpreting the
statute) in one territory have no influence in other territories.239 In other words, even if we
assume, unreasonably as this may sound, that two legal systems follow the substantive
rules of the TRIPS Agreement and create two legal systems that are completely identical
239
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verbatim, this still does not mean that the courts in these two countries will reach the
same result when facing a similar dispute. Judges and courts in each of these countries
will introduce into their analysis the underlying policies and ideals of their respective
legal systems and reach a conclusion, which best supports these principles.
Christopher Wadlow best described this problem.
“There is a central core to the principle of territoriality
which is that each sovereign state sets its own laws within
its own territory. Territoriality may therefore be
consistent with a state attaching legal consequences to
acts taking place abroad, if they have sufficiently serious
effects at home, as is already accepted in the closely
related field of competition law. Conversely, territoriality
in the narrow sense need not be inconsistent with foreign
courts enforcing intellectual property rights existing in
other states, to the extent that specific conventions or
international usage allow them to assert jurisdiction.
When the dust has settled, it will probably be realized that
territoriality and the multinational enforcement of
intellectual property rights in one set of proceedings are
perfectly compatible with one another in principle. What
makes the two incompatible in practice – apart from
major differences in civil procedure and remedies – is the
comparative law of intellectual property, under which
laws which look very similar in theory may be very
different in application.”240
To better explain this point, consider the following example. Two countries
recognize the “fair use” exception to copyrights. The laws of both countries about this
issue are identical. Both countries use the language of Section 107 of the U.S. Copyright
Act241 to address this issue. The courts of both countries are requested to declare that the
photocopying and dissemination of booklets, which contain excerpts from different
copyrighted works for educational purposes, result in copyright infringement. Both courts
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analyze the case under the four listed factors mentioned in their laws. They check the
purpose and character of the use, the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the work, and the nature of the copyrighted work. Theoretically
both courts are expected to reach the same conclusion since they are faced with identical
facts and follow the exact same laws. Nevertheless, it would not be surprising if each of
these courts reaches a different conclusion and the reason is simple. For instance, one
court may view copying of 20% of a work for educational purposes as infringing the
copyrights, while a different court in a country that puts more emphasis on education may
view copying of even 40% as fair use. The role of courts, when a statute regulating the
subject matter at issue is in existence, is not to create new laws but rather to interpret
them. The process of interpretation involves a great deal of discretion, which affects the
final result. Interpreting a statute involves utilizing different tools that may reflect the
underlying policies and ideas of the relevant legal system. This is the exact point that I
am trying to make. Harmonization of substantive laws will only provide partial solution
to these problems, as long as courts still have discretion in interpreting these laws, and
there is no indication that anyone will be willing to give up this discretion at the near or
even distant future.
Consider another example: in all countries, circumvention of technological
measures, which prevent copyrighted works from being copied, is prohibited. However,
in some countries courts recognize the rights of engineers to use reverse engineering or
de-compilations to make computer software interoperable with each other, while courts in
other countries do not recognize such an exception and it is even illegal in these
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countries. The same goes for trademark or patent law. For example, a European court
might face a demand to enforce a U.S. business method, even though such a patent will
not be recognized in the country where this court sits.242 The fact that the laws of both
countries are identical does not prevent courts in one country from viewing, by way of
interpretation, business methods as patentable subject matter.
This is the reality of the legal world, and the sooner we recognize the fact that the
harmonization process will take a long time, and even if accomplished, will not really
solve all the problems, the better.
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IV. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION IDEA –
OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS
In the previous chapter, I concluded that the idea of harmonization of intellectual
property rights could not be used as a potential solution to the underlying problem
addressed in this work with respect to the recognition and enforcement of foreign
intellectual property judgments. Harmonization of procedures and substantive rights can
reduce some of the tension among jurisdictions, and in certain situations even partly solve
the problem, but it cannot be used as a full comprehensive answer.
An alternative solution may be found in the sphere of public international law.
This means that we can try to create an international treaty or convention signed by
governments and countries that would provide a set of rules that would regulate the ways
in which a judgment rendered in one country can be recognized and enforced in another
country. There were several attempts in the past to create such an instrument. These
instruments attempted to provide a set of rules that would assist the Member countries in
regulating the issue, but they all failed. It seems that the problem was not with respect to
the general understanding that such an instrument is needed. History has proven that
many countries believe this to be the only possible solution. I contend rather, that the
problem is with respect to the content and substance of the instrument.
The absence of such a convention makes things more complicated. In such a case,
the enforcing court is most likely to apply “the internal rules of the court in which
enforcement is sought.”243 When asked to enforce a foreign judgment, the enforcing court
will always ask whether the court rendering the judgment was entitled to assert
243
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jurisdiction under the rules of a relevant international convention, or under the internal
rules of the enforcing court if no convention is applicable.244 There are very few cases,
which I will later discuss, in which the enforcing court has no right to examine whether
the rendering court indeed had jurisdiction to hear the dispute at issue. This is called
“direct jurisdiction,” because it is for the rendering court to decide whether it is entitled to
assert jurisdiction and hear the case under the rules of the applicable convention, and the
enforcing court has no right to consider whether the rendering court could indeed do so.
In pursuing a viable solution to the recognition and enforcement problem, one
must first examine what were the reasons for the failure of the previous attempts to
regulate this issue. This exercise will provide an opportunity to circumvent certain
problems and difficulties in the past, and look for alternative solutions to these problems
so that we do not repeat previous mistakes. This is what I attempt to do in this chapter.
1.

Private International Law – Historical Development
It is mainly due to the industrial revolution and cross-border trade that recognition

and enforcement of judgments has become such an important issue in international
law.245 Several attempts were made through the course of history to create such an
instrument, but all of them were unsuccessful for reasons that I will now review and
explain. Efforts to create one international instrument that regulates the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments are relatively new and can be linked mainly to the
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second part of the Twentieth century. There are, however, several bilateral and
multilateral conventions that address this issue and were relatively successful.
A.

The Brussels Convention
The Treaty Establishing the European Community signed in Rome on March 25,

1957 (the “Treaty of Rome”), included in Article 2202 a requirement that Member states
of the European Community engage in further negotiations “. . . with a view to securing
for the benefit of their nationals . . . the simplification of formalities governing the
reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments of courts or tribunals and of
arbitration awards.”246 The purpose of such an arrangement was to enable the players in
the European Community to take full advantage of the opportunities that exist as a result
of such economical cooperation, by providing them with legal protection upon which
they can rely should they decide to engage in economic activities.247 It intended to
encourage “free movement of judgments within the European Community, in the same
way that there is to be free movement of labour, services, goods, etc.”248 Until that point
in time, enforcement and recognition of foreign judgments were usually based on
conventional rules, which allowed the enforcing court to investigate the assertion of
jurisdiction by the rendering court. The system allowed the enforcing court to verify that
the rendering court was entitled to assert jurisdiction according to the enforcing court’s
own rules of jurisdiction, and address other questions such as whether the judgment was
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obtained by fraud, whether there was fair trial, and whether the defendant received due
notice of the proceedings.249 The fact that the rendering court had to make sure that it
could hear the case not only under its rules of jurisdiction, but also under any potential
enforcing courts’ rules of jurisdiction in order for the latter to agree to enforce or
recognize such a judgment, created a significant barrier.
In 1960, a committee of experts was set by the Member states to try and find a
solution to the problem. The committee’s work product became to be known as the
European Community’s Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters of Sept. 27, 1968 (the “Brussels
Convention”),250 which came into force on February 1, 1973 upon the ratification by six
Member states.251
The Brussels Convention created an organized system for the recognition and
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters,252 including intellectual
property rights, in certain parts of the European continent. It was drafted as a “double
convention,” regulating “the jurisdiction which the courts of Contracting States are
249

Id. at 4.

250

1968 O.J. (L 299) 32, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 229 (1969) (as amended by the Convention on

Accession of Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 21 (1979)).
251

For general discussion of conflict of laws in Europe, see generally, Domink Lasok & Peter

Stone, Conflict of Laws – European Economic Community Countries (1987), and Reimann
Mathias, Conflict of Laws in Western Europe: A Guide through the Jungle (1995).
252

See Article 1 of the Brussels Convention. The Convention does not apply to status or legal

capacity of natural persons, rights in property arising out of a matrimonial relationship, wills and
succession, bankruptcy proceedings, social security and arbitration.

128

permitted to exercise as well as the conditions upon which such judgments are to be
recognized.”253 This simply means that the Convention provides an agreed upon set of
bases for the assertion jurisdiction. The rendering court in any of the Member States has
to verify that it can assert jurisdiction according to the rules set forth in the convention,
rather than according to its own internal rules, before rendering a judgment. If the
judgment is later introduced to a different court in another Member State for the purpose
of recognition or enforcement, the court addressed will do so without engaging in the
investigation of whether the rendering court indeed had jurisdiction.254 The greatest
novelty in the structure of the - then new - Brussels Convention was the fact that it
provided the Member States with a relatively detailed set of jurisdictional rules according
to which a court in a Member State may assert jurisdiction over a defendant domiciled in
another Member State, and in what situations it should decline to do so.
Under the provisions of the Brussels Convention, a person who is domiciled in a
contracting State may be sued in the courts of another contracting State only under the
provisions and conditions set forth in the Brussels Convention, and no other basis of
jurisdiction can be asserted against him. Therefore, if the defendant is not domiciled in
one of the Convention’s contracting countries, the national local rules of jurisdiction can
apply, and the provisions of the Brussels Convention do not bind the courts.255 The courts
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of the contracting States are forbidden from applying rules of “exorbitant jurisdiction,”256
which until that point was enough to ground jurisdiction against a foreign defendant.
When analyzing a specific set of facts under the provisions of the Brussels
Convention, the basic question is whether the rendering court can assert jurisdiction
under the strict rules set forth therein. The basic rule of jurisdiction is that a person
domiciled in a Contracting State must always be sued in the courts of that State.257 This
means that the test is the domicile rather than the nationality of the defendant. This basic
rule is supplemented by specific grounds of jurisdiction, such as those for contracts258 or
torts.259 In addition, the jurisdiction may be limited in certain situations by exclusive rules
of jurisdiction, such as those for land.260
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The meaning of the term “judgment” under the provisions of the Brussels
Convention is any judgment of a court or tribunal, including costs awarded.261 This term
includes interim and provisional orders, even in cases when the court has no jurisdiction
over the main proceedings. There are several exceptions to this general rule, such as
interlocutory orders rendered ex parte and intended to be enforced without notice to the
defendant.262 Another exception is interlocutory orders, which do not regulate legal
relations, but rather regulate the further conduct of proceedings.263 Since the Brussels
Convention is clearly intended to address only civil and commercial matters, other
judgments such as those for the recovery of taxes, or penalties are outside the scope of
this convention.
The Brussels Convention addresses both the question of recognition of a foreign
judgment, and the question of enforcement. No special proceedings are needed for the
recognition of a judgment rendered in another contracting State, and this is done
automatically.264 The Brussels Convention does not permit a court to refuse the
recognition of a judgment rendered by a court in a different country simply because it
thinks that the judgment is wrong.265 Furthermore, there are only a few situations in
261
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which a court must not assert jurisdiction based on the general domicile rule. These
situations include cases involving insurance, consumer and exclusive jurisdiction
cases.266 Under the provisions of the Brussels Convention, recognition should be refused
in those cases in which the defendant neglected to appear in the rendering court and set
forth her defense due to insufficient service on time to enable the defendant to do so.267
This is a relatively unique arrangement in this Convention because it allows the enforcing
court to substitute its own judgment with that of the rendering court with respect to the
question of whether the defendant could indeed properly and timely assert her defense.268
Like in almost any international instrument involving recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments, the Brussels Convention provides for a public policy
exception to the general rule.269 This exception is usually invoked in unique situations
such as when the judgment had been obtained by fraud and cannot be set aside by
appealing to the rendering court.270 Another exception to the rule is directed at
incompatible judgments. This means that the recognizing court need not recognize or
enforce a foreign judgment if the judgment in question is irreconcilable with a judgment
previously rendered by that court,271 or with a judgment rendered by a court in a nonContracting State, which involved the same parties and cause of action and fulfilled the
266
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necessary conditions to be recognized in the recognizing State.272 With respect to appeals,
the recognizing court may stay recognition or enforcement if an appeal process was
initiated in the rendering State.273 This exception refers only to ordinary appeals, which
are those that are part of the ordinary course of action in the rendering state.
For a foreign judgment to be enforced under the rules of the Brussels Convention,
the winning party must turn to the enforcing court and ask for an order of enforcement.274
Once an order is rendered and no appeal process has been initiated, the foreign judgment
will be enforced under the enforcement mechanism of the enforcing country. Refusal to
enforce such a judgment can only take place under the exceptions to the general
recognition and enforcement rule set forth above, namely lack of jurisdiction in
insurance, consumer, and exclusive jurisdiction cases, and public policy, lack of due
service, incompatible prior judgments, and appeals.
The Brussels Convention was the first major international instrument to also
address the issue of recognition and enforcement of judgments relating to intellectual
272
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property rights. One has to remember that this convention was drafted prior to the
introduction of the Internet and the digital revolution. It was drafted in 1968 in times
when the concept of intellectual property rights was more closely related to traditional
patents, copyrights and trademarks that rarely had any impact or value outside the
geographic borders of the country which granted them, than it had to do with the
transmission of electronic, non-fixed files transferred by a click of a button to every
computer on the face of the earth. At the time the Brussels Convention was drafted,
international infringement of intellectual property rights was nearly impossible to
accomplish and therefore, was not a major problem as it is today. Since the rights were
territorial and their scope limited to the geographic borders of the country, which granted
them, the prospects of their infringement in foreign countries was hardly an issue.
Furthermore, even if foreign infringement did take place, the economic impact was
significantly less than it is today due to the very local characteristics of the markets at that
time. The significant development of international trade and commerce, the opening of
borders for transition of goods and the development of digital infrastructure changed this
reality. I dare say that the reality then was different than what it is today, and as a result,
so should be the law.
As mentioned before, the Brussels Convention is a “double convention” which
provides a set of bases for the assertion of jurisdiction. If the rending court asserted
jurisdiction based on one of the provided bases, then the judgment should be almost
automatically enforced in every Member country, subject to certain exceptions. It
addresses certain intellectual property rights such as patents, trademarks, designs, or other
similar rights required to be deposited or registered. In that respect, it provides that “the
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courts of the Contracting State in which the deposit or registration has been applied for,
has taken place or is under the terms of an international convention deemed to have taken
place”275 shall have exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of domicile. A closer look at this
provision reveals some interesting things about its scope. This provision is limited to
patents, trademarks, designs or other similar rights. The Common ground for these rights
is the fact that they traditionally need to be registered or deposited in order to be
effective.276 The drafters of the convention, on the other hand, did not specifically address
copyrights and all other rights that need no deposit or registration. Furthermore, even
with respect to patents and trademarks, Article 16 is limited to certain kinds of disputes,
namely proceedings concerned with their registration or validity. This language leaves
out of the scope of Article 16 all disputes concerning infringement of the rights. In other
words, if the dispute concerns infringement of a patent, for example, and the plaintiff is
awarded a favoring judgment, even under the relatively advanced provisions of Article 16
of the Brussels Convention no assistance can be found, and in order to enforce or
recognize the foreign judgment, the right holder must seek other solutions in the general
rules of the Convention.
Can we conclude, in light of the above, that only matters of validity or registration
are addressed in the Brussels Convention? Is there no way available under the Brussels
Convention to enforce judgments involving intellectual property infringement?
Professor Ulmer tried to answer this question:
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“[A]n action for infringement of copyright or of an
industrial property right may, therefore, be instituted both
in the contracting state in which the defendant is domiciled
and in the contracting state in which the damage or injury
has occurred. The fact that Articles 2 and 5(3) of the
Convention are applicable also to actions based on
industrial property rights (and correspondingly on
copyright) may be conclusively deduced from the fact that
in Article 16 exclusive jurisdiction is provided only for
actions concerning the validity or registration of industrial
property rights, whereas in other respects the general rules
as to jurisdiction are to suffice.”277
One may argue that this approach is wrong and that only the courts in the country
of registration should adjudicate questions of infringement of intellectual property rights,
because by accepting such jurisdiction it would necessitate a judgment on the validity of
the foreign intellectual property right. Such a decision is more appropriate for the courts
of the protecting country to render. Indeed, that was the approach taken by American
courts for many years.278
Article 24 of the Brussels Convention provides the following:
“Application may be made to the courts of a Contracting
State for such provisional, including protective, measures
as may be available under the law of that State, even if,
under this Convention, the courts of another Contracting
State have jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter.”
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There are two ways to address the question of the relationship between the two
Articles. The first one supports the notion that Article 16 is the only one that addresses
matters of intellectual property. The second one supports the theory that Article 24
compliments Article 16 in the sense that it allows courts, under certain circumstances, to
provide injunctions with respect to the infringement of intellectual property rights and not
only with respect to issues of validity or registration. Needless to say, the latter approach
is much broader than the former, and provides courts with the discretion to address a
broader variety of issues than if only Article 16 was relevant.
Dutch courts are granting Pan-European injunctions using kort geding
proceedings. These injunctions are based on Article 24, which allows the rendering court
to provide such a judgment even if it has no jurisdiction under the Convention to litigate
the underlying substance of the matter. Under this interpretation, a court may issue an
injunction even if it previously concluded that it has no jurisdiction to litigate the case
because it appears to be a claim regarding patent infringement, which involves the
validity of the underlying patent.
British courts had taken a similar path. They have concluded that in the
appropriate circumstances they will also render an extraterritorial judgment relating to
intellectual property rights, even if they have no jurisdiction to adjudicate the underlying
subject matter. In the famous case of Coin Controls v. Suzo International, the Judge
concluded:
“I am aware that interlocutory injunctions effective abroad
have been granted in patent matters by the kort geding
procedure in Holland. Such powers arise out of Article 24
of the Convention which is of very wide scope and
apparently is not limited by the provisions of Article 16. It
therefore has no direct bearing on the issues I have to raise.
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Further, in view of the fact that I decide in any event not to
grant interlocutory relief, the questions of whether or not
this court has the jurisdiction to grant such relief in respect
of infringements abroad and, if so, the considerations which
would have to be taken into account in deciding whether to
do so and the conditions it might feel obliged to impose on
a plaintiff granted any such relief do not arise for
consideration in this case.”279
The British Court’s interpretation as to the relation between Article 16 and Article
24 of the Brussels Convention is not, with all due respect, necessarily the correct one.
There are several ways in which this approach, where the two provisions have similar
importance and relevance and do not limit each other, can be contradicted.
Under general rules of interpretation, one can argue that Article 16 is lex specialis
whereas Article 24 is lex generalis and therefore, only Article 16 should be applied for
intellectual property rights. Article 16 provides an exclusive jurisdiction for the
adjudication of certain intellectual property rights. It specifically mentions and addresses
these rights and therefore, it can be argued that it is the drafter’s specific intention that
only these rights and such disputes be adjudicated under this Article and any attempt to
interpret these Articles differently will contradict this intention.
This approach is also supported by Article 19 of the Brussels Convention, which
provides that “[w]here a court of a Contracting State is seised of a claim which is
principally concerned with a matter over which the courts of another Contracting State
have exclusive jurisdiction by virtue of Article 16, it shall declare of its own motion that
it has no jurisdiction.”
This Article limits the jurisdiction of the court first seized only to those cases in
which exclusive jurisdiction can be established under Article 16, which includes, among
279
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other things intellectual property rights. As a result one can argue that if a court is
requested to adjudicate a claim that involves the issue of the validity or registration of
intellectual property right, it should independently declare that it has no jurisdiction. This
means that if there are Member states that can assert jurisdiction under Article 16, every
other court should decline jurisdiction. In light of the above, it is argued that Article 16 is
the only one in the Brussels Convention that addresses intellectual property rights, and
thus, jurisdiction of the courts under the Convention should be limited to what is provided
under this Article.
Those supporting this approach have also suggested that Article 24 “does not
confer international jurisdiction at all; it merely permits national courts to continue to
exercise their pre-existing jurisdiction under national law in certain limited circumstances
where it is expedient for them to do so in derogation from the world rules of the
Convention.”280
On the other hand, the opposite approach is also possible. This approach supports
the idea that Article 16 and Article 24 complement each other, and thus, Article 24 can
also be used where intellectual property rights are at issue. I believe the latter to be the
better and more logical approach for the following reasons.
First, Article 24 does not deal with specific kinds of issues. It is a general
provision that does not limit itself to certain kind of rights. Its language is broad and
applies to all rights, including intellectual property rights. It is like a huge cloud floating
over all bases of jurisdiction and triggered every time its application is needed. Article 16
provides a great variety of exclusive bases of jurisdiction addressing different problems
280
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such as intellectual property, validity of a constitution, nullity or dissolution of companies
or other legal associations. Article 24 is merely a “supporting” article that is relevant to
each of those bases of jurisdiction; it leans on Article 16 and has no life if its own.
Second, Article 19 does not contradict this interpretation because, as previously
discussed, the bases for jurisdiction under Article 16 are extremely limited and therefore,
Article 19 has effect only in those very limited cases. The purpose of Article 19 is to
indicate that since the matters addressed under Article 16 are issues of public policy, they
cannot be overruled by the agreement of the parties.281
Furthermore, it can be argued that Article 24 does not attempt to assert
jurisdiction in cases where other Member states can assert jurisdiction under Article 16,
but rather solely addresses cases in which provisional and protective measures are
needed. This, however, contradicts the ruling of the European Court of Justice, which
held with respect to Article 24 that “in relation to matters covered by the Convention, no
legal basis is to be found therein for drawing a distinction between provisional and
definitive measures.”282
The relationship between Article 16 and Article 24 is not provided for in the
Convention and therefore, we can expect a continuing debate in the future.
B.

The Lugano Convention
Since the Brussels Convention was only open to the Member States of the

European Union, other European countries such as Members of the European Free Trade
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Association (EFTA – Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland) could
not use the jurisdiction and enforcement system created by the Brussels Convention,
although they have a relatively free access to European markets. The wish to increase the
number of Member states that could use these rules led to the creation of the Lugano
Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters (hereinafter the “Lugano Convention”)283 of September 16, 1988, signed by the
Members of EFTA and the European Union. The Lugano Convention is in fact a parallel
convention to the Brussels Convention, and it contains substantially the same rules of
jurisdiction and recognition as the Brussels Convention. It refers to persons that are
domiciled in EFTA Member states.284 If differences in the texts of the two conventions do
exist, they are usually intended to reflect interpretations of the Brussels Convention
provided by the European Court of Justice in the twenty years that elapsed between the
signing of the two instruments.285
There are two main differences between the Brussels Convention and the Lugano
Convention that should be noted. First, enforcement of a judgment rendered against a
domiciliary of an EFTA state may be refused if the rendering court did not have
jurisdiction under the terms of the Lugano Convention.286 Second, the enforcing court
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may refuse to do so if the rendering court assumed jurisdiction in accordance with
another convention, the enforcing court is not a Member of that convention, or the
defendant is domiciled in that state.287
C.

The Brussels Regulation
Despite the relative success of the Brussels and Lugano Conventions, Members of

the E.U. have agreed on new rules for deciding jurisdiction and recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments in civil and commercial matters in the Brussels
Regulation288 (“Brussels Regulation”). The new Brussels Regulation determines the
international jurisdiction of courts in the E.U. countries that adopted it and introduces a
new and more expeditious procedure for recognizing and enforcing foreign judgments.
The purpose of the Brussels Regulation was to replace parts of the 1968 Brussels
Convention. The EFTA countries (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and
Poland) are still part of the Lugano Convention. Because it has opted out of the Brussels
Regulation, Denmark will continue to follow the rules of the Brussels Convention in its
relationship with the E.U. Countries.289
Adoption of the Brussels Regulation does not affect rules governing jurisdiction
and the recognition of judgments contained in specific Community instruments.290 It
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specifically excludes “revenue, customs or administrative matters” and does not apply to
the status or legal capacity of natural persons (including wills and succession),
bankruptcy proceedings, social security and arbitration.291 The Brussels Regulation does
apply, however, in all other civil and commercial matters whatever the nature of the court
or tribunal, including intellectual property.292 Jurisdiction under the rules of the Brussels
Regulation is determined according to the country in which the defendant is domiciled.
Nationality of the defendant is not a consideration.293 Domicile is determined based on
the laws of the courts of the country first seized. If legal firms or other artificial entities
are involved, domicile is determined based on the country where they have their statutory
seat, central administration or principal place of business. The general rule under the
Brussels Regulation is that persons should be sued in the courts of the Member States in
which they are domiciled. There are several provisions within the Regulation that provide
for Special Jurisdiction. When contracts are involved, the jurisdiction will be that of the
country of performance. The place of performance in the case of the sale of goods shall
be determined based on the place where the goods “were delivered or should have been
delivered,” and in cases of the provision of services, the place where “the services were
provided or should have been provided.”294 In torts cases, the courts of the country where
the harmful event occurred or may occur are the ones to assert jurisdiction.295
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The Brussels Regulation also addresses the issue of contractual agreements with
respect to jurisdiction. In cases where the parties to the contract agreed on a certain
jurisdiction to settle any dispute that may arise with respect to this specific relationship,
the courts of that jurisdiction shall have exclusive jurisdiction unless the parties agreed
otherwise.296 Such agreement must be in writing, but writing may be defined as “[a]ny
communication by electronic means which provides a durable record of the
agreement.”297 This groundbreaking definition is very significant in the sense that it
allows for electronic commerce to take place and it makes it easier for electronic
contracts (click-wrap) to exist.
D.

The 1971 Hague Convention
Until 1971, most attempts to draft a treaty for recognition and enforcement of

foreign judgments were regional. Despite various proposals, all attempts to create an
international treaty had failed.298 In 1962, the work on a new multilateral convention on
the recognition and enforcement of judgments was on the way under the auspices of the
Hague Conference on Private International Law. In 1971, the work was completed and
296

See Article 23 of the Brussels Regulation.
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Document Number 7 of April 1997) 7, available at <ftp://ftp.hcch.net/doc/jdgm_pd7.doc>.

144

the Hague Convention of 1 February 1971 on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (the “1971 Hague Convention”) was
introduced. The 1971 Hague Convention never became effective because only three
countries have ratified it.299 The reasons for the reluctance of the various countries to join
the 1971 Hague Convention as members are extremely important to our discussion.
The 1971 Hague Convention was drafted and structured in a very complicated
manner. For countries to achieve mutual recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments joining the 1971 Hague Convention was not enough. Rather, in addition to
joining the Convention, each two countries had to negotiate among themselves a
supplemental agreement - a requirement that did nothing but complicate things.300 One of
the incentives for creating such an instrument is to avoid the complexity of bilateral
negotiations. By requiring the member countries to enter into a separate agreement, we
simply make it harder for them to agree, and thus complicate things. This “method of
bilateralisation” is considered one of the major obstacles for countries to join the 1971
Hague Convention.301
Another reason that arguably affected the will of countries to join the 1971 Hague
Convention was the signing of the Brussels Convention. Many of the countries that
participated in the negotiations of the 1971 Hague Convention were European countries
who were also Members of the Brussels Convention and later the Lugano Convention.
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Joining these two more favorable Conventions eliminated from their perspective, to a
great extent, the need for such an international instrument.
Some believe, however, that as convincing as these reasons may seem, the real
reason for the failure of the 1971 Hague Convention to accomplish its goals is the fact
that it failed to address the issue of jurisdiction. It was the European countries who
objected to the idea that the convention “could not deal with provisions regulating the
jurisdiction of each State, and that they had no authority to negotiate on restrictions of the
bases of internal jurisdiction.”302 Catherine Kessedjian compares the relative success of
the Brussels and Lugano Conventions and the failure of the 1971 Hague Convention, and
she explains that these two conventions regulate first and foremost the issue of
jurisdiction and only later the issue of recognition and enforcement. These two
Conventions “primarily regulate the direct jurisdiction of courts in the subjects with which
they deal, treating this as a vital preliminary to the effects which arise from the resulting
judgments; these effects, it has to be conceded, are merely the natural extension of such
jurisdiction.

It is because the court which rules on the merits of the case possesses

jurisdiction (usually by virtue of the Convention, failing some error on the part of the court
seized), that its judgment will, except in limited exceptional cases, take effect on the
territory of all the other States Parties.”303
Another important reason for the failure of previous attempts to address this issue
stems from the very nature of the idea of recognition and enforcement of foreign

302
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judgments. The court addressed is expected to recognize or enforce a judgment provided
by a judge in a foreign country who belongs to a different legal system. Not all legal
systems are treated equally and there is a lot of criticism and mutual suspicion. Most
countries simply disfavored the idea of an automatic recognition rule that would require
them to give up their right to review decisions of an unknown foreign judge before they
were obligated to enforce it.304 The relative mild tension and lack of suspicion among the
European countries can be used as a possible explanation to the relative success of the
Lugano and the Brussels Conventions.
E.

The Hague Draft Negotiations
The United States is not a Member of the Brussels and Lugano Conventions. This

fact raised concerns in the American government that U.S. citizens could be sued in E.U.
countries and exposed to national jurisdiction in these countries. The American
government was not ready to have foreign judgments recognized in the U.S., while
American judgments are not recognized and enforced abroad, thus resulting in
disadvantage to Americans.305 As a result, the U.S. State Department initiated in 1992 the
negotiations of a new international instrument resulting in the Hague Preliminary Draft
Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters
(“Preliminary Hague Draft”)306 under the auspices of the Hague Conference on Private
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International Law.307 On 19 October 1996, the member states of the Eighteenth session of
the Hague Conference, reached a decision “to include in the Agenda of the Nineteenth
Session the question of jurisdiction, and recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments in civil and commercial matters.”308 In October 1999, the Special Commission
adopted the Preliminary Hague Draft, which was to serve as the basis for an international
convention regulating recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in commercial
matters.309 At the invitation of the Canadian Government, and in accordance with the
decision of the Special Commission of 30 October, 1999, the Hague Conference on
Private International Law organized a meeting of experts from around the world that was

2001 INTERIM TEXT PREPARED BY THE PERMANENT BUREAU AND THE CO-REPORTERS, available
at <Http://www.hcch .net/e/workprog/jdgm.html>. The previous version is available at
PRELIMINARY DRAFT CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION AND FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL AND
COMMERCIAL MATTERS, ADOPTED BY THE SPECIAL COMMISSION ON 30 OCTOBER 1999,
amended

version

(new

numbering

of

articles)

at

<Http://www.hcch.net/e/conventions/draft36e.html>. In this work all the references are to the last
version of the Preliminary Hague Draft and the explanatory footnotes.
307
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Intellectual Property, Electronic Commerce and the Preliminary Draft Hague Jurisdiction and
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held in Ottawa from February 28 to March 1, 2000 “to examine the issues raised by
electronic commerce in relation to the international jurisdiction of the courts.”310 In the
first part of the Diplomatic Conference that took place on 6-20 June 2001, a new version
of the Preliminary Hague Draft was proposed, which I will now review.311
Historically, when the work on the Preliminary Hague Draft started in 1992, the
purpose was to create an international instrument that would address disputes involving
traditional services, and physical goods. Only in a later stage were the problems
accompanying the introduction of the Internet, intellectual property and information, first
taken into consideration. It was mainly based on the model set forth in the Brussels and
Lugano Conventions that preceded it. However, there were also a few fundamental
differences. First, as I will later more thoroughly discuss, the Preliminary Hague Draft
was not exactly a “double Convention”, because it also allowed the assertion of
jurisdiction under national law, even with regards to Contracting States. Second, the
Preliminary Hague Draft did not establish a hierarchy with regards to the different types
of jurisdiction, unlike the Brussels and Lugano Conventions, which adopted a
fundamental jurisdiction based on the domicile of the defendant, and all other bases of
jurisdictions are an exception to the general rule.312
The Preliminary Hague Draft mentions three different kinds of jurisdiction, but
substantively deals with only two of them. In general, it sets in Articles 3-16 a list of
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bases for the assertion of jurisdiction. Resulting judgments can be recognized and
enforced in other Contracting States, subject to exceptions of due process of law, public
policy and the need to avoid inconsistent judgments.313 Article 18 gives a list of
“prohibited grounds of jurisdiction,” which are not covered under the Preliminary Hague
Draft, such as the nationality of the plaintiff, the nationality of the defendant, the
domicile, habitual or temporary residence, or presence of the plaintiff in the state. In case
a judgment is based on one of these prohibited bases for jurisdiction, the judgment is
unrecognizable and unenforceable in other Contracting States. Article 17, however,
allows the application of “jurisdiction based on national law,” subject to some conditions
and provided that the above-mentioned Article 18 does not prohibit it.
As mentioned above, the Preliminary Hague Draft is based on a model that
requires the enforcing court to recognize or enforce a judgment314 that was rendered in
another Contracting State, if the judgment was based on one of the grounds of jurisdiction
313

See, e.g., habitual residence of the defendant (Article 3), jurisdiction set in an agreement

(Article 4), appearance by the defendant in court without contesting jurisdiction (Article 5),
Jurisdiction relating to contracts (Articles 6, 7 and 8), jurisdiction relating to torts (Article 10),
jurisdiction relating to trusts (Article 11), jurisdiction relating to patents and trade marks (Article
12).
314

Article 23 of the Preliminary Hague Draft defines judgment as “any decision given by a court,

whatever it may be called, including a decree or order, as well as the determination of costs or
expenses by an officer of the court, provided that it relates to the decision which may be
recognized or enforced under the Convention”, or “decisions ordering provisional or protective
measures in accordance with Article 13, paragraph 1” which deal with the right of a court that has
jurisdiction to determine the merits of the case to order protective or provisional measures.
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provided in the document itself. Section 25(1) of the Preliminary Hague Draft provides
that “[a] judgment based on a ground of jurisdiction provided for in Articles 3 to 13, or
which is consistent with any such ground, shall be recognized or enforced under this
chapter.” The Preliminary Hague Draft provides us with a broad basis for enforcement of
judgments. In fact, it all comes down to one single question: whether the rendering court
had the right to assert jurisdiction under the bases for jurisdiction provided therein. The
party seeking recognition or enforcement of the foreign judgment carries the burden of
proving that the rendering court had jurisdiction under the bases provided for in the
Preliminary Hague Draft. Thus, the breadth and number of situations in which the
enforcing court could agree to act depends almost entirely on the interpretation of the
bases of jurisdiction in each field of law. In other words, if we would like to enforce a
judgment that was rendered in one Contracting State’s court with regards to violation of
copyrights or infringement of a patent, we would first have to prove that the rendering
court had jurisdiction to render this judgment “based on a ground of jurisdiction provided
for in Articles 3 to 13”315 of the Preliminary Hague Draft. We should keep in mind,
however, that the scope of the enforcement is limited to the bases provided for in the
Preliminary Draft. As a result, one would not be able to enforce a judgment that was
rendered in the court of one Contracting State in the court of another State, even if the
rendering court had legitimate jurisdiction over the case under both domestic and

315

Article 25(1) of the Preliminary Hague Draft.
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international law, unless it was also recognized as a basis of jurisdiction under the
Preliminary Hague Draft, subject to certain exceptions.316
During the negotiations period, a fierce debate developed as to the benefit of
including intellectual property rights within the scope of the Preliminary Hague Draft.317
The intangibility of the subject matter, the territoriality of the law and the cultural context
of its application create various problems that should be addressed. Several
commentators318 even suggested that intellectual property rights should be excluded from
the convention like other subjects such as wills and succession, status and legal capacity
of natural people, and admiralty and maritime matters.319 “There is currently reason to be
concerned that it may not be promulgated at all, or that if it is promulgated, that it will be
reduced in scope and cover only select areas of litigation, likely not to include intellectual
property.”320 Others have suggested that the need for such an international convention is
316

See also the last part of Article 24 and Article 17 of the Preliminary Hague Draft, which

acknowledge in certain situations the application of rules of jurisdiction under national law by
contracting states.
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issue be excluded from the final draft of the Hague Convention, we could instead adopt a unique
convention under the auspices of WIPO or the WTO that would deal with the recognition and
enforcement of judgments enforcing these rights. Such a convention would be more suitable to
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shrinking as a result of the fact that players in the digital world manage, or are forced to
find ways to do without litigation to address civil wrongs.321 Indeed, in the discussions of
the Special Commission that met at Hague from March 3 to 13, 1998 to discuss the
different aspects of The Preliminary Hague Draft, the intellectual property subject was
not even specifically discussed.322
The last version of Article 12(4) of the Preliminary Hague Draft provides:
“In proceedings in which the relief sought is a judgment on
the grant, registration, validity, abandonment, revocation or
infringement of a patent or a mark, the courts of the
Contracting State of grant or registration shall have
exclusive jurisdiction.”
Article 12(5) provides:
“In proceedings in which the relief sought is a judgment on
the validity, abandonment, or infringement of an
unregistered mark [or design], the courts of the Contracting
State in which rights in the mark [or design] arose shall
have exclusive jurisdiction.”
Clearly, the approach reflected in this language is extremely broad and territorial,
and gives the country granting the right, or where the right is registered, the exclusive
address all the delicate problems that are unique to intellectual property rights, and better defend
the interests of the creative community. See ROCHELLE C. DREYFUSS & JANE C. GINSBURG,
DRAFT CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION AND RECOGNITION OF JUDGMENTS IN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY MATTERS, (October 10, 2001), available at <http://www.kentlaw.edu/depts/ipp/intlcourts/docs/treaty10_10.pdf>.
321

Franklin & Morris, supra note 3, at 1221-1222.

322

Catherine Kessedjian, SYNTHESIS OF THE WORK OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION OF MARCH

1998 ON INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND THE EFFECTS OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL
AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS,

available at <http://www.hcch.net/e/workprog/jdgm.html>.

153

right to control not only the act of registration, revocation and abandonment of the right,
but also the opportunity to control its infringement. By using this language, almost any
dispute with regards to patents, trademarks or other related rights would be under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the court in the country where the right was granted or
registered, or in the case of an unregistered mark – the country where the right arose. The
rational and basis for this broad rule is quite obvious. The registration and
acknowledgement of intellectual property rights is a very complicated process. In fact
even within the registration country itself not every lawyer or judge can be involved in
legal proceedings that relate to intellectual property rights, and the people that practice
this field of law are required to develop special expertise in this field. In many countries,
due to the difficulty and uniqueness of the field of intellectual property law, decisions and
proceedings regarding intellectual property rights are taking place not in regular civil
courts, but rather in special courts, or agencies, which hold the required knowledge and
expertise to solve the difficult problems.323 The substantive law and the registration
process with regards to intellectual property rights can be very different from one country
to the other.324 As a result the most convenient and appropriate forum to handle this kind
of litigation would be the country where the right was registered or granted. In this forum,
the judges are more familiar with the relevant law, and have the best interpretation tools
to reach a just solution to the controversy. They are more familiar with relevant
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legislation and case law, and the whole litigation process should be shorter and less
expensive.
For example, assume that B registers a patent in her home country (e.g. France)
and several months later registers the very same patent in a different country (e.g.
England) using the earlier date of application in France, based on the right of priority.325
Then, in between the date of filing in France and in England, A files for the exactly
identical patent in England. A brings a law suit in a court in England against B, arguing
that the patent that B registered in France a few months before is invalid, and that A
should be the one able to register the same patent in England without enabling B to use
the right of priority. In the described situation, the English court would have to rule on
the validity of a patent that was registered in another country (France). There is a good
chance that the judge would be unable to read the relevant law and case law that are
pertinent to this situation. In fact, France has a civil law legal system, which he knows
little about, since he was educated in the British and American common law systems. He
would not be able to read the relevant documents and would need an interpreter.
Adjudicating and reaching an informed decision under these conditions would be very
difficult. The court would probably need to use experts that would testify on behalf of the
parties on the legal situation in France and be totally dependent on them – an undesirable
result. Although this is not a unique problem to intellectual property, it is more
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complicated in the intellectual property context because of the more complicated subject
matter. This would also take a considerable amount of time, and require the parties to
unnecessarily waste money on interpreters and expert witnesses, thus lowering the
chances of arriving at a just solution in a reasonable amount of time and cost. Thus, in my
view, giving exclusive jurisdiction over patents and trademarks to the court where the
registration or deposit took place might be a good solution to the jurisdiction problem in
this case.
The Brussels Convention separated the question of registration and validity of the
rights from the question of infringement. According to the Convention’s drafters’ view,
the grant of intellectual property rights is “an exercise of sovereignty and, therefore, a
decision as to the validity of the right should only be determined by the courts of the state
which granted the right.”326 When drafting the Preliminary Hague Draft, there was no
controversy among the experts with regards to the inclusion of exclusive jurisdiction for
proceedings relating to the “validity” of the intellectual property rights. However, the
inclusion of such exclusive jurisdiction with regards to the “infringement” of these rights
was not as clear. Several scholars suggested that there should be no difference between
the decision on the registration and validity of the right, and the decision on the
infringement and enforcement of the right.327 They argued that the court in the country
where the intellectual property rights were registered should exclusively decide both
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questions. They suggested that since a patent is a right to prevent others from using the
invention, the fact that the right cannot be enforced is just as important as the fact that the
right is not properly registered. In both situations, the holder of the claimed patent right
would be unable to enjoy the privileges that are attached to a patent right (i.e. preventing
others from using the invention). Thus, if the granting of the patent is considered to be a
sovereign act, why shouldn’t the enforcement of the patent considered similarly?
The Dutch Court of Appeals has adopted this latter approach.328 It argued that
infringement and nullity of a patent are closely linked to each other since it is impossible
to infringe on a patent that is null and void and thus does not exist. For example, a court
that is asked to decide the merits of an infringement claim will most likely have to stay
the proceedings until another court in a different jurisdiction reaches a decision on the
nullity of the patent claim that was brought by another party, unless it is absolutely clear
from the beginning that the nullity claim in the other court is baseless. As a result, it has
been suggested that “the separate hearing and settlement of the infringement issue and
nullity issue by two different national courts is far from ideal. It would be desirable for
the infringement and nullity issues to be decided by the same court.”329 After all, this is,
to a great extent, the same question. The Preliminary Hague Draft, however, took a
different path. It added a second alternative in Article 12(5)A, which acknowledges that
with respect to infringement of patents, trademarks, designs or other similar rights, the
country of registration or grant does not have exclusive jurisdiction, and other bases for

328

Expandable Grafts v. Boston Scientific BV, [1999] FSR 352, 361.

329

Id.

157

jurisdiction may apply.330 In other words they preferred the approach under which the
questions of validity and infringement are separated, and there is no exclusive jurisdiction
to the court of the state where the right is registered.
From the explanation notes to the last version of the Preliminary Hague Draft, it
remains unclear whether it was to eventually apply to copyrights. There were several
proposals regarding the inclusion of copyrights, and the last version excluded copyrights
from Article 12. There was still, however, a proposal to give exclusive jurisdiction, in
proceedings concerning the infringement of copyrights, to the courts of the State “under
whose laws the copyright or the neighboring right is claimed to be infringed.”331
Excluding copyrights from the scope of Article 12 of the Convention does not mean that
one cannot recognize or enforce judgments relating to copyrights. One can still do so if
the suit is brought in accordance with the rules of jurisdiction provided in Article 10 of
the Preliminary Hague Draft relating to torts.
By excluding copyrights from Article 12 of the Preliminary Hague Draft, the
drafters selected the easy solution of ignoring the problem rather than dealing with it. In
fact, at the beginning of the third millennium, copyrights infringement is becoming one of
the most important problems that the intellectual property world is facing. The Internet
created a reality where the dissemination of information and the copying and distribution
of copyrighted works is done without anyone being able to control it. One cannot ignore
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the fact that millions of copyrighted works such as pictures, movies and music – many of
which still under copyright protection – are being transferred daily among Internet
“surfers” all around the world without the right-holders’ permission, thus resulting in
copyright infringement. In order to maintain the balance between the need to encourage
creativity by securing property rights to inventors and creators on one hand, and the will
to enrich the public domain and the society and culture in which we live in by limiting the
scope of protection on the other, we have to maintain a system where a right-holder can
turn to a court and get a judgment protecting her rights, and then enable her to enforce it
in another country. Thus, it would be extremely unwise to simply ignore the problem of
enforcement of judgments relating to copyrighted works at this point.
F.

The 2004 Hague Draft
In June 2001, the Hague Conference met to discuss the future of the above

Judgments Project. The delegations confirmed their dedication to the project in principle,
but decided that at this point the Diplomatic Session could not be held before the end of
2002. It was clear from the continuing negotiations at that point that an understanding of
the jurisdiction issue could not be expected in the near future. The U.S. delegation was
one of the fiercest opponents to the proposed Preliminary Hague Draft, and its
representative said that [t]he US could not become a Party to a convention structured
along the lines of the preliminary draft Convention. In particular, the US could not accept
(in personam) jurisdiction in infringement on IP rights cases over a defendant who had no
relation with the jurisdiction.”332 Very importantly, representatives of the U.S. delegation
332
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said that they prefer “to focus on those elements of the [Preliminary Hague Draft] that are
achievable now and forgo those other elements until the time is right to address them.”333
Since the attempt to create an international instrument regulating the recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments under the auspices of the Hague Conference has
failed due to the inability to agree on the issue of bases for the assertion of jurisdiction,
the participants have decided to narrow the scope of the negotiations. They believed that
by addressing specific problems with a narrower scope, there are better chances that they
may actually agree on some issues, so that an international instrument may finally
become possible.
To try and address this lack of agreement problem, the Hague Permanent Bureau
has set up a new Informal Working Group in an attempt to prepare a new instrument on
this issue that would be submitted to the Special Commission for discussion.334 The

GENEVA, 1 February 2001, drawn up by the Permanent Bureau 3, available at
<ftp://ftp.hcch.net/doc/jdgmpd13.doc>.
333

William New, E-Commerce: U.S. May Face Opposition on Narrow Jurisdictional Treaty,

NATIONAL

JOURNAL’S

TECHNOLOGY

DAILY

(April

17,

2002)

available

at

<http://www.cptech.org/ecom/jurisdiction/techapril02.html>. Most other countries including
Australia, Canada, the E.U. and Japan took a different approach and preferred a more
comprehensive solution along the lines of the Preliminary Hague Draft.
334

PRELIMINARY RESULT OF THE WORK OF THE INFORMAL WORKING GROUP ON THE

JUDGMENTS PROJECT, FOR THE ATTENTION OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION OF APRIL 2003 ON
GENERAL AFFAIRS AND POLICY OF THE CONFERENCE (Preliminary Document No 8 of March
2003 (corrected)), available at <ftp://ftp.hcch.net/doc/genaff_pd08e.pdf 3>.

160

parties have agreed that further, more limited scale negotiations should take place.335 The
purpose was to present a text “with a sufficient prospect of reaching agreement.”336 As a
result, the Informal Working Group eventually decided to begin work on choice of court
agreements for commercial transactions. The Informal Working Group proposed a new
draft for an international instrument, which is significantly narrower in scope than that
initially expected, and solely concentrates on “agreements on the choice of court
concluded in civil or commercial matters.”337 In March 2004 Masato Dogauchi and
Trevor C. Hartley introduced a new Draft Report at Hague.338
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This new attempt is based on the belief that “such enhanced cooperation requires
a secure international legal regime that ensures the effectiveness of exclusive choice of
court agreements by parties to commercial transactions and that governs the recognition
and enforcement of judgments resulting from proceedings based on such agreements
…”339 The new proposed convention is extremely limited in scope. Even with respect to
choice of court agreements, it is limited and does not include agreements “between a
natural person acting primarily for personal, family or household purposes (the
consumer) and another party acting for the purposes of its trade or profession, or between
consumers.”340 In other words, the proposed convention excludes business to consumers
(B2C) and consumer to consumer (C2C) agreements. Most importantly, the proposed
convention also does not apply to “the validity of patents, trademarks, protected industrial
designs, and layout-designs of integrated circuits.”341
The mechanism under which the proposed 2004 Hague Draft operates is quite simple. A
judgment rendered by a court in a Member country that had been mutually selected by the
parties as the exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate their disputes in a choice of court
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agreement is almost always recognized and enforced.342 However, there are several types
of issues that are excluded from the scope of this proposal. These include, among others,
family law, bankruptcy disputes and the validity of patents and trademarks.343 It is
important to note that under the current version of the 2004 Hague Draft, only exclusive
choice-of-court agreements are included.344 Some courts interpreted such provisions to
mean that a judgment shall be recognized even though rendered by a court other than that
selected by the parties as the nonexclusive jurisdiction. Courts of Member States must
decline jurisdiction if the parties to the agreement selected a different country as an
exclusive jurisdiction for the litigation of disputes, unless “the parties are habitually
resident [only] in the State of the court seised, and the relationship of the parties and all
other elements relevant to the dispute, other than the agreement, are connected with that
State.”345
The 2004 Hague Draft sets forth the conditions under which a choice of court
agreement shall be valid.346 The court addressed has no right to review the merits of the
case.347 Like in most similar instruments previously proposed, here as well, a list of
exceptions to the general enforcement rule is provided. In these situations, the court
342

Article 7(1) of the 2004 Hague Drat.

343

Article 1(3) of the 2004 Hague Drat.

344

“A choice of court agreement which designates the courts of one State or one specific court

shall be deemed to be exclusive unless the parties have expressly provided otherwise. Article 2(2)
of the 2004 Hague Draft.
345

Article 5(f) of the 2004 Hague Draft.

346

See Article 7 of the 2004 Hague Draft.

347

See Article 7(2) of the 2004 Hague Draft.

163

addressed has the right to refuse to recognize or enforce the foreign judgment rendered by
the chosen court. These exceptions include situations where the choice of court
agreement was “null and void,” a party lacked the capacity to enter into the agreement,
situations when the defendant had no time or was not notified in a sufficient manner to be
able to adequately assert a defense, when judgment was rendered using procedural fraud,
when the judgment resulted from proceedings incompatible with fundamental principles
of procedure of the State addressed, and when recognition or enforcement would be
manifestly incompatible with the public policy of the State addressed.348
This attempt may be viewed as a good start, but also contains many flaws. First,
the scope of the proposed instrument is very narrow and therefore, it does not really solve
many of the problems associated with the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments. In fact, it only addresses a small fraction of the problems. Since B2C and C2C
agreements are excluded, the proposal addresses mostly agreements that are signed
between businesses (B2B). These are usually sophisticated parties who engage in
extensive negotiations, many times with assistance of attorneys who can find ways to
protect the interests of their clients such as guarantees and letters of credits. These
agreements are only a small fraction of the number of contracts signed worldwide. There
are many agreements signed between businesses and consumers and between consumers
among themselves. This gap is expected to grow in the future when on-line trade
develops and the number of agreements signed through the Internet grows.
Second, the application of this convention to intellectual property rights is very
limited. At first, it was decided that copyrights shall be included within the scope of the
348

See Article 7(1) of the 2004 Hague Draft.

164

proposed instrument, but patents, trademarks (both registered and unregistered) and other
registered industrial property rights shall be excluded from its scope. Later on, there has
been a shift in this approach, and a call was made to include other forms of intellectual
property rights as well. The idea of including intellectual property rights within the scope
of the 2004 Hague Draft was based on the fact that this issue usually arises with respect
to license agreements between commercially sophisticated parties who tend to know the
risks involved and take them into consideration, Therefore, such choice of court
provisions should be abided by, just as arbitration clauses are enforced.349 There seems to
be an agreement that the issue of validity of intellectual property rights is out of the
proposal’s scope. The issue of validity is unique in the sense that every decision has
implications on the registration authorities in the country that originally registered the
right. If a trademark or a patent were registered in one country after thorough
investigation by the relevant authorities, and they concluded that the applicant was
entitled to such rights, it is very difficult for this country to recognize and enforce a
foreign judgment rendered by another country that may decide that the right that had been
registered in the enforcing country is invalid. This may be viewed as major interference
with the authority and sovereignty of the country of registration. Furthermore, many
believe that the courts of the country of registration are the most suitable to address the
issue of the validity of the registered right, as they are the ones with the most expertise.
Indeed, the negotiating parties agreed that “it could be made clear that any judgment
rendered on the basis of a choice of court clause would not have any effect on registration
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authorities or, in the case of an unregistered trademark, on the validity of the mark as
such.”350
There is, however, a proposal to include a provision within the proposed Draft
that will allow courts to adjudicate even cases involving the validity of patents and
trademarks if they arise “merely as an incidental question.”351 Such resulting judgment
shall, however, be limited in scope and effect only to the parties involved (in personam
rather than in rem). There are those who fear that the fact that judgments addressing the
issue of the validity of a patent or trademark are limited in application to the parties
themselves still does not solve these problems, because there is a concern that such a
judgment shall be viewed as “collateral estoppel.” On the other hand, this concern is not
necessarily well grounded, as there are many situations, such as arbitration, where
validity issues are raised as an incidental question, but are not viewed as collateral
estoppel later on.
Third, even if the scope of the proposed convention is limited to B2B agreements,
there are still some problems that may arise as a result of the existence of the Internet. For
example, when click-wrap agreements are involved or when the agreement contains
prohibition on deep linking to other websites, there is always a fear that by agreeing to
enforce an agreement that a certain jurisdiction shall adjudicate disputes between the
parties, we provide the stronger party with an unjustified advantage. The stronger party
can dictate a forum where certain acts are prohibited, and thus achieve certain advantages
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in violation of certain basic principles, such as the fair use doctrine or an American First
Amendment, free speech, type of argument.
As a general rule, agreements regarding choice of court are a good thing that
needs to be encouraged. The principle of freedom of contracts is inherent in most modern
legal systems and helps the parties to best reflect their mutual interests in the transaction.
These agreements, like those involving arbitration, are very popular in business
transactions, and are widely enforced and recognized by courts.352 Their most significant
advantage is the fact that they reduce misunderstandings and uncertainties, by enabling
the parties at the negotiations stage to determine the identity of the court that shall have
the right to litigate any disputes that may arise in the future. At this early stage of the
parties’ relations when there is mutual good faith attempt to bridge existing gaps, it is
easier to agree on this difficult question than at a later stage when they are fighting and
potentially trying to harm each other’s interests. Furthermore, such agreements may save
the parties in the future significant resources that would have been spent in order to
determine the appropriate jurisdiction to hear the dispute. In the absence of such an
agreement, there is a tendency by defendants to drag out the issue of jurisdiction for long
periods of time by filing different motions to move the litigation to a more favorable
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forum, thus hoping to exhaust the plaintiff and make him give up. For example, the
defendant may argue that other forums are more appropriate to hear the case based on the
forum non-conveniens or lis alibi pendens doctrines. An agreement regarding the issue of
jurisdiction eliminates this problem in advance and may save these precious resources.
This is especially true in negotiations and agreements between businesses.
Consider, for example, a situation when two major players in the computers industry such
as Microsoft (software) and IBM (hardware) negotiate a license agreement or a joint
venture to create a product where hardware is supplied by IBM and software by
Microsoft. In this case, the parties are likely to be represented by expert lawyers and
business people who are capable of calculating the risks involved in the transaction, and
take into consideration the pros and cons involved in determining the identity of the court
to address any possible dispute in relation to such a transaction. If they manage to agree
on a certain forum, it is very unlikely that they argue in the future that they were not
aware of the consequences of such an agreement, or that they were forced to do so.
Therefore, when such sophisticated parties are involved there is no real reason to refuse
enforcement of this agreement. This is not different in any way from the long agreed
upon principle of abiding by arbitration clauses and agreements. Our example is very
similar to that involving arbitration, where the parties mutually agree on the forum that
shall solve their disputes. The fact that one is an official institution and one is an
arbitration panel should not change this general idea.
Things get more complicated when the two parties are not sharing the same
qualities and sophistication. This may be viewed as differences in market power.
Consider an example, in which Microsoft licenses one of its software products to a

168

private party to be used in his home personal computer. The private party is not the one to
draft the license agreement, nor can she negotiate this agreement. She has two options:
sign the agreement prepared by Microsoft “as is,” including the choice of court provision
it contains, or she can refuse to do so. If she refuses to do so, her option is to buy an
alternative product, assuming that one exists, or she can try and do without the software.
Needless to say that even if she chooses to purchase an alternative product from one of
Microsoft’s competitors, she would most likely face the very same problem, as similar
choice of court provisions are likely to be part of the competitor’s agreement as well.
Assume that the licensee lives in Germany, and the license agreement says that any
dispute between the parties with respect to the license agreement shall be litigated in a
court in the State of New York. It is quite clear that the licensee will never bother to go
through the trouble of suing Microsoft or any other licensor in New York. She will not be
able to afford it and this would simply be too complicated to pursue. Do we really want
such a reality in which parties cannot enforce their legal rights because they do not have
enough bargaining power? One program can be sold to millions around the world. Each
of these individuals lacks the incentive to try and enforce its rights under the contract, but
if we add up the damages and the financial stakes involved, the amounts may be
overwhelming.
To a certain extent this is similar to class action suits, when each individual by
himself lacks the required incentive to stand up for his own rights. In the U.S., Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows one or more members of a class to sue as
representative parties on behalf of all other members of such class, if the class is so
numerous that joining of all members is impracticable, or if there are questions of law or
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fact common to the class, or if the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and if the representative parties will fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class.353 This problem of differences in
bargaining power has been amplified since Internet commerce started to develop. Many
on-line agreements for the provision of products or services are signed without the
purchasing party being able to negotiate anything. The buyer has the alternative to buy
the product or service or refrain from doing so. The class action is not a magic solution to
this problem for several reasons. It may solve some of the problems in countries that do
provide a class action mechanism, but the majority of countries do not even offer such a
mechanism as a possible solution under their statutes. Even in those few countries that do
provide a class action solution, many times, the chances of actually going forward with
such a procedure all the way to the end and winning the case are very low. Furthermore,
in the digital era and the Internet, many times the potential plaintiffs or members of the
group come from different countries, which raises a completely different set of issues as
to the jurisdiction of the court, which I will address later in more detail. In a class action
situation, most of the time the plaintiffs and defendants are nationals of the same country,
whereas on the Internet, we may have a situation where the defendant is organized in one
country and the plaintiffs live in ten different other countries. This problem may make
the class action mechanism irrelevant.
Many believe these agreements to be contracts of adhesion, and therefore, they
were excluded from the 2004 Hague Draft. One must note that even if the buyer is a
sophisticated party such as a big international company, this reality does not change since
353
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in many cases, an alternative solution cannot be found and the company has no option but
to purchase the product and sign the agreement.
G.

The Dreyfuss – Ginsburg Proposal
In a forum in Geneva that took place in January 30 and 31, 2001 Professor

Dreyfuss and Professor Ginsburg introduced a new draft convention that tries to simplify
some of the problems that were raised and introduced in this work with regards to the
recognition and enforcement of judgments in intellectual property matters (the “DreyfussGinsburg Proposal”). They suggested that the creation of a special instrument that would
specifically deal with intellectual property rights, rather than a more general solution, is
very important because it would increase efficiency in solving intellectual property
disputes by consolidating all the actions under the jurisdiction of one court and enable us
to take into account the unique aspects and characteristics of intellectual property rights
derived from their intangibility.
This proposal is mainly based on the Preliminary Hague Draft, discussed above.
Similar to the Preliminary Hague Draft, this proposal is also based on the principle that
recognition and enforcement of the judgment depends on the question of whether the
rendering court had an approved basis of jurisdiction over the litigants.354 The changes in
this proposal result from the need to adjust the Preliminary Hague Draft to the special
needs and uniqueness of the creative community.
In general, the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Proposal would be only open to countries that
have joined the WTO and would cover the same scope of rights covered by the TRIPS
Agreement. There is one possible exception to this general rule. It concerns patent
354
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litigation. The reason for this exception is that patents are presumably more territorial in
nature than other intellectual property rights, and other than software and business
methods, most of the other patent infringements are unlikely to take place in cyberspace.
Because of the expertise required in this field and the low incidence of simultaneous
multinational infringements, it is most likely that the benefit would not cover the costs
involved.
In my view, this approach, which excludes patent litigation from the proposed
convention, is somewhat problematic. Patent litigation is among the most important
issues in the modern intellectual property world. The birth of the Internet and the intense
development of new technologies in computers, optics and biotech are the flag of the
high-tech revolution of the 1990s and the beginning of the 21st century. In fact, it is not
even clear that if it was not for this subject (e.g. protection through patents of business
methods and software) that scholars would have taken the time to study this subject and
try to find a solution by reaching an international understanding about the recognition and
enforcement of judgments relating to intellectual property rights. It would not be
unreasonable to predict that in the next few years, controversies with regards to patents
are going to be a main part of intellectual property litigation. Especially because of the
growth in Internet usage and the globalization of economic markets, one will have to deal
with litigation that has international consequences. I think that the exclusion of this very
important subject from such convention would be unreasonable and might make the
whole convention less significant.355 Ignoring the problem will not make it go away.
355
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One may justifiably argue that even if patent litigation is eventually excluded
from the scope of an international convention on the recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments, at the minimum, such an instrument must allow an American-like
“issue preclusion” mechanism to be included in determining factual issues with respect to
patents.356 In other words, even if the enforcing court is not obligated to recognize and
enforce the legal findings of the foreign court, it can still make use of the factual findings
of such foreign court, thus saving both parties substantial time, money and other
resources that would have been utilized to re-litigate these factual findings. This,
however, depends upon the conclusion that the foreign court follows basic notions of due
process of law, as reflected in international law, in making its factual findings. Adopting
the issue preclusion doctrine as applied in the U.S. and other common law countries can
be of great assistance to us, even if we eventually fail to achieve an understanding as to
the requirements for an international convention on recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments. We can utilize it to take a factual determination of a foreign court and
apply it to a current dispute, even if the legal issues are contested, thus saving money,
would “prevent the development of methods for consolidating worldwide patent actions.”
Dreyfuss & Ginsburg, supra note 320, at 8. However, in my view, this is not a sufficient reason
and we can still reach the consolidation goal by litigating all the cases in the country of
registration, which would be a more reasonable solution, as discussed above.
356
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time and other valuable resources. For example, in In-Tech Marketing Inc. v. Hasbro,
Inc.,357 the Federal District Court for the District of New Jersey decided to grant issue
preclusion to a decision rendered by a Dutch court holding that a patent assignment
agreement had been dissolved due to failure to pay royalties. Since this was a claim for
tortious interference with contractual relations, and one of the elements of such a claim is
the existence of an agreement, the U.S. court used the Dutch Court’s factual finding that
no agreement was in effect to reject the claim.
With regards to the issue of jurisdiction, the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Proposal supports
a much broader set of fora with “adjudicatory authority over the parties,”358 than the
Brussels Convention and the Preliminary Hague Draft. This means that in every set of
facts more than one court can assert jurisdiction over the parties. The idea behind the
adoption of a wide range of possible jurisdictions is the concept of “commitment to
consolidation.” The basis for this proposal is the assumption that courts throughout the
world would cooperate with each other and with the parties in order to find the best place
to litigate the entire dispute, allowing a relatively large number of potential jurisdictions.
It is therefore argued, that this approach will give everyone greater flexibility in resolving
intellectual property disputes.
Once again I have to disagree. In my view, the assumption that courts and parties
would cooperate in order to find the most convenient forum is somewhat naive. The
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“forum non-conveniens” rule is well known in private international law.359 However, in
many cases, and for various reasons, courts in different countries ignore this rule. They
do not do it directly because they do not want to be perceived as violators of international
law, but they do it indirectly by means of interpretation and by distinguishing between
different cases and factual circumstances. Many times courts are weighing various
considerations that do not necessarily directly relate to the dispute. Naturally, courts have
the tendency to try and assist their subjects within their legal borders, and many times
plaintiffs are forum shopping for the forum that will best protect their interests. This is
something that we should try to avoid. Furthermore, it is hard to believe that a plaintiff
who selected a specific forum for its own convenience would cooperate, as in the abovementioned assumption, with the court that tries to send him to another, less favorable,
court.360
Like the Preliminary Hague Draft, the Dreyfuss–Ginsburg Proposal is also
structured as a “mixed” convention. It lists bases for the assertion of jurisdiction, and if a
court having a legitimate jurisdiction renders a judgment, the courts of all Member States
should enforce it. It also lists bases of jurisdiction that are prohibited in cases that involve
parties that are foreign habitual residents of Member States, and it leaves the Member
359
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States with discretion as to the conditions that would apply in the enforcement of
judgments predicated on other bases of jurisdiction.
As mentioned, it gives a relatively long list of bases of jurisdiction that can be
utilized by the courts. Article 3 gives general jurisdiction to the courts of the country
where the defendant is habitually residing.361 The Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Proposal also
acknowledges the growing tendency among parties to reach an agreement that a certain
court or an arbitration body will have jurisdiction over disputes arising between them,
and gives these agreements full validity.362 This is the same idea later advanced in the
2004 Hague Draft previously discussed.
Special consideration was given in the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Proposal to actions
relating to the infringement of intellectual property rights. As we recall, the question of
jurisdiction in infringement actions was very controversial in the drafting of the
Preliminary Hague Draft. The Proposal allows a plaintiff to bring an action for
infringement in the courts of the State where the defendant substantially acted (including
preparatory acts) in furtherance of the alleged infringement, the State to which the alleged
infringement was intentionally directed, or any State in which the infringement
foreseeably occurred.363 A closer look at this suggestion for jurisdiction in infringement
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cases reveals that almost every country that is somehow related to the infringement can
claim jurisdiction. In my view, this solution is far from being perfect. This is especially
true with respect to intellectual property. Most intellectual property rights (i.e. copyrights,
patents and trademarks) are territorial in nature. This means that they are protected only
within the borders of the country that granted them. For example, if one registers the
trademark “Jeansie” for the manufacturing of jeans pants in Israel, it does not mean that
another person cannot register the same mark for jeans pants in Germany without
violating the Israeli trademark. As a result, there is no point in giving jurisdiction to
litigate an infringement claim to a jurisdiction that has nothing to do with the
infringement, simply because the defendant happened to make all the preparatory acts in
this jurisdiction’s territory. The court of this country will be asked to protect intellectual
property rights under the laws of a foreign country, and to interpret laws that the judges
know nothing about and in which they have no vested interest.
With respect to claims for enforcement of agreements pertaining to intellectual
property rights, they can be brought “in any country whose rights are covered by the
Agreement.” If more than one country’s rights are covered by the agreement, the action
can be brought “in the country with the most significant relationship to the contract.”364
What exactly the term “most significant relationship” means is unclear.
According to the remedies section of the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Proposal, monetary
and injunctive relieves (including permanent and preliminary injunctions) rendered by a
competent court (that has jurisdiction over the case) must be recognized by the addressed
courts of a Member State. However, there are a few exceptions to this rule. Punitive and
364
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exemplary damages are recognized only if the addressed court also recognizes them,
while compensatory awards must always be enforced.365 On the other hand, the addressed
court is entitled to refrain from enforcing an injunction in cases of health and safety
hazards, or if fundamental cultural policies are at stake, but only if a damages remedy
would be an effective alternative. In addition, courts other than the one where the suit is
pending are also entitled to render a preliminary injunction, which is limited to the
relevant court’s territory.366
One of the most important issues that are dealt with in the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg
Proposal is the consolidation issue.367 It is argued that the consolidation of disputes
involving intellectual property rights can contribute to the development of sound
intellectual property law and avoid confusion and misunderstandings. The idea that lies in
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the basis of this notion is that “greater consolidation has benefits for both sides because it
preserves litigation resources and reduces opportunities for harassment.”368 I absolutely
agree with Professors Ginsburg and Dreyfuss that consolidation is extremely important in
the modern world and that it will benefit all the parties involved. It will save expenses,
time, and will assist in reaching consistent results. However, I am not certain that this
justifies extending the bases for jurisdiction in such a way that will result in uncertainties
and forum shopping, as mentioned before. I think that an approach that will give
exclusive jurisdiction to the country that granted the right, or where the right is registered,
will be a better solution to the problem, because these courts are much more equipped to
cope with the difficulties of interpreting the relevant laws. Furthermore, providing a
broad list of bases of jurisdiction may potentially lead to difficult results. For example,
we can find ourselves in situations where two parties that are in a dispute file parallel
complaints in two different jurisdictions. Both courts can legitimately decide the case
under the proposed convention and neither agrees to waive jurisdiction based on the lis
pendens doctrine. The result is two contradicting judgments rendered in two different
countries that legitimately asserted jurisdiction over the dispute. What would a court in a
third country now do when faced with these two judgments and asked to enforce them?
2.

The Reason for the Failure of Previous Attempts
There are several explanations that can be provided for the continuing failure to

accomplish the goal of creating an international convention for the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments. One such explanation can be the mistrust and
suspicion that exists between the various countries and legal systems. Some countries and
368
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legal systems, for various reasons, view themselves as superior to others. This can be the
result of not sharing the same ideas as to general concepts of justice, because of
differences in public policies, or simply because they have different due process of law
provisions. The problem with this somewhat psychological explanation is that for various
reasons, it is not something that one can come and say out loud. One country cannot
simply declare that the legal system of another country is so mistrusted that its judgments
cannot be recognized and enforced. For example, it is much easier for an American court
to enforce a judgment rendered by a British court, than it would be for such a court to
enforce a judgment rendered by a religious court in Pakistan or Afghanistan. Therefore,
the fear of taking a broad international obligation to enforce judgments rendered by all
foreign courts is a major obstacle to the adoption of such an instrument.
A closer look at the previous attempts to create an international instrument for the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments may provide us with more
explanations as to the reasons for this lack of success. The common ground for all these
instruments is the fact that they, to a certain extent, tried to mix the issues of recognition
and enforcement with the issue of jurisdiction. All these attempts were based on the
notion of automatic enforcement of foreign judgments by the court addressed, subject to
very limited exceptions, if the rendering court had legitimate jurisdiction based on a list
of pre-approved bases of jurisdiction provided for in the same international instrument.
Even the recent attempt in the Preliminary Hague Draft to create a mixed convention
model based instrument failed, as many believe, due to the use of the Brussels
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Convention as a model.369 These proposals all required the potential members to agree on
bases for the assertion of jurisdiction.
Theoretically, this fact should not necessarily create a problem if the member
countries can actually agree among themselves on the jurisdiction question. However, a
question has to be asked as to why the various players in their efforts to create such an
international instrument neglect to reach an understanding as to the required bases of
jurisdiction. The most significant explanation is that the potential participating countries
have different political, economical and cultural objectives that pull them in different
directions and prevent them from reaching a common ground.370 Each country tries to
follow its own agenda and pursue its own interests that do not necessarily comply with
the interests of other potential members.
There are significant differences in interests among various countries with respect
to the protection of intellectual property rights.371 This reality is not a new one and has
been recognized and addressed long ago. During the negotiations of the TRIPS
Agreement, disagreements arose between different groups of countries that shared
contradicting interests and views regarding the protection of intellectual property rights.
Developed countries such as the U.S., Japan and Members of the European Union
obviously supported a more protectionist approach, as they are the main producers of
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intellectual property rights, especially with respect to patents. A significant part of these
economies is based on the creation, utilization, and export of inventions protected by
intellectual property rights. Therefore, it is not surprising that these countries took a
strong protectionist approach on this issue. Their greatest fear was the possibility that
many of the inventions protected in their territories, which involve significant monetary
and technological investments, would be copied, duplicated, and sold in other countries
where less emphasis is put on protection measures, thus resulting in significant monetary
losses. In addition, they fear that such unauthorized and uncompensated utilization of the
inventions will reduce the incentive to engage in new development in the long run, since
no benefits would result from these inventions if they are easily copied and widely
distributed. On the other side, stood the least developed countries. They have very limited
technological resources and hardly engage in research and development. These are
mostly poor countries with failing economies that are unable to engage in the
development of new technologies and innovation due to lack of resources on one hand,
and are in great need for new technologies and developments introduced in more
developed countries on the other. The direct result of this reality is the provision of very
limited protection to intellectual property rights in these territories. In between stood the
developing countries who do engage in the development of technology, but would benefit
from weaker levels of intellectual property protection.
One of the best examples to describe this inherent conflict between developed and
least developed countries is in the field of pharmaceuticals. For example, the Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (“AIDS”) is the leading cause of death in Sub-Saharan
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Africa countries.372 Unlike what many think or believe, the AIDS disease is a treatable
one, and doesn’t necessarily mean an immediate death. For example, in the U.S. the use
of newly developed drugs managed to quadruple the median survival time from one to
four years.373 The drugs available today do not cure the infected person, but rather
prolong and improve the quality of her life. There are quite a few drugs that treat AIDS
today, that when taken together in what is known as a “cocktail” enable doctors to treat
the disease. The only problem with this optimistic picture is the fact that these drugs are
extremely expensive. In fact, the cost of treatment using these drugs is in the range of
10,000 – 15,000 dollars annually per patient.374 Most of these drugs are the subject matter
of patents. This means that the pharmaceutical companies have a monopoly, for a limited
time, over the sale of these drugs, and control the prices at which these drugs are sold in
the free market. The official explanation given by the pharmaceutical companies for this
high cost is that selling these drugs in Africa for lower prices than in developed countries
will eliminate the companies’ ability to finance any future research and development.375
On the other hand, we simply cannot ignore the poor victims of the AIDS epidemic that
are in great need of these currently very expensive and unaffordable drugs, and facing
death if we cannot furnish them with a reasonable and already existing solution. In other
372
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words, “the exclusivity of patent protection, especially in the pharmaceutical industry,
ought to be seen in the context of balancing the interests of the industry in recovering its
investments on the one hand, and the interests of consumers, and especially low-end
consumers suffering from life threatening illnesses, on the other.”376 It is clear that the
interests of the least developed countries of providing cheap drugs to treat AIDS is the
opposite of that of the developed countries who prefer protecting profits from the sale of
these drugs through patent protection.
As I mentioned above, the differences in interests between various countries were
also a major obstacle in the negotiations of the TRIPS Agreement. The TRIPS Agreement
provides several arrangements to satisfy the needs of the developing and least developed
countries, while still attempting to protect the rights and interests of the developed
countries. For example, the least developed countries were granted a grace period of 10
years to be able to adjust their legal systems and laws to the requirements of minimum
standards set forth in the TRIPS Agreement.377 Similarly, Article 65(2) and (4) allows the
developing countries a grace period, under certain conditions, of four and five years
respectively to make the necessary accommodations. Another solution under TRIPS was
the option governments were awarded to grant compulsory licenses to use and
manufacture foreign patents in certain and unique situations.378
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The same problem of contradicting interests in the protection of intellectual
property rights arises with respect to the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments. The reason is simple. Courts are reluctant to recognize or enforce foreign
judgments if they contradict the enforcing country'
s interests. They can always try to find
a way or a reason to justify avoiding doing so. One may argue that by doing so, these
countries risk the possibility that their own judgments will not be recognized or enforced
in foreign countries, which is something that they probably would like to avoid. In other
words, they rely on the idea of reciprocity to solve this problem, which is based on the
belief that the fear that their own judgments will not be enforced or recognized abroad
will deter them from not enforcing foreign judgments at home. There is one major
problem with this assumption, which links to the differences in interest problem
mentioned above, and causes this whole argument to collapse. Those countries that may
refuse to recognize or enforce foreign judgments are usually the same countries that have
less advanced intellectual property capabilities and provide lower levels of protection (i.e.
developing countries). To simplify the argument, this means that these countries are not
afraid that foreign courts as a penalty or retaliation shall not enforce the judgments that
their courts render, which protect local technologies, because they do not always have
such technologies to protect. From an economic perspective, the gain that they may make
as a result of not enforcing foreign judgments protecting advanced foreign technologies is
far greater than the loss that they may suffer if their judgments are not enforced abroad in
retaliation for their refusal to enforce foreign judgments.
The pattern of the TRIPS negotiations is repeated here. The fact that different
countries have contradicting interests and each of them has its own private agenda leads
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to the inevitable conclusion that it will be very difficult to reach a common ground of
understanding that would make it possible for different countries to agree on an
instrument that would govern recognizing and enforcing foreign judgments. Some
countries are simply more eager to have their judgments recognized and enforced abroad
than others. From a practical perspective, it seems that if a country is determined to allow
intellectual property infringement within its borders because it serves its interests, no one
and nothing will be able to hold it back from doing so. The conclusion, therefore, is that
in order to be able to create such an instrument, a way needs to be found to overcome
these differences in interests, a process that has already started in the drafting of the
TRIPS Agreement.
The only instrument that did not try to mix the issue of enforcement with the issue
of jurisdiction was the 1971 Hague Convention, which was also the only one to ever
reach the advanced stage of ratification. Even though this instrument ultimately failed, we
can be encouraged by its relative success mainly because there were other reasons that
can explain this failure, such as its complex structure that required Member countries to
negotiate bilateral instruments in addition to their signing of the convention, as more
thoroughly discussed before.
To a certain extent, the differences in interest problem may ironically be the very
reason for the relative success of the Brussels and Lugano Conventions, which relate to
participants who, at least in recent years, pursue a similar agenda and interests.
Despite the extensive negotiations, which took place in previous years to reach a
common agreement regarding bases of jurisdiction for issues involving intellectual
property rights, no such understanding has ever been reached, and it is hard to believe
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that it may be reached in the near future. The interests and the gaps involved are simply
too wide. As one U.S. government official has put it: “The group is finding it difficult to
draft rules even in a limited number of areas,”379 not to mention a more comprehensive
instrument. Therefore, the solution should be probably looked for in another direction.
This means that we will need to find a way to somehow circumvent the jurisdiction
problem to avoid antagonism on the part of potential members of such an international
instrument.
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V. JURISDICTION
1.

The Importance of the Jurisdiction Question
The question of jurisdiction is not the focus of this work. However, in writing on

the question of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, one cannot completely
ignore this issue since, as I have concluded in the previous chapter, the lack of agreement
on this issue is the most significant reason and factor in explaining why we currently do
not have, and probably will not have in the near future, an international instrument
regulating the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.
One commentator described the importance of the jurisdiction issue as follows:
“A claimant wants to be able to take action speedily, in a
court close to him and whose rules are familiar to him, in
order to protect the rights which he enjoys or thinks he ought
to enjoy. As for the defendant, he does not want to have to
defend the suit in a court far away from the centre of his
personal or economic interests, and he wants the court
dealing with the case to uphold his right to adversarial
proceedings which respect to the fullest the right of defence.
In our view, therefore, the issue is much more one of direct
jurisdiction than of the recognition and enforcement of
judgments.”380
The question of whether the rendering court has the right to assert jurisdiction in a
specific case is considered by many to be the most fundamental factor in determining
whether to recognize or enforce a foreign judgment, or whether to refrain from doing so.
The negotiations of the Preliminary Hague Draft during the last ten years have proven
that an agreement on this issue will eliminate many of the obstacles involved in the
creation of such a convention, but that such an agreement is very hard to reach.
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The writing of scholars on the issue of the appropriate bases for jurisdiction with
respect to the adjudication of various disputes regarding intellectual property rights is
extensive. In fact, the writing on the jurisdiction issue supersedes to a great extent the
writing on the recognition and enforcement issue. The disagreements among scholars in
this field are significant. There are different approaches and schools of thought and the
controversies are only enhanced by the introduction of new technologies, such as the
Internet, that add new problems to the already existing ones.
In light of the importance of this debate and its direct influence on the current
inability to establish a worldwide system for the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments relating to intellectual property rights, I will now shortly address the
jurisdiction issue in this chapter. My purpose in doing so is not to fully analyze the issues
relating to the jurisdiction question, as this is not the goal of my research and it is beyond
its scope. Rather, I will attempt to provide the reader with a general understanding of the
problems and obstacles that this issue presents, as a possible explanation for the failure of
all recent attempts to solve the recognition and enforcement problem.
In the Anglo-American legal systems the decision by the enforcing court of
whether to recognize or enforce a foreign judgment turns, to a great extent, on the
question whether the rendering court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the case from an
international perspective.381 Put differently, “if a community asserts jurisdiction, it must –
if it wants its judgment enforced – convince others of the justice of its ruling and the
legitimacy of its assertion of community dominion.”382 Many times, when recognition or
381
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enforcement of a foreign judgment is sought, some connection between the losing
defendant and the rendering court can be detected, upon which the rendering court
decides that it has jurisdiction over the matter and the parties. This relationship can have
different forms such as the conducting of business in the rendering forum, a contractual
provision providing the rendering court with the authority to hear the case, or some
impact that affects the rendering forum. This connection between the defendant and the
rendering forum can be regarded as the defendant availing herself to the jurisdiction of
the rendering court, and therefore she should be estopped from arguing that the judgment
is unenforceable.
If one decides to pursue the enforcement of a judgment rendered in her favor in a
foreign jurisdiction, or when a suit is filed for relief based on the ruling of a foreign court,
she is faced with the problem that the court addressed is under no obligation to abide by
the foreign jurisdiction’s ruling, and instead, is free to examine the merits of the case and
refrain from acting on the foreign judgment.383
If a monetary judgment is involved, for example, the court, which rendered the
judgment, will never be able to enforce its own judgment if the defendant has no assets
within the territory over which the rendering court has jurisdiction. In other words, the
rendering court cannot order the seizure and selling of assets located outside its
jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying its judgment. Similarly, if an equitable relief
such as an injunction is involved, the rendering court is unable to order the enforcing
authorities within its jurisdiction, (e.g. the sheriff in the U.S. or the execution authority in
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other countries) to enforce the judgment if the assets, instruments or occurrences involved
in this case are outside the jurisdiction.
The winning party has three options then. She can either decide to give up and
waive her rights, or re-file the lawsuit in a different forum, which is the unlikely solution
because of the costs and waste of resources involved. She can also try to enforce the
judgment in a different forum where the chances of being able to receive what she was
hoping to gain are higher. The latter solution, namely requesting one court to recognize or
enforce a judgment rendered by another court, is not easily implemented, and creates
numerous problems. Some of these problems are shared by all kinds of judgments and
some are more unique to certain fields of law.
There are many considerations that the enforcing court must take into account
before engaging in the recognition or enforcement of a foreign judgment. It is not done
automatically. These include, the extent to which decisions are published and available to
the public in this legal system, as well as the extent to which the rendering court has
traditions of fairness and objectivity, and problems regarding the fairness and objectivity
of the specific adjudication.384
2.

The Term Jurisdiction
The first step in every analysis is to determine the competent jurisdiction in which

the claim should be brought. The plaintiff is likely to attempt to bring the suit in the
jurisdiction in which as many of the intellectual property claims that she can bring may
be consolidated, thus saving expenses and other resources, and maybe allow her to enjoy
the “home court advantage.” For example, if she has protected rights in four different
384
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countries, and these rights were infringed by the same person or entity in all these
countries, she would most likely decide to bring the complaint in the forum that will
enable her to consolidate all or many of the claims, preferably her home country, or a
country with reputation of having protectionist views.
There is no worldwide set of standards for the assertion of jurisdiction by courts.
Each country has its own laws regulating this issue and those may vary from one legal
system to the other. However, there are some common grounds and similarities between
the various legal systems in that respect. Many legal systems will generally assert
jurisdiction if one of the involved parties (plaintiff or defendant) are domiciled or are
nationals of this country and in cases where some kind of harm is caused in or impacting
this territory. This means that there has to be some kind of connection between the parties
or the relevant cause of action and the country where the claim is filed for its courts to
assert jurisdiction. Many times, even a few connecting factors are enough for courts to
assert such jurisdiction, if they feel that the interests of their country are at stake. This
also means that in many given situations, more than one court can assert jurisdiction over
the case. The solutions that are provided in international law to address those situations
where more than one court can assert jurisdiction are based on the doctrines of lis alibi
pendens and forum non-conveniens, which means that the court addressed rejects
jurisdiction in cases where another court have already asserted its own jurisdiction, or
where the addressed court holds that another court is a more appropriate jurisdiction to
adjudicate the case.
Consider the following example given by Professor Eugene Ulmer nearly thirty
years ago. A French traveling theatre company goes on a tour in Belgium. It is
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performing a work, which is subject to copyright protection in Belgium, but is not subject
to copyright protection in France. Clearly a suit can be brought against the French entity
in Belgium, but can a claim be brought in France for violation of Belgian copyrights in
Belgium?385
The term jurisdiction when used with respect to intellectual property rights is very
broad. It can include jurisdiction to adjudicate infringement of the rights; it can include
adjudication of claims regarding the registration of the rights386 or their validity or
cancellation;387 it can include jurisdiction to adjudicate the misuse of a license granted to
use the intellectual property rights and similar claims. In practice, from an international
perspective, the most interesting question is that with respect to the jurisdiction to
adjudicate infringement of intellectual property rights,388 mainly because this is the most
controversial issue.
As previously explained, due to the territorial characteristics of intellectual
property rights, it is well accepted that the protection of the rights is limited to the
geographical borders of the country that granted the right. For example, a U.S. patent can
provide protection against unauthorized exploitation of the patent committed in the U.S.,
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but does not protect against the unauthorized use of this patent in France.389 The question,
however, is whether a suit for infringement of an intellectual property right within the
borders of one country can only be brought in the courts of the country where this right is
protected and therefore infringed, or can it also be brought in other countries as well?
One may wonder why anyone would be interested in bringing a suit for the
infringement of an intellectual property right in a jurisdiction other than that in which the
right is infringed. The reasons are diverse and many explanations can be provided. For
example, if the relief prayed for in the complaint involves monetary damages, and the
defendant is known to have many assets in countries other than that where the right is
infringed, it would not be unreasonable to file the suit in the country where the assets are
located and ask its courts to assert jurisdiction. Another example is when the defendant
resides in a country other than that in which the right is protected, and the plaintiff would
like to have an injunction ordered against the defendant in the country in which he resides
or domiciled, so that if the order is not complied with he could hold the defendant in
contempt of court.
It is interesting to learn that this problem does not only arise as a result of the
development of the Internet and other advanced methods of communications and
transportation, but has been here long before this era. However, the Internet has
contributed significantly to the resurfacing of some of these issues.
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3.

Jurisdiction in Cyberspace
The Internet has changed in many ways the reality in which we live. Its structure

and architecture as a borderless instrument changed in many respects the way we think,
act, and conduct business. Assertion of jurisdiction in the online world is extremely
difficult. The main reason for this is the fact that all legal systems are based on the
general assumption of the existence of borders (i.e. territoriality), whereas such borders
do not exist in the online world. In the digital world, works can be posted on a server
located in one country and be viewed simultaneously in every other country in the
world.390 For example, an unprotected symbol in one country may be posted on the
Internet and viewed from countries where such symbol is protected as a trademark, thus
resulting in an unintentional infringement of the trademark in these other countries. This
borderless reality required the online world to make significant adjustments that are still
in progress and are far from being achieved. There are numerous law review articles and
proposals that were published about this issue, but it still seems that the number of
articles equals the number of proposals to solving this issue, and a comprehensive
possible solution is not in near sight.391
390
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Currently, there are two main schools of thought in the academic debate regarding
the assertion of jurisdiction in the Internet context, for the purpose of creating an
international instrument that will enable international recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments relating to intellectual property rights. The first approach is the
“country of origin”, and the second is the “country of destination.” The former approach
allows the exercise of jurisdiction in the countries in which the source of the transmission
originated (i.e. where the server is located). The latter allows the exercise of jurisdiction
in the countries in which the services, goods, and information are received. There are
many significant problems that these two approaches raise in their application, such as
the “race to the bottom” or the “forum shopping”392 problems in the “country of origin”
approach, and the multiple jurisdictions and the consolidation problems resulting from
the “country of destination” approach.
There are several possibilities to assert jurisdiction with respect to intellectual
property rights infringements in cyberspace. The first option is to assert jurisdiction based
on the defendant’s domicile. In the U.S., for example, though copyright law is federal, the
courts look to the laws of the forum in which they sit in order to assert jurisdiction.
Generally, the defendant can be sued in his domicile or place of business regardless of the
International Copyright in a Digitally Networked World, 20 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 571
(1996); Kathleen Patchel, Choice of Law and Software Licenses: A Framework for Discussion, 26
BROOK. J. INT’L. L. 117 (2000).
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fact that the claim arose somewhere else. By asserting general jurisdiction, the courts can
hear claims regarding the distribution of copyrighted works outside the borders of the
U.S. Another possibility is to assert jurisdiction based on the place of origin of the harm.
The place of occurrence of the harm can be either understood as the place where the harm
was generated, or where the harm impacted. If we select the place where the harm was
generated (i.e. where the communication originated), there still remains a problem in
cyberspace to localize the place it originated. The location of the server in the U.S. would
be a proper solution.393
A different approach to the assertion of jurisdiction in cyberspace is by using the
long arm statute. In this case, the basis for the assertion of jurisdiction is the place of
impact of the harm. In this case, even if none of the operations leading to the impact in
the U.S. actually took place within its borders, the American court would still assert
jurisdiction. In that respect, one of the questions that have been raised is, whether the
availability of the infringed material in the U.S. is sufficient to assert jurisdiction. The
answer to this question depends on constitutional limitations on judicial competence. In
order to assert jurisdiction over a defendant, she has to have “certain minimum contacts
with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice.’”394 This was interpreted to require “some act by
which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities
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within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.”395 The
minimum contacts test used by the American courts is very flexible in the sense that it
leaves the presiding court significant discretion and latitude. This flexibility, however, is
also its greatest disadvantage since the inquiry under the test is very fact specific and it
makes it very difficult for the parties to determine in advance what would be significant
contacts that are enough to expose them to adjudication in a certain fact pattern.396
The question then, is when does a defendant avail herself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum? If it can be proved that she targeted the American
market, the answer is simple – she availed herself. The answer is more complicated when
the defendant was not targeting the U.S., but simply put the work on the Internet (similar
to putting the work in the stream of commerce). It seems that in this case, such an act will
not suffice. Others, however, may claim that by doing so she knew of the possibility that
it would reach the U.S., and therefore, the court should have jurisdiction.
We should also note that with respect to the assertion of jurisdiction, courts in the
U.S. have made a distinction between cases in which the defendant is a “buyer” and cases
in which the defendant is a “seller.” Sellers are usually more extensively regulated than
buyers do, even though this is a generalization and not a perfect distinction. The U.S.
Supreme Court has held in the past that “purchases and related trips, standing alone, are
not a sufficient basis for a State'
s assertion of jurisdiction.”397
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Assuming that sufficient minimal contacts with the U.S. do exist in order to assert
jurisdiction, a question arises as to the scope of the claims that can be litigated in the U.S.
court. The answer to this question seems to be that the defendant is usually required to
defend against those claims that can be localized in the U.S., and not claims regarding
illegal distribution of the copyrighted works elsewhere.398 The main problem with this
approach is that if only long arm jurisdiction can be asserted, the plaintiff will have to
litigate all the claims that cannot be localized in the U.S., elsewhere and will be unable to
consolidate them. Professor Ginsburg introduced a possible solution to this problem. She
offered to apply a “single publication rule,” similar to the one known in cases of libel and
defamation. Under this approach, an American court with personal jurisdiction over a
defendant can provide damages not only for Internet downloads taking place within the
U.S., but also downloads taking place elsewhere.399

defendant in a wrongful death action) with the State of Texas, which consisted of one trip to
Texas by its chief executive officer for purpose of negotiating a transportation services contract,
acceptance of checks drawn on a Texas bank, and purchases of helicopters and equipment from a
Texas manufacturer were not enough contacts to satisfy the requirements of the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See also, Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 43
S.Ct. 170 (U.S. 1923), holding that business visits, “even if occurring at regular intervals, would
not warrant the inference that the corporation was present within the jurisdiction of the state.”
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VI.

THE

BASIC

CHARACTERISTICS

OF

A

POSSIBLE

SOLUTION
Until now my writing has concentrated on the problems that arise when trying to
create an international instrument for the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments relating to intellectual property rights, the attempts to create such an
instrument, and the reasons for their failure. Since even the few regional arrangements
that tried to address this issue, such as the Brussels and the Lugano Conventions,
succeeded in regulating this issue to a very limited extent, one must wonder why.
The common ground to all these instruments, as I previously concluded, is the fact
that they all, to some extent, tried to mix the issues of enforcement and recognition with
the issue of jurisdiction. All of these attempts were based on the notion of automatic
enforcement, subject to very limited exceptions, that is, if the rendering court had
legitimate jurisdiction based on a list of approved bases of jurisdiction provided for in the
same international instrument. In other words, these were all “double convention”
oriented instruments. Even the recent Preliminary Hague Draft attempt to create a mixed
convention failed, as many believe, due to the use of the Brussels double convention as a
model.400 This attempt ignored the cultural and background differences between the
negotiating parties, and some view that as the reason for this unsuccessful attempt to
create an international instrument that regulates the issue. In fact, the Preliminary Hague
Draft was essentially drafted as a double convention and only four days before the
closing of its fourth session, the Special Commission accepted the format of a mixed
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convention.401 “The Special Commission in its work premised a higher degree of
consensus among the Hague Conference Members than existed and ignored the full
implication of the fundamental differences in the economic, political, and institutional
situation that made the Brussels and Lugano Conventions workable, and the global
setting of a Hague Convention.”402
In sum, the debate in the world today among scholars is not about the recognition
and enforcement question, but rather on the bases of jurisdiction issue. Scholars do not
object to recognition or enforcement of foreign judgments, but rather cannot agree on the
bases of jurisdiction upon which these judgments should be rendered and then recognized
and enforced.
I will now look into the possible solutions to the problem and propose what I view
as the most reasonable and only practical solution available in today’s international
climate.
1.

The Bilateral Treaty Solution
As I discussed in previous chapters, the idea of a single multinational instrument

regulating the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments seems by many to be
too ambitious. The possibility of many countries agreeing on all of the different issues
that the creation of such an instrument involves, such as the bases for the assertion of
jurisdiction by the rendering court, at this point, seems remote. As a result other solutions
need to be sought.
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One such possible solution may be to create a set of bilateral treaties between
different countries that regulate and set the standards for the mutual recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments. The idea of utilizing bilateral treaties to achieve
certain goals is not new in international law and has been tried before. For example,
during the years 1913 and 1914 William Jennings Bryan who was three times presidential
candidate and served as U.S. Secretary of State under President Wilson initiated a noble
project that aimed at minimizing the possibility of war in the world. He sponsored the
signing of bilateral agreements with 30 different nations in which the participating
countries undertook it upon themselves to submit international conflicts and disputes to
adjudicating panels in an attempt to solve these disputes before setting on the course of
war. Some of these treaties provided for a cooling-off period of one year before taking
any additional measures. The problem with this solution was that when real disputes
arose and real crisis developed these treaties were not followed and thus, proved to be
useless.403
This idea has some advantages as well as some disadvantages. Negotiating a
single international instrument has proven to be extremely complicated. As I previously
discussed, each participating country has its own agenda and each country has different
interests at stake. Therefore, negotiating a single international instrument is significantly
more complicated than negotiating a bilateral treaty, as the participants need only adhere
to the wills and interests of two parties. Furthermore, negotiating a bilateral treaty rather
than an international or multilateral treaty narrows the scope of controversy and the
403
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number of disputed points. Since each country involved in international negotiations tries
to promote the inclusion of its own interests in the final draft, it is harder to bridge the
gaps between more than two participants and consider all of these interests. Even if an
attempt to bridge the gap between two countries is successful, there is always a
possibility that a third party may disagree with them. Furthermore, in bilateral
negotiations there is a better opportunity to address specific issues and gaps, and in
certain situations, even an opportunity to solve the problems by making certain
adjustments in the substantive laws of the negotiating parties. This is more complicated to
do in multilateral negotiations. With respect to the using of bilateral treaties to resolve
international law problems, it should be noted that intellectual property protection started
with bilateral treaties, which developed the principle of national treatment, to replace the
concept of material reciprocity.
The bilateral instrument solution, however, is far from being a perfect one as well,
even though it is true that it would be significantly easier to reach a bilateral agreement
than an international treaty. Consider the following example: two hypothetical developed
countries share the same ideas with respect to the fair use doctrine in copyright law.
These two countries can fairly easily reach an understanding with respect to the mutual
recognition and enforcement of judgments involving copyright disputes. The question
that one may ask is what exactly did we manage to accomplish with this instrument, and
did we really solve the problem? I argue that if indeed the two countries in my example
share the same basic ideas with respect to copyright laws and both are developed
countries, which follow basic concepts of due process of law, they will recognize and
enforce each other’s foreign judgments with respect to copyrights even without the
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existence of a bilateral treaty between them. They do not need a treaty to do what they
already have been doing. And indeed, the way American courts recognize and enforce
foreign judgments is the best proof of this point.404 The creation of a bilateral treaty in the
above case would definitely not resolve the problems that I try to address in this work –
recognition of judgments of countries that share different views regarding intellectual
property protection.
Another point that we need to address is that if history had taught us anything, it is
that even negotiations between two countries that presumably share the same ideas and
values, are not always likely to succeed because even the most similar countries have
some differences that under certain circumstances may be impossible to bridge. The best
example is that involving the U.S. and British negotiations to create a bilateral treaty for
the recognition of judgments. After the United Kingdom joined the European Community
and the Brussels Convention, the U.S. and the United Kingdom engaged in extensive
negotiations to create a bilateral treaty that would allow mutual recognition and
enforcement of judgments. The purpose, at least from the American perspective, was to
have at least American judgments protected in one major European country, thus
eliminating some of the disadvantage that U.S. businesses were expected to suffer due to
the adoption of the Brussels Convention. “[T]hese negotiations came to naught even
though the United Kingdom and the United States share a common legal heritage and the
British have traditionally been most liberal in recognizing foreign country judgments,
because British insurance and manufacturing interests were leery of excessive American
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jury verdicts and punitive damages awards, as well as judgments in antitrust cases.”405
This attempt indicates that even if two countries share the same interests, there are still
going to be some gaps that may prevent them from reaching an understanding on
sensitive issues, such as the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.
Similarly, if two countries that share different ideas with respect to substantive
intellectual property law also have different ideas about due process of law and adhere to
different public policies, the prospects of reaching an understanding on the recognition
and enforcement issue are significantly lower. In such a situation, the problem of gaps in
substantive views does not disappear merely because there are only two participants
rather than twenty or a hundred. The substantive gap still exists and closing the gap will
not necessarily become easier. The most significant value of a bilateral treaty then would
be in the negotiations stage, because the two participating countries need to address the
requirements and interests of only one more country other than themselves; whereas in
multilateral negotiations, solving a single problem that exist in the negotiations with one
party does not necessarily solve the problems that these two countries may have with a
third country.
2.

The Proposed Multinational Solution
After reviewing and analyzing the different problems that are related to the

recognition and enforcement of foreign intellectual property judgments and their
uniqueness, it is now time to address these problems and complement them with a
proposed solution.
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Creating a single international instrument to regulate the issue of recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments with respect to intellectual property rights is not an
easy task and requires the participating countries to compromise on some of the issues
about which they have very strong feelings. It would require the participants to be
attentive to the needs of others, knowing that others would be attentive to theirs. This will
not be easy because as one commentator has put it “[b]etter the devil we know – and have
learned to live with – than the devil we know not.”406
My proposal for the creation of an international instrument regulating recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments is less ambitious in many respects from all recent
attempts to create such an instrument. However, this may be the very reason why it has a
better chance of gaining approval and support from many countries.
In a nutshell, what I propose to do is adopt a simple convention that only regulates
the issue of recognition and enforcement of intellectual property judgments and refrains
from addressing the issue of jurisdiction. The jurisdiction issue shall be addressed as one
of the listed exceptions to the general enforcement rule, as I will later show. The
proposed convention shall be open for signing to Members of the TRIPS Agreement and
shall be created within the TRIPS framework, thus taking advantage of certain of the
unique characteristics of this agreement and the mechanisms that it already contains.
The convention shall be based on a “presumption of enforceability.” This would
be a rebuttable legal presumption that would hold any foreign judgment recognizable and
enforceable, unless there was any legitimate reason under the agreed upon exceptions not
to do so. This presumption shifts the burden of proof and burden of persuasion to the
406
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party against whom the judgment is being recognized or enforced, to prove that one of
the agreed-upon exceptions should be applied in a specific case. The rationale behind my
proposal is mostly economical. Some call this “judicial economy.”407 We should
recognize and enforce foreign judgments whenever it is economical to do so. In light of
the huge expenses involved in litigating intellectual property disputes, it is almost always
economical to recognize and enforce a judgment unless there is an acceptable noneconomical reason to refrain from doing so. As previously discussed, other possible
rationales are fairness and justice.
In order to enable as many countries as possible to join the convention without
fearing that their interests may be hurt, these exceptions should be drafted very broadly so
that they can be utilized more freely. It is likely that countries would object less to joining
the convention if they know that if there is a real need, they can back off and avoid
recognition and enforcement of the foreign judgment based on an exception to the general
rule. One of these exceptions is lack of jurisdiction on the part of the rendering court. In
order to avoid the lack of agreement previously discussed with respect to the jurisdiction
issue and the complications it involves, it must appear as an exception to the presumption
of enforceability, rather than as a prerequisite for recognition and enforcement, as has
been done until now. This exception is extremely important with respect to intellectual
property matters and allows the court addressed to refuse enforcement if it has a
legitimate reason to determine that the rendering court should not have heard the specific
case due to lack of jurisdiction. Another exception to the general rule should be that of
due process of law. Articles 40 and 41 of the TRIPS Agreement should guide what
407
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exactly constitutes due process of law. In addition, there must be a broad public policy
exception that must be drafted along the lines of the TRIPS Agreement. I will later
discuss these exceptions more thoroughly.
Even though this proposal does not solve all the problems raised throughout the
years with respect to the recognition and enforcement issue, it does provide an excellent
starting point and framework for the establishment and building of trust, confidence and
reliance between the potential member countries. At the very least, it creates a binding
international obligation on the part of the participating countries to recognize and enforce
foreign judgments. These countries can utilize the proposed exceptions to the
presumption in order to refrain from doing so, but they shall still be limited to the four
corners of these exceptions and would have to provide a good explanation to their fellow
countries, as well as expose themselves to limited levels of retaliation, if they decide to
ignore the foreign judgment.
There are two additional issues that my proposal addresses. The first is the
problem that results from situations in which the rendering court provides the plaintiff
with a remedy that is unknown or unavailable in the enforcing legal jurisdiction. For
example, a court provides the plaintiff with an injunction and the plaintiff is unable to
enforce it in another country because injunctions are not recognized as a remedy in this
country. In such a case, I propose to use a method of “enforcement in proximity.” This
means that the enforcing court must substitute the remedy provided by the rendering
court with the closest remedy available in his jurisdiction, thus attempting to minimize
the negative effects on the plaintiff. In other words, it must substitute the provided
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remedy with another remedy that shall, as closely as possible, achieve the goal intended
by the rendering court.
In the long run, my proposal also calls for the creation of an international court
system that shall enable a private party to contest the refusal of one court to enforce a
judgment rendered by a court in another country. Such a court system shall be expected
to do the same line of work that is currently done by the European Court of Justice with
respect to the Brussels Convention. However, at this stage, it is pre-mature to make this
newly created court system a part of the overall solution since it would create an
unnecessary artificial barrier to the adoption of such convention.
Potentially, if my proposal is adopted and proven to be successful in resolving the
problems associated with recognition and enforcement of foreign intellectual property
judgments, it could be broadened to cover other subject matters as well, thus creating a
novel, more general solution to the problem, which currently does not exist. Put
differently, it could serve as “the pilot” for a broader in scope convention, which is not
solely related to intellectual property rights, and achieve what all past attempts previously
discussed have failed to achieve.
The central pillar of my proposal for a new international convention is the
realization that the solution to the recognition and enforcement problem should be
developed gradually over time. By proposing a rebuttable presumption of enforceability
and broad exceptions I attempt to create “soft law” that would be fairly easy for potential
participants to get used to at this point. Over time, as confidence and trust are built, we
would be able to narrow these exceptions and close potential loopholes. What we are
doing now is simply planting the seeds for the future. This is a gradual process that
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should not be taken lightly; an international and moral obligation to recognize and
enforce foreign intellectual property judgments should not be taken for granted, as it is far
more than what we have in place today.
Gradual development of international law is not a new paradigm with respect to
intellectual property rights. Professor Jerome Reichmen has proposed the following two
analogies with respect to the development of international intellectual property law over
time that may serve to convince most skeptics that my proposal has great potential to
solve the recognition and enforcement problem:
When the Paris Convention was adopted in 1883 it addressed the protection of
trademarks to a very limited extent. The original Article 6 of the Paris Convention simply
provided that every trademark duly filed in the country of origin had to be accepted for
filing and protected in its original form in other countries of the Paris Union. Paragraph 4
of the Final Protocol provided that the above provision was an exception to the rule,
which concerned solely the form of the mark and national laws governing the filings of
trademarks. In other words, “the general rule of the Convention was the application of
national laws regarding all trademarks registrations in the countries concerned.”408 Parts
of the original Article 6 were later included in the new Article 6quinquies.409 This was an
example of soft law that left substantial discretion to national laws of the countries where
registration of the mark was sought. Over the 120 years that have passed since the first
Act of the Paris Convention, this very broad discretion has narrowed substantially and the
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very soft law gradually but consistently disappeared. The Members of the Paris Union
have grown accustomed to the idea of the protection of trademarks, have cooperated with
each other over a long period of time, and most importantly built trust and confidence. As
a result, the Members of the Paris Union agreed to the adoption of Article 6quinquies,
which narrowed substantially the discretion of national courts. This revolutionary
standard provides that “[e]very trademark duly registered in the country of origin shall be
accepted for filing and protected as is in the other countries of the Union,” subject to
certain exceptions. This provision is revolutionary in the sense that it means that
Members of the Union must honor trademarks registered in other Member countries “asis.”
Article 6quinquis overrides both national treatment as well as the rule of
independence of trademarks. It is literally a minimum standard, and in fact, the registrant
may claim better treatment in the country where the new registration is sought than its
own nationals get.
In addition, one should not forget that there is no definition of the term trademarks
in the Paris convention but only the negative drafting in 6quinquies defines them. Later
on in the early 1990s when the TRIPS Agreement was adopted, Article 15 defined marks
for the first time rather broadly, including service marks.
There is a great difference between the state of trademarks protection in 1883 and
what we have today. We started with a very soft rule that left the participating countries
with substantial discretion and ended up with a narrower and stronger rule of trademark
protection today. The supernorm 6quinquies set out ostensibly soft law, the ground for
denial of registration, which gradually hardened and negatively defined a harmonized
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trademark regime, capped by TRIPS article 15.1, in 1994. Interestingly, when the Paris
Convention was adopted in 1883, “the only ground for refusal or invalidation of the
registration of trademarks covered by the Article under consideration was contained in
the rule (then paragraph 4 of Article 6) that filing may be refused if the object for which it
is requested is considered contrary to morality or public order.”410 The 1911 Washington
Conference substantially extended and broadened these grounds and they were further
developed at The Hague (1925), London (1934) and Lisbon (1958).
Another, perhaps more interesting example is that involving the protection of
unfair competition under international law. In 1883, when the Paris Convention was
adopted, unfair competition was not even within the scope the protected subject matter.
Professor Bodenhausen describes the evolution of Article 10bis:
“[t]he Additional Act, adopted by the Revision Conference
of Brussels in 1900, introduced the latter principle [national
treatment] with respect to unfair competition in a newly
inserted Article 10bis. The Revision Conference of
Washington in 1911 went a step further, in introducing into
the said Article the obligation for all Member States to
assure to nationals of the Union effective protection against
unfair competition. This obligation was strengthened, and a
definition and examples of acts of unfair competition were
introduced in the Article by the Revision Conference of the
Hague in 1925. The Revision Conference of London in
1934 improved these provisions, and the Revision
Conference of Lisbon in 1958 added a further example of
acts of unfair competition.”411
The adoption of the definition and minimum standards in subsection 3 forced the
Members of the Paris Union to finally take positive actions to protect unfair competition
in their national laws. It was American scholars'realization that the U.S. was not in
410

Id. at 114.

411

Id. at 142-43.

212

compliance with its international obligations under the Paris Convention, which resulted
in the adoption of the original version of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.
The last development in that respect was the extension of the unfair competition
protection in Article 10bis of the Paris Convention to also cover trade secrets in Article
39 of the TRIPS Agreement.
3.

Basic Assumption - Bases of Jurisdiction will Not Work
When talking about a new convention regulating the recognition and enforcement

of foreign judgments in intellectual property matters, we must first discuss the question of
how such a convention should be structured. Each of the possible structures has certain
advantages and disadvantages. Answering this question is not easy and instigates a fierce
debate. It appears that this preliminary decision is the most fundamental element for the
success of every new instrument regulating this field. Before proceeding to the analysis
stage of each of the possible solutions, I will first shortly define them.
The first possible solution is one that involves a simple convention.
“A simple convention deals only with the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments and is therefore not
concerned with matters of direct jurisdiction. In other
words, it does not respond to the question as to when courts
have jurisdiction in proceedings instituted for the first time.
If a simple convention contains rules on jurisdiction, they
are only rules on indirect jurisdiction. These are rules
which, only a posteriori, at the stage of the recognition and
enforcement of the judgment, serve to verify the
jurisdiction of the court of origin in order to ascertain
whether its decision may or may not be recognized or
enforced in the State addressed.”412
412

ON

Catherine Kessedjian, SYNTHESIS OF THE WORK OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION OF JUNE 1997
INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND EFFECTS OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL AND

COMMERCIAL MATTERS (Hague Conference on Private International Law, Preliminary Document

213

The best example for the use of this model in an international instrument is the
1971 Hague Convention.
The second possible structure is the double convention.
“A double convention deals with both the question of direct
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments. It thus responds to the question as to which
court has jurisdiction to entertain proceedings and to that as
to the effect of the judgment thus delivered.”413
The double convention model traditionally includes an exhaustive list of grounds
of jurisdiction. This means that the rendering court has no discretion as to the assertion of
jurisdiction based on grounds of jurisdiction not provided for in the convention. In other
words, if the rendering court asserts jurisdiction based on a basis of jurisdiction that is not
provided for in the convention, it takes the risk that other Member states will refuse to
recognize or enforce the judgment merely because they are under no international
obligation to do so. The Brussels and Lugano Conventions are examples of conventions
based on this model.
The third structure that is available and sometimes viewed as a sub-chapter of the
double convention model is the mixed convention. A mixed convention “specifies the
authorized grounds of jurisdiction, the prohibited ones and in which all the other grounds,
No 8 of November 1997) Footnote1, at 1. See also CONSULTATION PAPER ON THE DRAFT HAGUE
CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF
JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL OR COMMERCIAL MATTERS, International Law Division, Department of
Justice
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i.e. those falling neither within the category of authorized grounds nor within that of the
prohibited grounds, are left as a matter for national law to decide freely.”414 The most
important element in the mixed convention model is that the rendering court may assert
bases of jurisdiction other than the mandatory ones provided for in the convention, which
leaves him a greater amount of discretion. In other words, “[w]ith a mixed convention . . .
States must always make the authorized grounds of jurisdiction available to the litigants,
but they may retain other grounds of jurisdiction.”415
When asked to recognize or enforce a foreign judgment based on a mixed
convention, the enforcing court has some discretion based on the basis of jurisdiction
utilized by the rendering court. If the rendering court asserted jurisdiction based on one of
the mandatory bases provided for in the convention, recognition and enforcement would
be nearly automatic, subject to certain limitations.416 If the rendering court asserted
jurisdiction based on one of the prohibited bases provided for in the convention and
therefore is not in compliance with its provisions, every court in other Member countries
must refuse enforcement of the judgment. With respect to those bases of jurisdiction that
are not covered or addressed in the convention, which means that they are neither allowed
nor prohibited under the convention, the enforcing court may decide for itself whether to
go ahead and enforce the judgment or simply refuse to do so. This means that the
enforcing court is not prohibited nor compelled to do so.
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To a certain extent, the mixed convention model is much more similar to a simple
convention than to a double convention due to the fact that it enables the rendering court
to provide, and the enforcing court to recognize and enforce judgments that are not
limited to the bases of jurisdiction provided for in the convention itself. Rather, it can
implement some independent discretion. The Preliminary Hague Draft is an example of
the using of the mixed convention model.
As I previously concluded, there are very slim chances that in the near future an
international agreement may be reached as to the bases of jurisdiction that should be
provided to litigate intellectual property disputes involving international elements. The
“double convention” model as previously described does not seem to be working. All
previous attempts failed because the representatives of the participating countries could
not reach an understanding on the appropriate bases of jurisdiction that should be
adopted. As I previously mentioned, the two main reasons for this inability to reach an
understanding on these issues is the different interests that each of these participating
countries has, and the mistrust between the different countries in each other’s courts and
judges. These differences are substantially based on cultural and most importantly
economic differences. In this environment, the prospects that such an agreement will ever
be reached do not appear to be very encouraging.
For this reality to change, many things that currently seem extremely unlikely to
take place must occur. The cultural and economical gaps between very rich countries that
support strong protection of intellectual property, such as the U.S., and poorer and less
fortunate countries that have less of an interest in the protection of intellectual property
rights, yet still joined the TRIPS Agreement simply because they had to do so in order to
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join the WTO and be Members of GATT, seem impossible to bridge at this point in time.
Nothing in the near future can be expected to change this reality. It is enough to look at
the circumstances surrounding the Preliminary Hague Draft negotiations to prove this
point. For ten years, the participants have been trying to agree on a list of bases for the
assertion of jurisdiction with no apparent success. From the extensive writing on the issue
of jurisdiction, it is clear that the number of different views matches the number of
writers on the topic. In fact, the recent developments in that respect, where the idea of a
broad, mixed convention has been abandoned and replaced with a very limited
convention on choice of court agreements, is the best proof that no real progress has been
made and that we have returned back to square one where we started over ten years ago.
This was a real life experiment on the dynamics surrounding the drafting of an
international convention on this topic with results that are by far more accurate than
anything we could have achieved in any other way.
History has proven that the double convention structure is likely to succeed only
in situations where the participating countries share the same views and political, cultural
and economical interests. The need to agree on a close list of bases for the assertion of
jurisdiction, which is the very basis for the success of such an international instrument,
requires the participating countries to have substantial confidence in each other,
something that can be usually found in regional agreements, and is lacking in the broader
international forum. There is a very simple psychological explanation to this
phenomenon. It is much easier to trust and expose yourself to something or someone you
know than to the unknown. It is not surprising then that the Brussels and Lugano
Conventions were a relative success. They are both regional instruments that were
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negotiated among countries that share very similar cultural, political, historical and most
importantly economical background. The fact that some of these countries were long time
historical enemies does not change this conclusion. At the point of time in which the
European countries negotiated these instruments, they shared a joined view of a united
Europe and their political and economic interests were extremely close to each other. In
other words, they had a real incentive and interest in the successful implementation of
these new Conventions. This means that even if they did not necessarily agree on
everything, they sometimes agreed to swallow the bitter pill for the sake of later enjoying
the benefits of belonging to this Union of countries. It is clear that the history that these
countries share is one of the key factors that made it easier for them to agree. The
economic gain that they were expected to generate from joining the union compensated
them for the concessions they had to make and the fear and risks involved. To some
extent, the relative success of these two instruments is similar to the success of the sister
states recognition and enforcement system in the U.S., which is based on “full faith and
credit.” Both examples are based on the larger commitment that these Members have
towards one another.
It is therefore not surprising that during the Preliminary Hague Draft negotiations
the proponents of a double convention were the European countries.417 Only in a later
stage, a few days before the official publication of the first draft of this convention was it
decided to revise it and turn it into a mixed convention. The reason for this sudden
change was the fear that an instrument structured as a double convention would never be
signed because of the limited discretion available to the participating countries whether or
417
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not to assert jurisdiction. Independent countries do not like the idea of a possible
interference with their sovereignty and require that they have the option to decide for
themselves how to react in each given situation. The hope was that the mixed convention
structure would make it easier for them to accept the limitations on their discretion by
providing them with some more latitude than in a double convention. It was the American
delegation, which pressured the delegates to agree to a mixed convention structure
arguing that for constitutional reasons it could not participate in a double convention.418
In a perfect world, where everyone shares the same interests and follows the same
agenda, the double convention model would have been the ultimate solution, because it
provides security and an element of predictability that are so important in the business
world. The only problem is that we do not live in a perfect world and there are many
conflicting interests, which make it very difficult for different countries to reach a mutual
understanding as to the way judgments should be internationally recognized and
enforced. There is a great difficulty inhibiting the international community from reaching
an understanding as to the list of bases of jurisdictions that can serve as the basis for an
international convention structured as a double convention.
In light of the above, I do not see any prospects in continuing to explore the
option of a “double convention” based instrument to solve this problem. It is not the lack
of understanding among law professors and scholars that prevent us from reaching this
goal. It is the political agenda and conflicting interests that the participants pursue, as
well as their conflicting economical and cultural backgrounds that are the main obstacle
to reaching such an agreement. It is my view that following the path previously taken by
418
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others to regulate the issue of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in
intellectual property disputes is the wrong path to take and any such attempt is doomed to
follow in the footsteps of its predecessors and result in a failure.
A different model is required to address this issue – one that would manage to
circumvent or eliminate the lack of agreement on the issue of jurisdiction lying in the
basis of the continuing failure of the “double convention” model. Therefore, my proposed
solution attempts to assist the international community in its efforts to reach an
understanding as to the way foreign intellectual property judgments should be recognized
and enforced despite the differences in opinions, agendas and interests, and without
having to unnecessarily step into the minefield of the jurisdiction issue. Needless to say
that this, or every other proposal, will fail to achieve its goals, if sincere attempt by the
participating countries to resolve the differences is not made. After all, it is mainly about
politics and personal agendas, and if the participating countries decide not to cooperate
due to their own personal reasons, nothing can force them to go all the way. We can
provide these countries with the solution, but we cannot enforce them to adopt and
implement it.
4.

A Simple Convention Model as a Possible Solution
An alternative solution to the recognition and enforcement problem can be the

creation of an instrument based on the simple convention model, which only regulates the
recognition and enforcement issues and avoids doing so with respect to the jurisdiction
issue. In today'
s world, where technology is fast developing and there is no need for one
to be present at a certain place to conduct business, many fear that people will take
advantage of this reality in what some call a “race to the bottom” and others view as
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“forum shopping.” For example, one may choose to locate a server in certain countries
knowing that these countries have more flexible intellectual property laws that may allow
her to minimize exposure to copyright or trademark infringements. Similarly, she can
locate a server in a country that does not recognize the concept of moral rights and then
engage in certain infringing activities with the knowledge that this website is accessed
from a country like France which does recognize such rights. The server owner may
choose the court of this country as the forum to adjudicate her claim for a declaratory
judgment that she is entitled to engage in such activity, which is not forbidden, as we
recall, in this forum.
One of the most important elements in entering into an international business
transaction is predictability and the ability to know and be certain where the litigation
would take place in cases of disputes between the business parties. Knowing which court
will assert jurisdiction in cases of disputes will make it easier for the participating parties
to calculate the risks involved in entering into the transaction. This is why it is so popular
in practice today to ensure that the parties are clear as to which court will litigate any
dispute between them by using forum selection provisions. The importance of the
element of predictability in business transactions is not to be underestimated.
I argue that even though the solution of a simple convention is maybe less
attractive than that of a double or mixed convention because it lacks the element of
predictability, it is still a good solution, at least in the short run, especially in light of the
fact that the chances of reaching an agreement based on these two models are slim if not
non-existent. To put it differently, it is better to have something than to have nothing. A
default solution is better than not having a solution. A simple convention will leave the
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jurisdiction problems to the discretion of the participants and would make it easier for
them to join the proposed international instrument. They will not feel as if anyone
interferes with their sovereignty and will feel more comfortable taking the risk of entering
into this adventure. It seems that the possibility of reaching an understanding and
agreement on a simple model based convention is much more real than the other nonavailable options.
Most importantly, this proposed convention creates an international obligation to
recognize and enforce foreign intellectual property judgments. The international
commitment undertaken by the potential participants in the proposed treaty also includes
a moral obligation and a duty of transparency that could fall under the TRIPS Agreement.
In order to support my theory I looked for examples of currently existing
instruments that were drafted as a simple convention and are successfully working. One
such instrument is the Inter-American Convention on Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign
Judgments and Arbitral Awards signed in Montevideo on May 8, 1979419 (the
“Montevideo Convention”). The Convention was ratified and is now in force in nine
countries.420
This Convention is very short and is literally very simple. The purpose of the
Montevideo Convention is to ensure the extraterritorial validity of judgments and arbitral
awards in the Member countries.421 The Montevideo Convention applies substantially “to
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judgments and arbitral awards rendered in civil, commercial or labor proceedings in one
of the States Parties”422 subject to certain reservations they can make. The instrument
contains a set of conditions that if met, the judgment has extraterritorial effect in all the
Member countries. The conditions for enforcement set forth by the Montevideo
Convention are very basic and include: fulfillment of all formal requirements so that the
judgment be deemed authentic in the rendering jurisdiction, adequate translation of the
relevant documents, assurance that the parties had an opportunity to present their
arguments and defense, the judgment must have the effect of res judicata in the rendering
country, and no basis exists for a public policy exception in the country of
enforcement.423
Most interesting to us is the fact that the Montevideo Convention does not
regulate the issue of jurisdiction. The only reference in the Montevideo Convention to the
issue of jurisdiction can be found in Article 2, which requires the enforcing court as a
condition for enforcement of the foreign judgment to verify that the rendering judge or
tribunal were competent “in the international sphere” to provide the judgment “in
accordance with the law of the State in which the judgment . . . is to take effect.” The
debate surrounding the potential bases for the assertion of jurisdiction as it appeared in
The Hague Preliminary Draft negotiations, the Brussels and Lugano Conventions or even
in the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Proposal is absent in this case. It is simply avoided. If a
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judgment cannot be executed for some reason or the other in its entirety, the judge may
agree, at the request of an interested party to partial execution.424
The avoidance of dealing with the issue of jurisdiction is especially interesting in
light of the fact that some of the Member countries of the Montevideo Convention have
unstable political situations, and their judicial systems have suspicious reputations with
respect to corruption. In light of this fact, it would have been expected that there be more
emphasis on the issue of jurisdiction, and that the parties be more careful about it, as this
would limit the discretion of the rendering court with respect to whether it is authorized
to hear a specific case or not, thus avoiding any opportunities for corruption. In fact, that
was not the case when the Montevideo Convention first came into force and it is for the
enforcing court to determine the jurisdiction issue with respect to the rendering court.
A very interesting development took place in 1984 that may provide us with an
indication about the superiority of the simple convention model. In that year there was an
attempt to complement the Montevideo Convention with a new convention that attempted
to regulate the issue of indirect jurisdiction. This was the Inter- American Convention on
Jurisdiction in the International Sphere for the Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign
Judgments425 signed at La Paz, Bolivia on May 24, 1984 (the “La Paz Convention”). The
purpose of the La Paz Convention was to complement the Montevideo Convention and
provide a set of bases of jurisdiction that, if complied with, satisfied the jurisdiction
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requirement under Article 2(d) of the Montevideo Convention previously discussed.426
The La Paz Convention was signed by many countries, but was ratified only by Mexico
and therefore, never came into force. In other words, once these countries tried to replace
the simple convention model with a double convention model that also regulated the issue
of jurisdiction, the whole structure collapsed.
Interestingly, the idea of not addressing the issues of jurisdiction should
theoretically be relatively easy to accept for the U.S., which is expected to take an
important role in any future negotiations of such an international recognition and
enforcement convention. In fact, the UFMJRA, like a simple convention, does not
provide bases for the assertion of jurisdiction of the rendering court as a prerequisite to
the enforcement of foreign judgments. All it provides in Section 4 is that a judgment shall
not be conclusive and thus available for recognition in the U.S. if the rendering court did
not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant, or if it did not have subject matter
jurisdiction. In other words, like in a simple convention model, U.S. courts adopting this
model act do not have to address the issues of jurisdiction as a prerequisite for
enforcement, or limit themselves to a given set of bases of jurisdiction, very much like in
my proposal.
The advantages of a simple convention are seen in yet another example that
avoids regulating issues of jurisdiction. I am referring to the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards signed in New York on June
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10, 1958427 (the “New York Convention”). The New York Convention is extremely
important to this research for one very important reason. It managed to create a very
useful and widely recognized system for the international recognition and enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards based on a model that concentrates on the recognition and
enforcement part, and ignores issues of jurisdiction. This convention resembles to a great
extent, with respect to arbitral awards, the simple convention model that I am discussing,
and apparently is very successful. The fact that the New York Convention has been
adopted and ratified by over 120 countries and has been successfully followed for forty
five years is an indication of the potential success of a simple convention attempting to
regulate recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.
Under the New York Convention each contracting state must “recognize arbitral
awards as binding and enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the
territory when the award is relied upon.”428 All the parties need in order for the New York
Convention to apply, is an arbitral award and an arbitration agreement.429 The arbitration
agreement requirement should be viewed as the most important element of the New York
Convention, as it provides the basis and source for the authority of the arbitrator or the
arbitration panel to hear the case on the merits and provide the award. In other words, it
provides the basis for the assertion of jurisdiction by the arbitrator or panel. The basis for
international commercial arbitration as reflected in Article 2 of the New York Convention
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is the presumption that contracts made in international commerce between
businesspeople have designated a neutral forum for the resolution of their disputes. This
presumption is important to the understanding of the difference between an arbitration,
where the defendant had agreed in advance to the adjudication of the dispute in front of
an arbitration panel, and an international judgment, where the plaintiff sometimes drags
the defendant into litigation in a forum she did not agree to. By analogy, this is similar in
many ways to the preliminary requirement in a simple convention model that the
rendering court have jurisdiction over the parties and the dispute. It seems that once
Member countries realized that this instrument does not threaten their sovereignty, the
way to a full acceptance of this mechanism was short.430 One must raise the question,
why would one country object to the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment
if it already recognizes similar judgments rendered by an arbitration panel that is not even
subject to the same legal constraints and appellate review that a judge is subject to? As
one commentator has put it “[i]t is ironic that decisions that are less formal and subject to
less review are entitled to transnational recognition, whereas judgments rendered in court
systems are not.”431
One may try and argue that the great success of the New York Convention is no
indication of the potential success of a simple model based convention because here the
parties voluntarily submit to a neutral third party arbitrator. I disagree with this argument.
It is absolutely true that in a perfect world, a third party arbitrator is expected to be very
neutral and the arbitration voluntary. This, however, is far from being true in today’s
430

Kessedjian, supra note 298, at 9.

431

McGarrigle, supra note 25, at 137.

227

world where arbitration has long been neither voluntary nor neutral. In the modern world,
almost everywhere you go and every time you purchase something, whether it is a credit
card, insurance policy, or a car, you find yourself forced to sign an arbitration clause
contained in the purchase or service agreement. You cannot, of course, negotiate out of
this clause because the seller or the service provider will refuse to enter into the
transaction without this clause. Because this is the custom in many industries and
markets, you cannot simply get the product or service from someone else since everyone
in the industry require the same very clause.432 As to the neutrality argument, arbitrations
today are to a great extent conducted by institutions that were specifically created for that
purpose, such as the American Arbitration Association. These institutions have great
financial interests in the arbitration as they have to attract more business. Sometimes one
company, such as a bank, utilizes one such institute to conduct hundreds of procedures
each year and the customer has really no choice, but to participate. These companies are
repeat players and it is not so apparent that they do not have the “home court advantage”
in these disputes. Therefore, it is not clear that such an arbitrator is more neutral and
objective than an independent foreign court. Since we tend to enforce such arbitral
awards, there is no justification to avoid enforcing foreign judgments in a simple model
based convention.
It is true that there is a growing body of law in the U.S. today that restrains the use
of mandatory arbitration clauses that are “unconscionable”, as previously discussed.
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However, arbitral awards are still widely enforced in the U.S. Furthermore, this fact does
not change the analysis since when foreign judgments are involved, courts may utilize the
public policy exception to refuse recognition of the foreign judgment.
Before adopting an instrument based on the simple convention model, we must
ask what do we really accomplish by doing so? Do we really solve the jurisdiction
problem by ignoring it? One of the main arguments in opposition of the simple
convention idea is that it really does not solve anything, because the jurisdiction problem
does not go away. In other words, the fact that we refrain from including agreed upon
bases of jurisdiction in the convention does not mean that the enforcing court can avoid
looking into whether the rendering court could have rendered the judgment. The
enforcing court will still need to address this issue before recognizing or enforcing the
foreign judgment, but it will not have a convention to use as a guide.
It should be noted that when the negotiations of the Preliminary Hague Draft
started in 1992, the idea of creating a simple convention was immediately turned down.
Opponents of this proposal suggested that such an instrument “would not be an
improvement on the current situation and practice” 433 (i.e. no convention at all). They
argued that in the current legal situation each country could decide for itself whether it
should assert jurisdiction and whether it should recognize or enforce a foreign judgment.
Therefore, if we do not agree on the bases for the assertion of jurisdiction we do not
really do anything new because each country can continue to do whatever it had done
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at

before. This alleged justification for avoiding a simple convention solution is far from
being accurate. Even though such a convention will not provide a list of agreed upon
bases for the assertion of jurisdiction, it will change dramatically the current international
regime. It will add a major international obligation and a moral commitment on the part
of all of the participating countries to recognize and enforce foreign judgments,
something that does not exist under the current regime and should not be underestimated.
This is a major improvement to what we have today. Sovereign countries must abide by
their commitments under international law. Most countries recognize international law or
at least pretend to make significant efforts to comply with their international obligations.
They do so out of respect for other countries and in an attempt to maintain some kind of
global order. Even though the mechanisms that the international community can utilize in
order to force its members to fulfill their international obligations are extremely limited,
these obligations have tremendous power merely by their very existence. Countries are
very careful to comply with their international obligations. Not many countries can afford
themselves to ignore other countries, and history has proven that even the stronger
countries are careful not to violate their international undertakings, preferring the way of
diplomacy. No country would like to be viewed as an outsider by the international
community. It is true that the chances that the international community will attack a
country that refused to enforce another country’s judgment with nuclear weapons are
slim, but there are other civilian and commercial methods of retaliation, such as trade
sanctions, that the international community can take in order to force non-complying
Members to live up to their international obligations.
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In sum, a worldwide simple convention that regulates the issue of recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments will make a great contribution. It will create a set of
mutual international undertakings on the part of all of the participating countries with
whom they will have to comply. At the same time, it will be significantly easier for the
different countries to agree to enter into such a convention, as previously discussed,
because the issue of jurisdiction will not be within the scope of this convention and they
will still have great latitude and discretion. At least for now, this seems to be the only
practical solution.
5.

Presumption of Enforceability
The basis for the idea of a simple convention is that a judgment is always

recognized or enforced unless there is a good reason not to do so. My proposal includes a
rebuttable legal presumption that every foreign judgment is entitled to recognition and
enforcement. I will refer to this as a “presumption of enforceability.” Under this rule, the
court addressed will always automatically recognize and enforce the foreign judgment
when asked to do so. Like other legal presumptions, the party against whom the judgment
is recognized or enforced carries the burden of proving and convincing the court that
there is a legitimate reason for which it should refrain from doing so. In other words, the
party objecting to the recognition of the foreign judgment has to overcome the
presumption.
The TRIPS Agreement establishes the minimum standards tool, which provides us
with a wide enough basis that justifies the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments and the existence of a presumption of enforceability. The minimum standards
requirement is broad enough to put all of the Member countries of the TRIPS Agreement
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on a similar platform that will guarantee that to a certain and sufficient extent, the laws of
all Member countries are substantially similar to those of their own and thus, will make it
easier for them to enforce the judgment even though the laws of the rendering and the
enforcing forums are not identical. One must keep in mind that the basic assumption is
that identity is not required for recognition or enforcement of judgments. In fact, if
identity is required, the international rules guarding the enforcement process are
substantially less needed as previously discussed. These rules exist to address specifically
those situations where substantive differences do exist, in order to promote social and
legal causes such as reciprocity, cooperation and to save economic resources.
Interestingly, the idea of such a presumption of enforceability may already be
found in other legal systems. For example, the recognition and enforcement of judgments
system in Germany established in Section 328 of the Code of Civil Procedure
(Zivilprozessordnung, ZPO) provides a negative list of grounds for refusal of such
recognition. It other words, it assumes the recognition of such judgments as a general
rule.434 Recognition will not take place for certain reasons such as lack of jurisdiction,
fault in service of process, obvious incompatibility with German legal principles, and the
absence of any guarantee of reciprocity.435
After the proposed convention is adopted, it can be expected that case law
interpreting the convention will emerge thus creating additional jurisprudence. The new
rules created by case law with respect to the reasons why not to enforce judgments can
later be inserted as rules or standards into the convention through negotiations.
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For the presumption to arise, the party addressing the court or seeking recognition
or enforcement of the foreign judgment must only prove that the judgment is genuine. For
that to happen, she must carry the burden of providing a true, correct, and authenticated
copy of the judgment at issue. This is a very simple rule that may be easily complied
with. The purpose of the rule is to make it as easy as possible for people to have favoring
judgments recognized and enforced in foreign countries. Once this requirement has been
complied with and the presumption established the opposing party must satisfy the
burden of proving that there is a legitimate reason for the court addressed to refuse the
recognition or enforcement of the judgment. As I will later discuss, there are several
reasons why a foreign judgment should not be enforced. These reasons include, among
others, neglect to follow due process of law and violation of the addressed jurisdiction’s
public policies.
Once the presumption of enforceability is established there are only two ways in
which it can be overruled. The person against whom the foreign judgment is being
recognized or enforced, namely the defendant in the recognition and enforcement
procedure, initiates the former, while the court addressed initiates the latter. The reasons
for refusal to recognize and enforce the foreign judgment in both of these situations are
inherently different. The defendant may overcome the presumption of enforceability by
arguing and providing evidence that there were certain problems during the litigation of
the case in the foreign court that justify such a refusal, because otherwise justice would
be impaired. The best example for such a refusal is if the rendering court had not
followed “due process of law.” This may include situations where the defendant did not
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have her day in court and was not provided with the opportunity to be heard or provide
evidence. This is not a closed list and other examples can be provided.
The addressed court may also refuse to recognize and enforce the judgment by its
own initiative. However, the court’s discretion is limited to those situations in which the
underlying public policies in the enforcing jurisdiction would be violated or contradicted
if the judgment is recognized or enforced. This discretion, however, should be extremely
limited and utilized only in rare situations, because otherwise it would interfere with the
delicate balance between the rendering country and the enforcing country, thus avoiding
any potential excuses for retaliation. One should note that the purpose of the solution is to
create a standard, which can later evolve through interpretation and additions, as occurred
in the past with regard to the unfair competition-Lanham Act, section 43, example.
One may ask what is the legal basis and source for the creation of a presumption
of enforceability. After all, this term does not appear in the relevant literature. The answer
I believe can be drawn from Article 41 of the TRIPS Agreement. It is my argument that
the obligation to recognize and enforce foreign intellectual property judgments is not a
new one. In fact, all of the TRIPS Members have already taken such an obligation when
they signed the TRIPS Agreement in 1994. After all, “the principal motive forces for
including intellectual property rights as a subject matter of the Uruguay Round of the
GATT was the perception that the existing international intellectual property regime
lacked effective enforcement.”436 There is no logic in arguing that these efforts intended
to be limited to the provision of intellectual property rights within the territories of the
Member States. After all, this is an international instrument that addresses relations
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between countries and promotes the desire “to reduce distortions and impediments to
international trade, and taking into account the need to promote effective and adequate
protection of intellectual property rights, and to ensure that measures and procedures to
enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate
trade.”437 The need for an international instrument that regulates this issue is more
procedural than substantive. Certainly the drafters of the TRIPS Agreement did not intend
to provide the Member States with means to grant and protect intellectual property rights
that cannot eventually be effective and enforced. Article 41 specifically requires the
TRIPS Members to ensure in their national laws that they can effectively take actions
against any acts of infringement of intellectual property covered under the scope of the
agreement.438 These include expeditious and other remedies to prevent and deter from
future infringement. In no way does the TRIPS Agreement limit itself to actions or
judgments within the territory of each country. The language of Article 41 is very broad
and seems to include acts of infringement of intellectual property rights, which have
some effect in other Member countries, even though they originate in the enforcing
country. In other words, an international obligation to recognize and enforce foreign
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judgments with respect to intellectual property rights is already in place and a new one
does not need to be established. All we need is the procedural measures to implement it.
A major question that we must pay attention to is whether these exceptions to the
presumption of enforceability should be drafted in a broad or narrow manner. The
purpose of this exercise is clear. A narrow definition shall allow the presumption to hold
up in more cases than if it were the other way around, thus making it more difficult to
overcome the presumption and vice versa.
The answer to this question depends in many ways on what exactly we want to
achieve by adopting such a presumption, and what are the underlying policies we believe
are suitable. As I previously discussed thoroughly, there are many reasons for the
growing need for an international instrument regulating the issue of recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments. Arguably, if our goal is to adopt such an instrument,
the best way would be to draft very narrow exceptions and limitations to the presumption,
thus enabling as many judgments as possible to be recognized and enforced, and only in
extreme situations refusal to do so would be justified.
However, adopting such an approach may prove to be extremely dangerous and
make such an attempt futile. There is great fear among countries to enter into an
international obligation that would force them to recognize and enforce foreign
judgments. This fear sometimes results from the unknown. Each country has its own laws
and legal traditions, and would oppose any attempt to coerce it to comply with rulings of
foreign courts. This fear is very hard to overcome and it is probably another major reason
for the failure of previous attempts to achieve this goal. These parties are aware of the
advantages that such an instrument may provide their citizens, namely protection of their
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rights in foreign countries who are also members of the convention, but are paralyzed by
the possibility that other courts would interfere with their jurisdiction. Therefore, at the
end of the day, when they look at the equilibrium of “pros and cons” of joining such an
instrument, they prefer losing the advantages and avoiding the disadvantages. The
solution, therefore, would be to enable member countries to avoid recognition and
enforcement by drafting very broad exceptions to the general presumption of
enforceability. Such a solution would make it easier for many countries to join the
instrument despite their fears, because the existence of broad exceptions may serve as a
relaxation pill, since they know that despite the fact that they undertook such an
international obligation, they may still avoid doing so without violating their international
obligation by simply utilizing the broad exceptions. After many countries join and sign
the instrument and the system functions smoothly for several years, the trust among the
participating countries is expected to grow. We can then try to gradually narrow these
exceptions to enable the recognition and enforcement of even more judgments. By then,
we can hope that the routine daily functioning of the system proposed will produce
precedents, and general and more widely accepted rules, that would make it easier for the
system to function more smoothly. This process will probably take many years and no
one should expect a miracle solution. Building trust among sovereign nations, especially
when interference with their jurisdiction is involved, is a lengthy process. What I am
proposing is simply to plant the seeds for the future.
6.

Any Solution must be Part of the Framework of the TRIPS Agreement
There are several arguments to support the idea that an instrument which is

limited in scope to intellectual property rights and drafted within the framework of the
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TRIPS Agreement is more likely to succeed, be adopted, and implemented, than a more
general instrument, such as the one resulting from the Hague negotiations. The first to
propose this idea were Professors Dreyfuss and Ginsburg. It seems that the advantages
and benefits that a narrower instrument limited to intellectual property rights may
produce exist both in the negotiations stage and in the implementation stage. First and
foremost, a limited instrument will enable the negotiating parties to concentrate on the
issues that are unique to intellectual property and thus save time and resources. This will
also enable the parties to concentrate on substantive issues that are unique to intellectual
property rights and there intangibility.439 For example, a major question with respect to
the enforcement of foreign judgments is that involving public policy. As I will later
discuss, almost any major instrument addressing the issue of recognition and enforcement
of foreign judgments contains a public policy exception. What exactly constitutes public
policy for that purpose is not entirely clear. Therefore, if the instrument is more limited in
scope to include only intellectual property rights, more time and resources can be spent to
address and define this term.
A second reason to prefer an intellectual property limited instrument is that such
an approach will create synergies that may not be otherwise gained. Those countries that
are currently Members of the TRIPS Agreement have already undertaken upon
themselves to protect intellectual property rights. Thus, it may be expected that these
countries will have less objection to the concept of the need for protection of intellectual
property rights abroad. Furthermore, by doing so, we can take advantage, during the
negotiation period, of the WIPO infrastructure and institutions.
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An intellectual property only instrument will also enable the international
community to take advantage of certain features that can already be found within the
TRIPS Agreement. For example, parties will be able to take advantage of the already
existing requirements for due process of law that appear in Articles 41 and 42 of TRIPS,
thus eliminating certain points of controversy.
From an enforcement and implementation perspective, if a country is not fulfilling
its obligations under the agreement we can utilize the dispute resolution mechanism
under TRIPS to make this country conform to its international obligations.440 This would
also provide the participating parties with a certain degree of flexibility in making
adjustments to the convention as reality changes.
7.

Procedural Requirements
Before a judgment can be recognized or enforced by a foreign court, certain

procedural pre-conditions should be followed. The purpose of these conditions is to
convince the addressed court that the judgment at issue is indeed what it pertains to be,
and that there are no other proceedings in the country where the judgment was rendered
that can affect the enforcement proceedings. These procedural requirements are very
common in such instruments.
A.

Proof of Authenticity of the Judgment
The first requirement is that the party seeking recognition or applying for

enforcement of the judgment furnish the addressed court with a complete and
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authenticated copy of the decision.441 The purpose of this requirement is to assure the
authenticity of the document setting forth the judgment in order to avoid any
misunderstandings and avoid a situation where the addressed court accidentally enforces
a fake judgment.
Things get more complicated when the decision now being recognized or
enforced was rendered by default, namely without the appearance of the defendant in
court and without the latter being able to present a defense. Many countries allow in their
civil procedure rules the rendering of a default judgment against a defendant if no
appearance is made. The rendering of such judgment is usually conditioned upon proving
that the defendant knew or should have known about the ongoing proceedings. Such
knowledge is traditionally accomplished by proving that service of process was duly
made on the defendant. For example, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit enforced a
default judgment rendered by an Israeli court even though the service of process was
made in Hebrew rather than English, a language, which the defendant does not read.442
The court explained that there was personal service of process by the plaintiff’s attorney
that was legal under Israeli rules of civil procedure and “[i]t would be insulting were [the
court] to require that the Israeli legal machinery adapt itself by translating the official
language of that country, Hebrew, into any defendant'
s language.”443 The court made it
clear that “[i]t is not alleged that the Israeli court lacked competent jurisdiction, nor is the
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general integrity of the Israeli judicial system questioned, nor is it alleged that the
judgment rendered in this case was fraudulent.”444
Therefore, in order to avoid any misunderstandings most international instruments
addressing this issue requires that “in the case of a judgment given in default, the original
or a certified true copy of the document which establishes that the party in default was
served with the document instituting the proceedings or with an equivalent document”445
must be produced to the court by the party requesting enforcement.
B.

Translation of the Judgment
The addressed court is also entitled to request the party asking recognition of the

foreign judgment to provide the court with a translation of all the relevant documents.446
Such translation will allow the addressed court to judge for itself what the rendering court
intended in its decision and avoid subjective interpretation of the judgment by the
requesting party. Unfortunately, some courts’ decisions are not always absolutely clear
and therefore, the enforcing authority needs to engage in its own interpretation process.
As a result, the translation must be accompanied by an affidavit subject to the rules of
evidence of the rendering country indicating that the translation is reliable or by a
certificate provided by a diplomatic or consular agent. This requirement, however, should
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not be mandatory and courts may rely on their own ability to read the judgment and the
order of the rendering court without the need to rely on a third party’s translation.
C.

Res Judicata
Another relevant requirement is proving to the enforcing court that the judgment

has the effect of “res judicata” in the rendering forum and is now enforceable in that
state. One of the fundamental requirements in many legal systems for the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments is res judicata. The concept of res judicata originated
in Roman law, but its appearance in English law has Germanic roots. Res judicata means
that the judgment must be final and conclusive before it can be recognized.447 It merges
the “plaintiff’s cause of action in the judgment – that is, he may not re-litigate the same
claim – and the bar which the successful defendant may interpose against a second action
on the same claim.”448 In general, the effect of such a judgment is that the parties are
prevented from raising the same issue between themselves in any other proceedings. A
non-final decision such as preliminary equitable decisions (i.e. preliminary injunctions)
does not have the effect of res judicata.
Generally, there are two bases to support the doctrine of res judicata. The first is
the interest of the public at large that the dispute between the parties shall end. The
second refers to “a principle of justice and fairness that no one ought to be troubled twice
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for the same claim.”449 There is a conflict, however, between common law and civil law
concerning the exact point in time in which judgments become res judicata. At common
law a judgment is considered to be res judicata as soon as the rendering court in ordinary
proceedings can no longer reconsider the issue.450 In other words, a judgment may be
recognized on “the condition that the subject-matter has been raised and controverted
before the earlier tribunal and cannot be re-opened in the same court by further
proceedings,”451 although it can still be appealed or reviewed by a higher court. Israel,
however, although being a common law based country, considers a judgment to be res
judigata only after it can no longer be appealed to a higher court in the technical meaning
of the word. It does not matter that it might be later revised or canceled in a special
proceeding by the court rendering the judgment.452 The civil law system, on the other
hand, requires that the judgment no longer be subject to any ordinary453 forms of review
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or appeal.454 For example, in Germany the decision is considered to be res judicata only
after it is considered “formelle rechtskraft,” which means that it can no longer be
“impugned through ordinary methods of review.” In France the judgment is considered to
be “autorite de chos jugee” as soon as it is pronounced, but it is suspended as soon as
review proceedings are initiated. Only when the decision can no longer be impugned it is
considered to be “res judicata” (“force de la chose jugee”).455
This is also true in the intellectual property context. Consider an example in
which a German court recognizes the fact that a company is the owner of a very famous
trademark and awards the plaintiff with monetary relief, and afterwards the winner asks
an American court to enforce the judgment against the same defendant. The American
court will have to reject the enforcement request as long as the judgment can still be
appealed in Germany, although it could have enforced a similar judgment that was given
in the U.S. This way the American court can prevent the German judgment from gaining
more influence and power outside the German borders than in Germany itself.
This distinction, for example, has great significance with regards to stay of
proceedings as a result of a “lis alibi pendens”456 claim. Thus, the Preliminary Hague
Draft, in order to avoid interpretation conflicts between different countries, left the
determination of when a judgment becomes res judicata to the laws of the country giving
the judgment.
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A very significant element of the res judicata doctrine is the similarity of the
parties. As a general rule, attempts to rely upon the preclusive effects of a foreign
judgment in subsequent proceedings are limited to the same parties or privies that were
members of the original litigation in the rendering court. If the parties are not identical,
the judgment has no effect. The logic behind this rule goes to the basic notions of almost
every legal system, which prohibit the taking of legal rights without due process of law. If
the one against whom the judgment is being enforced was not involved in the hearings in
the rendering court, and was not given the opportunity to be heard and to raise any
claims, defenses or arguments, the judgment cannot be enforced against her.457
In England, the common law Doctrine of Privity provides that “the only persons
who can take advantage of the preclusive effects of a judgment, or be bound by it, are the
parties or privies to the proceedings from whence the judgment derived.”458 As a result,
the parties in both proceedings need to be identical, or at least privies of those involved in
the initial proceedings. It is the one seeking the enforcement of the foreign judgment that
carries the burden of establishing that the parties engaged in the enforcement proceeding
are those that were engaged in the original proceedings or in privity with them.
The term parties usually refer to the parties that are named on the records as the
parties to the original litigation in the rendering court. However, there are numerous
examples in which privies may also enforce a foreign judgment rendered in proceeding of
which they were not a part. In that respect, the privies are entitled to have the foreign
judgment enforced in their favor if they claim for “a title or right under, through, or on
457
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behalf of, a party bound.”459 The basis for the privity between the parties may be that of
blood, title or interest. Privies in blood usually refer to ancestors and heirs, while privies
in title usually refer to those who upon the death or insolvency of the person succeed to
her rights or liabilities. Privies of interest are those who have some kind of interest in the
previous litigation or its subject matter, whether legal or beneficial.460 If we take this
notion one step further, we can argue not only that the parties in both proceedings should
be the same, but that they should also represent and protect the same ideas and stands
which they protected in the first proceedings “for a party who litigates in a different
capacity or in different rights is in law a separate person.”461 This idea goes all the way
back to the Roman law idea of res judicata.
When dealing with intellectual property rights, the question of the parties
involved seems to be sufficiently regulated. Intellectual property rights are first and
foremost property rights. As such, they are well defined and are easily transferable. This
means that there may be differences between different regimes with respect to the
substantive determination of the right and the requirements for its establishment, but as
soon as the right is granted, it can be transferred fairly easily by sale or by inheritance.
Under international instruments such as the TRIPS Agreement, the major intellectual
property rights such as copyrights, patents and trademarks survive the death of the owner
of the right. For instance, patent rights under TRIPS are protected for a period of twenty
years from the filing date without limiting their existence to the survival of the patent
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holder.462 Similarly, copyrights under the Berne Convention as incorporated by Article
9(1) of TRIPS are protected until fifty years after the death of the author463 and
trademarks are protected indefinitely upon seven years repeating renewals of the right.464
These provisions indicate that intellectual property rights survive the death of the author
or inventor. Therefore, any person who receives the intellectual property rights upon the
death or bankruptcy of the original inventor or author is deemed a party to any legal
proceedings in which the latter had been involved, and is bound by any decision granting
rights or creating obligations with respect to these rights.
Furthermore, at least when monetary judgments are involved, the grant of a
judgment creates in and of itself a new obligation, which can be argued to be separate and
independent from the original intellectual property right, which was the subject matter of
the original litigation. This obligation has nothing to do with the intellectual property
right and therefore, can be easily transferred, even if it is enforced by someone that had
nothing to do with the original litigation and received the right by way of inheritance, or
even by sale under certain circumstances.
There are significant differences between judgments in rem and judgments in
personam with respect to the enjoyment of the effects of res judicata. Naturally, the
effect that a judgment in rem has is significantly broader than the effect that a judgment
in personam has, due to the fact that the latter is limited to the parties involved in a
certain dispute, rather than the whole world as in the former situation.
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Intellectual property rights in that sense are quite unique because they mix
elements of both worlds. As a general rule, when one is granted a patent right and the
right is registered in the local patent office in the territory, the right is in rem. The right is
not valid, however, against the whole world due to its territorial nature, but it is a good
right against anyone in the territory in which it is in effect. In other words, the in rem
characteristics of the right are limited to the territory in which it is registered, or the
territory in which it was granted if no registration exists.
Traditionally, a foreign judgment addressing the status of an object is usually
considered to have an in rem effect. If the litigation involves the question of the validity
of the intellectual property right, the judgment will have broad effect against the whole
world. This may have a fundamental impact on the ability of someone who objects to the
enforcement of a foreign judgment to raise the issue of the validity of the underlying
intellectual property right, even if he had not been a member to the proceedings in which
the validity of the intellectual property right was decided.
A judgment however, that is granted against one who infringed the right within
the protected territory, has the characteristics of an in personam judgment. The reason is
that the judgment aims at stopping or compensating a specific infringement by a certain
person or entity of an in rem right. The direct result is that theoretically, if the whole
world would interfere with the patent right of the holder, she would be required to obtain
in personam judgments against each and every one of the individuals in the world based
on her in rem right. From an international perspective, this makes it very difficult for one
to protect fully these rights.
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Most interestingly, the Brussels and Lugano Conventions do not include a res
judicata clause that makes it a preliminary condition to the recognition and enforcement
of foreign judgments. However, before a judgment can be recognized under the
Preliminary Hague Draft it must first have the effect of res judicata. Article 25 (2)
provides that “[i]n order to be recognized, a judgment referred to in paragraph 1 must
have the effect of res judicata in the State of origin.” This language has several purposes.
First, it excludes from the scope of the proposed draft all preliminary and non-final
judgments and orders, such as preliminary injunctions. Secondly, it solves the debate
regarding the applicable law to determine the res judicata question by providing that it is
to be solved by the laws of the country where the judgment was rendered. However, since
this term does not necessarily have the same meaning in every legal system, different
alternatives have been proposed.465
It is important to clarify that the enforcing court is not entitled to make any
additional procedural requirements. The reason is that we must try to avoid any attempts
to circumvent the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments mechanism by
creating unnecessary procedural obstacles. If we let every court come up with additional
requirements before recognition and enforcement are allowed, we simply empty the
whole instrument from content, as the addressed court would be able to establish
additional demands before actual enforcement takes place.
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referred to in paragraph 1 shall be recognized from the time, and for as long as, it produces its
effects in the State of origin.”
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8.

Exceptions to the General Enforcement Rule
One of the most important goals of my proposal for an international convention

for the recognition and enforcement of foreign intellectual property judgments is to make
it attractive enough so that as many countries as possible would choose to become
members of the convention. The more countries that join, the more effective and useful
the convention is. In the previous chapters, I have indicated that many countries fear that
by joining such an instrument they surrender elements of their sovereignty and
independence and therefore, they have chosen in the past to avoid becoming parties to
such proposals. In order to overcome this fear, I propose, as part of my simple convention
solution, to provide very broad exceptions to the general presumption of enforceability.
By doing so, we can try and convince such hesitating countries that they can be
comfortable joining the convention because if a need arises, they can find refuge by
utilizing one of the broad exceptions to refuse the recognition or enforcement of the
specific judgment. These broad exceptions provide a safe harbor that can eliminate, in the
eyes of the hesitating countries, some of the risk involved in joining the convention.
Thus, they can comfortably undertake the international obligation involved and at the
same time protect their sovereignty and independence by using these broad exceptions.
A.

The Due Process Argument
One of the most significant arguments that is made against the recognition and

enforcement of foreign judgments, especially by American scholars, is the one involving
“due process” of law. The due process requirement is among the most fundamental pillars
of the American legal system and an integral part of its Constitution. They argue that
courts in many countries around the world are not following even the basic requirements
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and notions of due process of law and therefore, the judgments they provide are not
worthy of being recognized and enforced. In other words, they argue that it would be
unjustified and contrary to their basic beliefs and what these legal systems represent, to
recognize or enforce a judgment, which was obtained without complying with
fundamental requirements of due process. The idea behind these arguments is that we
cannot put the defendant at a disadvantage simply because the litigation took place in
another forum.
I argue that this reason for refusing to recognize or enforce foreign judgments is
not as convincing with respect to intellectual property judgments as it is with respect to
other judgments. The reason for this argument is found in certain provisions contained in
the TRIPS Agreement. As previously mentioned, intellectual property law has been
undergoing a significant process of harmonization during the last hundred and twenty
years. The TRIPS Agreement is a very unique attempt to create an international
instrument that regulates many aspects of one legal field. The TRIPS harmonization
process is not limited to substantive intellectual property law, but also addresses the way
these rights are administered. Two elements in the TRIPS agreement are important to
establish my argument. First, in order to be a Member of GATT and the WTO every
country must also sign the TRIPS Agreement. The result is that many countries have
signed this agreement and have to abide by its provisions even if they are not very
comfortable doing so, in order to advance other commercial interests that they may have
on their agenda.466 As a result, many countries that do not necessarily have a strong
466
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interest in protecting intellectual property rights do so in order to be able to enjoy other
benefits they receive by remaining Members of GATT and the WTO. The second
element of the argument is that countries that do not comply with the provisions of the
TRIPS Agreement may be sanctioned for their behavior under its provisions. In other
words, “[t]rade sanctions may be collectively authorized to assure compliance by WTO
Members with TRIPS obligations.”467
Interestingly, the TRIPS Agreement itself satisfies some of the basic requirements
of due process of law and these requirement are inherent in, and an integral part of, this
agreement. In fact, Part the III of the TRIPS Agreement is dedicated to assure the
enforcement of intellectual property rights. The inclusion of the enforcement section in
the TRIPS Agreement is considered by many to be one of the most significant
achievements of the TRIPS negotiations.468 As a result, if the TRIPS Agreement satisfies
basic notions of due process of law, and since every member to my proposed convention
must also be a Member of the TRIPS Agreement, the justification for the due process
exception to the general enforcement rule is significantly reduced because the different
countries have already undertaken the obligation to provide it.
It is interesting to compare the requirements set forth in the landmark decision of
Hilton v. Guyot with respect to the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments,

incorporation of transition periods in favor of developing countries in the TRIPS Agreement and
other parts of the WTO Agreement text.” FREDERICK ABBOTT ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SYSTEM: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS, 339 (1999).
467
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with the general obligations that the Members of TRIPS undertook regarding the
enforcement of intellectual property rights. If indeed I were correct in my argument that
basic elements of due process of law, in its American form, already appear in the TRIPS
Agreement, recognition and enforcement of foreign intellectual property judgments
would be much easier because the rendering court is already required to provide these
minimum standards of due process.
The case of Hilton v. Guyot sets the basic standard in the U.S. for recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments and is instructive as to the basic requirements of due
process of law. The U.S. Supreme Court held:
“In view of all the authorities upon the subject, and of the
trend of judicial opinion in this country and in England,
following the lead of Kent and Story, we are satisfied that
where there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial
abroad before a court of competent jurisdiction, conducting
the trial upon regular proceedings, after due citation or
voluntary appearance of the defendant, and under a system
of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration
of justice between the citizens of its own country and those
of other countries, and there is nothing to show either
prejudice in the court, or in the system of laws under which
it was sitting, or fraud in procuring the judgment, or any
other special reason why the comity of this nation should
not allow it full effect, the merits of the case should not, in
an action brought in this country upon the judgment, be
tried afresh, as on a new trial or an appeal, upon the mere
assertion of the party that the judgment was erroneous in
law or in fact. The defendants, therefore, cannot be
permitted, upon that general ground, to contest the validity
or the effect of the judgment sued on.”469
Similarly, the Restatement provides that “[a] court in the United States may not
recognize a judgment of the court of a foreign state if the judgment was rendered under a
judicial system that does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with
469
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due process of law.”470 The Restatement, however, does not exactly define what due
process of law means in this context, and this is left for the interpretations of the various
courts. The Restatement’s Official Comment does make a reference to the passage from
the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Hilton v. Guyot quoted above, as a potential source
for such interpretation. In addition, “[e]vidence that the judiciary was dominated by the
political branches of government or by an opposing litigant, or that a party was unable to
obtain counsel, to secure documents or attendance of witnesses, or to have access to
appeal or review, would support a conclusion that the legal system was one whose
judgments are not entitled to recognition.”471
Article 41(1) of TRIPS sets the general principles for the enforcement of
intellectual property rights. It provides the following:
“Members shall ensure that enforcement procedures as
specified in this Part are available under their national laws
so as to permit effective action against any act of
infringement of intellectual property rights covered by this
Agreement, including expeditious remedies to prevent
infringements and remedies which constitute a deterrent to
further infringements.”
This Article does not limit itself to remedies after the infringement had taken
place, but rather also addresses the issue of prevention of intellectual property
infringements, including expeditious remedies to prevent infringement.472
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Following is a comparison between the requirements for due process of law under
the Restatement and the Hilton v. Guyot case (in bold) and the requirements of the TRIPS
Agreement.
Opportunity for a full and fair trial abroad: The TRIPS Agreement requires
that “[p]rocedures concerning the enforcement of intellectual property rights shall be fair
and equitable.”473 This requirement provides that the proceedings may not be
unreasonably complicated or costly, or entail unreasonable time limits or unwarranted
delays. The purpose of this Article is to ensure that when enforcement of intellectual
property rights is involved, especially cases involving non-nationals as the main plaintiff,
the procedures should not be more complicated than the customary procedures in the
relevant country.474

The parties must have an opportunity to be heard and provide

evidence to support their position, and the final judgment must be based on this
evidence.475 Furthermore, the requirement for “fair and equitable procedures” includes
the availability of civil judicial procedures.476 The merits of the case shall preferably be in
writing and reasoned and should be available at least to the parties without undue delay.
Trial before a court of competent jurisdiction: Review under the TRIPS
Agreement must be conducted by a “judicial authority of final administrative decisions
473
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concerning the enforcement of intellectual property rights be fair and equitable and “[t]hey shall
not be unnecessarily complicated or costly, or entail unreasonable time-limits or unwarranted
delays.”
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and, subject to jurisdictional provisions in national laws concerning the importance of a
case, of at least the legal aspects of initial judicial decisions on the merits of a case.”477
Trial conducted upon regular proceedings: There is no obligation on the
Members of the TRIPS Agreement to “put in place a judicial system for the enforcement
of intellectual property rights distinct from that for the enforcement of laws in
general.”478 In other words, intellectual property litigation under TRIPS is the same as is
litigation of other issues, and it involves the regular legal proceedings provided by the
laws of the relevant state.
Trial after due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant: The TRIPS
Agreement goes into great detail to assure the parties the opportunity to appear before the
relevant court and present their case. Defendants have a right to receive “written notice
which is timely and contains sufficient detail, including the basis of the claims,”479 parties
have the right to an independent counsel, and most importantly, these “procedures shall
not

impose

overly

burdensome

requirements

concerning

mandatory personal

appearances.”480 It is a prerequisite for the validity of these proceedings that the parties be
offered an opportunity to be heard.481
Trial under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial
administration of justice between the citizens of its own country and those of other
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countries: This requirement is very easy to establish under TRIPS as it reflects the same
idea as the National Treatment provision of this agreement, which is considered by many
to be one of its cornerstones. It requires that “[e]ach Member shall accord to the nationals
of other Members treatment no less favorable than it accords to its own nationals with
regard to the protection of intellectual property,”482 subject to certain substantive
exceptions. There is nothing in the TRIPS Agreement to support an argument that this
requirement only applies to the substantive provisions of TRIPS and not to its procedural
parts. Therefore, it can be inferred that in conducting civil legal proceedings regarding the
protection of intellectual property rights, the rendering court is obligated to treat foreign
nationals in the same manner that it treats its own.
From this review, it is apparent that the drafters of the TRIPS Agreement went a
long way to ensure that the notion of due process of law, similar to the way it is
understood in the U.S., is followed and adopted by Members of the TRIPS Agreement, at
least with respect to intellectual property rights. It should be noted that if this basic
requirement is not followed by one of the Members of TRIPS, it risks that this issue be
raised under the Dispute Settlement provisions of TRIPS by one of the other Members.
This, of course, may result in the sanctioning of the violating Member, something that
most countries would probably like to avoid.
I argue that since international intellectual property law, as codified in the TRIPS
Agreement, requires most countries to provide due process of law in disputes concerning
such subject matter, the likelihood that due process of law will not be provided is
significantly lower than in other fields of law where such international obligation does
482
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not exist. It seems that Member countries have more to lose if sanctioned because they do
not comply with these requirements than what they can gain from this. Therefore, the
argument of many scholars that judgments rendered in other countries should not be
recognized or enforced simply because they do not comply with basic notions of due
process of law, is of substantially less influence in the intellectual property context.
One must remember that TRIPS is an agreement between countries and therefore,
allegedly has no direct influence on private people. However, the fact that the rendering
jurisdiction may be sanctioned under international law does not help the private person
who suffered from this lack of compliance with international obligations and
undertakings. Therefore, we still need the convention to include a due process of law
exception so that a judge in the enforcing jurisdiction can protect the rights of the
defendant without having to wait for the wheels of international law to roll. In other
words, we need such an exception in the new convention, but it is expected that there will
not be much of a need to use it in light of the due process obligations provided in the
TRIPS Agreement.
By way of analogy, we can also turn again to the New York Convention with
respect to arbitral awards. It also addresses this issue and provides that “[r]ecognition and
enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of the party against whom it is
invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent authority where the recognition and
enforcement is sought, proof that: . . . the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with
the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the
law of the country where the arbitration took place.”483 This Section of the New York
483
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Convention allows the enforcing court to refrain from doing so if it is unsatisfied with the
procedures governing the arbitration. It should be noted, however, that the scope of
review of the enforcing court is clearly limited to the compliance with the laws and
procedures of the country where the arbitration took place rather than that of the
enforcing country. As a result, the enforcing court cannot refrain from enforcing the
arbitral award simply because the procedural thresholds in the rendering country are
lower than those of the enforcing country. One may even attempt to take this argument
one step further and say that the potential members of any future convention on
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments should not use differences in due
process of law and procedural law as an excuse against becoming members of such a
convention, as they have already agreed to comply with these procedures in the past when
they first accepted the provisions of the New York Convention. If the laws of the
rendering court were good enough to govern arbitrations then, why should this be any
different?
B.

Fraud
Another basic ground for refusal by courts to recognize or enforce foreign

judgments is that resulting from “fraud” by the winning party in obtaining the judgment.
Long ago it was established in England and the U.S.484 that a judgment obtained by fraud
may be denied recognition and enforcement in the second addressed forum.485 One major
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question that remains unanswered is the exact meaning of the term “fraud” in this
context.
There are few obvious situations in which this exception might be applied and we
can learn about them by analogy from other fields of law where a similar exception has
been implemented. For example, under Article 4 of the Paris Convention, participating
countries are expected to recognize the right of priority with regards to patents. Thus, if
one managed to apply for a patent in country A, he could use the same filing date in order
to register the same patent in another Contracting State - B, although someone else tried
to register a similar patent in State B in the period between the two filing dates. Assume a
situation where defendant tries to register a patent in country B and realizes after a while
that based on the right of priority, plaintiff registered the same patent using an earlier date
of registration in country A. The two parties become involved in legal litigation in
country B over the right for the patent, and the plaintiff wins. In order to succeed in his
suit in country B, plaintiff introduces a forged certificate of registration, according to
which he registered the same patent in country A, a few days before his opponent
registered his patent in country B, thus trying to take advantage of the right of priority
and win the patent in country B as well. Based on this decision, the court also awards the
plaintiff compensatory damages for patent infringement within its jurisdiction for the use
the defendant had made of the patent before it was determined that the plaintiff is entitled
to the patent based on the right of priority. Defendant is a resident of country C and all of

that were presented and perjury. Extrinsic fraud, on the other hand, deals with the rendering
court’s jurisdiction and not with the actual proceedings (e.g., lack of opportunity to present the
case due to false misrepresentations). SCOLES ET AL., supra note 76, at 1169.
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his assets are located within this territory. If a court in country C would be asked to
enforce a judgment relating to the above-mentioned patent in favor of the plaintiff, it may
refuse to do so because the judgment was obtained by fraud and the plaintiff that claimed
the patent never had a legitimate right to receive it.
There are at least four types of possible frauds that can be differentiated: 1) fraud
as to the jurisdiction of the court of origin, 2) fraud in relation to the applicable law, 3)
fraud concerning prior notification of the defendant in the original proceeding, and 4)
fraud committed in the submission of evidence to the court of origin.486 My example is
based on the last type of fraud, but many examples can be provided for the other kinds as
well.
These are all examples of fraud relating to the conducting of the original
proceedings. Needless to say, no court needs to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment
if the objecting party can provide evidence that the other party had bribed the judge
rendering the judgment. After all, it is justice that we seek and this is the ultimate goal.
It is interesting to note that Section 482 of the Restatement, previously mentioned,
also provides for an exception of fraud. The comment to this section, however, makes a
distinction between “intrinsic” fraud487 and “extrinsic” fraud.488 It is argued that intrinsic
fraud should not normally defeat recognition of the judgment of the foreign court,
because these are allegedly things that could be addressed by the rendering court. The
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purpose of the intrinsic fraud rule was to prevent reconsideration of disputed evidence by
the enforcing court. It has been proposed by the Restatement that “[i]f the judgment could
be set aside in the rendering state, the court in the United States where enforcement is
sought should stay the action for enforcement in order to give the judgment debtor a
reasonable opportunity to petition the rendering court to set the judgment aside, subject,
in appropriate cases, to the giving of security.”489 This, however, was not the approach
taken by the drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, which refused to make
such a distinction.490
It is my opinion that the approach taken by the Restatement (Second) of
Judgments ignoring the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic fraud is the preferable
one and any future international convention containing a fraud exception, should be
interpreted broadly to contain both kinds of fraud. If justice is what we have in mind,
there is no room for such a distinction. After all, it is usually the winning party who
engaged in the suspicious activities that resulted in the fraud, and there is no justification
to reward such party by requiring the other party to go into additional expenses and
initiate additional proceedings in the rendering forum to set the judgment aside. It is true
that the enforcing court is not and should not be sitting as an appellate court on the
decisions of the rendering court, but this is not the issue in this case because when it
comes to intrinsic fraud, the rendering court was not aware of the circumstances
involving the fraud at the time the judgment was rendered, so we are not actually secondguessing its decision on this point. Furthermore, one must not forget that not always can
489
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the losing party return to the rendering jurisdiction to request the setting aside of the
judgment, since such a procedure is not always available.
One must be very careful in utilizing the fraud exception to avoid recognition and
enforcement of the foreign judgment. When intrinsic fraud is involved, many times the
evidence provided to the court during the adjudication of the case is disputed by the
adverse party. When the facts are disputed, reliance on disputed evidence should not be
confused with intrinsic fraud, and no court should hurry into condemning a judgment
based on fraud. Accusations of fraud by one of the parties are not always justified, and
many times they are merely the result of a different view or method of interpretation of
the facts.
Most international instruments addressing recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments contain a “fraud” exception to the general rule of enforcement,491 and every
future attempt to create such a convention should also contain such a provision.
C.

Public Policy
Probably the most important exception to the presumption of enforceability is that

involving “public policy.” “This provision is traditionally found in all national laws and
in all the international conventions, whether bilateral or multilateral.”492 There seems to
be a consensus about the need for a public policy exception and it can be found in most
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international instruments.493 The problem with this exception is that we know why we
need it, but we are not sure what it exactly means.
In many countries, this rule originated in the laws of contracts. Many contract
statutes forbid enforcement of contract provisions that are against the public policy of the
state. The purpose is clear: it aims at protecting the state and its citizens from
circumvention of the law by contracting around it. The same idea follows in the field of
private international law with respect to the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments. If the addressed court thinks that enforcing the judgment would violate the
public policy of the country addressed, it is entitled and even obligated to refuse to do so.
The exact meaning of the term “public policy” or “ordre public,” as it is known in
several countries, is not entirely clear. Once again, the case law in this field is not
uniform, and different opinions have been introduced. In order to determine whether it is
justified to refuse recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, courts are using
different tests. For example, in the U.S. “[t]he public policy exception operates only in
those unusual cases where the foreign judgment is ‘repugnant to fundamental notions of
what is decent and just in the State where enforcement is sought,’”
493
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judgment “‘tends clearly’ to undermine the public interest, the public confidence in the
administration of the law, or security for individual rights of personal liberty or of private
property.”495 Thus, it is highly unlikely that an American court would agree to use its
jurisdiction over a foreign entity that has a branch in a U.S. territory, if it would be asked
to determine the rights of this entity to intellectual property in its home country.496 It was
Judge Cardozo who defined public policy as “some deep-rooted tradition of the common
weal.”497 The Restatement also addresses this issue in Section 482 by providing for an
exception to the general rule of enforcement if “the cause of action on which the
judgment was based, or the judgment itself, is repugnant to the public policy of the
United States or of the State where recognition is sought.” The Comment to this Section
defines public policy as “fundamental notions of decency and justice.”
Along these lines, the American Law Institute is drafting its version of the public
policy exception in its recent enforcement project. This definition is extremely important
when one is dealing with substantively un-harmonized intellectual property regimes.
Under this very narrow definition, “[t]he fact that the judgment in question is based on a

contract because it was not repugnant to the public policy of Massachusetts, despite the
differences between Belgian and Massachusetts law on this point). See also The Restatement, §
482.
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cause of action not known (or previously abolished) in the United States should not lead
to denial of enforcement.”498
Even more important is the fact that different countries have different ideas as to
what this term means, and that what is considered to be a public policy in one country is
not necessarily a public policy in another. To a certain extent, the public policy exception
is a protection mechanism that provides countries with the ability to protect the very basic
ideas and principles that guide them. Generally, the public interest at issue in intellectual
property cases is the protection of the public domain. For example, the Preamble to
TRIPS recognizes “the underlying public policy objectives of national systems for the
protection of intellectual property, including developmental and technological
objectives.” In cases where intellectual property rights are involved, the question is
whether a nation could or should be allowed to have idiosyncratic notions about the
public domain. Clearly some countries, such as the U.S. in the Yahoo! case previously
discussed, insist on their idiosyncratic notions (e.g. about the First Amendment).
I believe, however, that there are other public policies involved that courts should
be and are allowed to take into consideration. For example, the TRIPS Agreement
recognizes in Article 31 the concept of compulsory licenses in cases of “a national
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency.” Similarly, TRIPS in Article 27
allows its Members to exclude inventions from patentability when it is necessary to
protect public order (“ordre public”), or morality, including protection of human, animal,
or plant life or health. Therefore, I believe that it is broader in scope and more
complicated than one can describe it. Thus, in certain situations there may be conflicting
498
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public policies that can influence the decision of whether to recognize or enforce the
foreign intellectual property judgment. Since each country is different from the others,
there is no wonder that the public policies guiding them are different as well.
This vagueness in determining what public policy means creates numerous
problems. One may even dare argue that the term public policy has an inherent conflict.
This term exists in the international sphere. It appears in international instruments and
aims at providing countries with a mechanism that will enable them to refrain from
recognizing and enforcing foreign judgments, even though all other requirements were
met. This is their last resort. On the other hand, the determination of what exactly
constitutes public policy is done not in the international sphere but rather in the national
sphere, namely by national courts. In other words, we are facing a situation were
international law provides a mechanism that can be only interpreted by national laws.
Hence, we assume that French public policy is different from British public policy, which
is different from American public policy, and we accept this notion.
The hardest question with respect to public policy is how far should we stretch the
use of this concept to regulate activities taking place outside the geographical and
political borders of the recognizing or enforcing jurisdiction. With the changes in
technology and the fading of borders, this is expected to become a fundamental question,
and the Yahoo! Case previously discussed is a wonderful example of the complexity of
the questions involved. It is my argument that a distinction needs to be made between the
application of the public policy exception to recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments in cases where the behavior to be regulated takes place outside the borders of
the enforcing jurisdiction, and those cases in which the regulated behavior is to take place
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inside the borders of the enforcing jurisdiction. Extraterritorial application of the public
policy exception should be viewed very suspiciously because it increases tensions
between the relevant jurisdictions. Despite the fading of political and geographical
borders, there is still a very strong sense of self-government and control among countries.
Therefore, outside interference will not be viewed favorably, and we will result in
achieving the exact opposite of what we initially wanted to achieve, namely recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments.
The drafters of the Preliminary Hague Draft used the words “manifestly
incompatible” with public policy. This means that the right to refuse to enforce or
recognize foreign judgments should be carefully and seldom used, and only in extreme
situations. The drafters did not mean that simply because the court rendering the first
judgment applied a law that is different from the one that the court addressed would have
applied, should the case had been brought to its review, or because the rendering court
made a mistake regarding the facts of the case or the law (unless induced by fraud), the
addressed court can refuse the recognition or enforcement.499
In light of the above analysis, one might ask whether it is time to finally get rid of
the public policy mechanism in international instruments. I believe the answer is no. This
negative answer is not because this mechanism is so perfect, but rather because we have
yet to come up with a sufficient substitution that would be good enough to fill the current
function that the public policy mechanism fills. Automatic recognition and enforcement
of foreign judgments is unreasonable and will not work now and probably ever. Each
country is unique and has its own agenda in the sense that it protects those values and
499
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policies that are most important to its development. Therefore, as long as there is no
substitution for the public policy mechanism in international law, we will have to
preserve it.
The use of the public policy exception to international recognition and
enforcement of judgments, however, should be extremely narrow. This exception should
be rarely used by enforcing courts and limited to extreme situations in which no other
solution is available. A world with better business relations and better exchange of
commodities and products requires an established and reliable system for recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments; overuse of the public policy exception would result in
interference with the elements of predictability and certainty previously discussed.
What exactly constitutes public policy with respect to intellectual property rights?
Once again the starting point of the analysis is the TRIPS Agreement. It is well
established that the intellectual property field is unique in the sense that there is an
international treaty in force that is regulating this field of law substantively, and not only
procedurally, and provides us with a set of substantive minimum standards that all
Member States must comply with. If Member States neglect to comply with these
minimum standards, they may become liable to other countries in the public international
sphere rather than only in the private international sphere. Obviously this does not mean
that they all share the exact same policies and substantive laws. It does, however, mean
that they are expected to comply with the same basic notions and adhere to them, at least
with respect to a certain minimum.
It would not be unreasonable to argue that as long as the minimum standards of
the TRIPS Agreement are complied with, the potential need to refuse to recognize and
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enforce foreign judgments is reduced. The fact that the TRIPS Agreement provides a set
of minimum standards makes intellectual property somewhat different from many other
fields of law such as torts and contracts and, in my view, should limit to some extent the
availability of the public policy exception. The public policy exception cannot be used as
means to circumvent the minimum standards of TRIPS. I argue that as long as the
minimum standards are met, we should be more careful in using the public policy
exception to justify refusal to recognize or enforce foreign judgments for the following
reason. By signing the TRIPS Agreement, the Member States undertook an international
obligation to comply with its rules, with the expectancy that all other Members will also
comply with them. By adopting public policy rules, these countries are substantially
saying that they independently toughen the very same requirements that they agreed to
comply with when they signed the TRIPS Agreement and even if the rendering
jurisdiction complied with the minimum standards of TRIPS, it is still not enough for
them. In doing so, they are violating their international obligation by creating additional
artificial obstacles that were not initially adopted and recognized by the international
community. Individual public policies of each of the Member States should not be used to
create additional barriers to international trade.
One may criticize this argument by saying that even if the minimum standards are
met; there are still certain situations in which public policies should be used to justify
such a refusal for recognition or enforcement of a foreign judgment. This is probably
true, but only to a limited extent. The TRIPS Agreement itself provides means to address
such situations and therefore, solutions should be almost always limited to those already
provided by TRIPS. These means include, for example, the compulsory license
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provisions of TRIPS,500 which enable countries, in certain situations and subject to
certain conditions, to utilize foreign patents to achieve certain goals. This means that the
drafters of TRIPS were aware of the possibility of certain situations in which compliance
with the minimum standards would be difficult to accomplish and therefore, provided
means to cope with this difficulty within the four corners of this agreement. In other
words, when faced with such a problem, the recognizing court must look for a solution
inside the international obligations of TRIPS, and turn to the public policy exception only
as a last resort.
The fact that the judgment rendered in the foreign country provides broader and
stronger protection than if it were given by the enforcing court does not change the above
conclusion. As we recall, the TRIPS provides minimum and not maximum standards.
Under TRIPS, Member States may decide to provide broader and stronger protection than
other Members. By joining and signing the TRIPS Agreement, Member States take the
risk that they may have to deal with countries that provide lesser or more protection than
they do, and that this reality would not necessarily comply with their underlying public
policies. This is the price they must pay in order to remain members of the international
community and they must recognize that they must take the good with the bad. In many
respects, this is not at all unique in international law. Courts around the world regularly
and daily enforce judgments that provide to the plaintiff better protection than they would
otherwise have. One such example is recognition and enforcement of after-marriage
alimonies for the divorced spouse in Israel. A woman in Israel is entitled to alimonies
until the final divorce ceremony under Jewish law. As of this day, the woman is not
500
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entitled to any support from her divorced husband. However, if the after-marriage
alimonies were awarded to the woman by a foreign court and an Israeli court is requested
to enforce such a decree, it will not hesitate to enforce it.501
This discussion assumed the actual need for a public policy exception for the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. This need has been assumed mainly
because this is the reality in which we currently live. All of the major international
instruments regulating this issue such as the Brussels and the Lugano Conventions, as
well as national legislation in many countries, contain such an exception, and it seems
that no one is asking whether it is really needed. The answer to this question with respect
to the protection of intellectual property rights is not entirely clear and I believe that a
good argument can be made against the utilization of such an exception.
In the preamble to the TRIPS Agreement, the participating States declare that one
of their reasons for joining the TRIPS is because they are “[r]ecognizing the underlying
public policy objectives of national systems for the protection of intellectual property,
including developmental and technological objectives.”502 This language establishes that
the TRIPS Agreement itself already takes into consideration the underlying public
policies with respect to intellectual property rights, at least those that are within the scope
of this agreement, and therefore there is no need for this exception as long as the
judgment complies with the provisions of TRIPS.
What, then are the underlying public policies referred to in the preamble to
TRIPS? Blakeney believes that an answer may be found in Article 7 of this Agreement,
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which addresses its objectives503 and provides that these include “the promotion of
technological innovation and . . . the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the
mutual advantage of producers and users of technical knowledge . . . in a manner
conductive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.” In
addition, Article 8 of TRIPS amplifies the objectives referred to in the Preamble and
permits Members of TRIPS to “adopt measures necessary to protect public health and
nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socioeconomic and technological development.”504
To many this argument may sound unrealistic and imaginary in the sense that
there is always a need for such an exception when recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments is involved. However, there are indications that this argument might work as
well as it has been in other contexts where it has already been implemented. Take for
example the American legal system. Courts in the U.S. only in very rare and extreme
situations recognize a public policy exception when recognition and enforcement of sister
States judgments are involved.505 The TRIPS Agreement and this American example
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have a common ground, which may justify following a similar approach. In both
situations the underlying public policies are to some extent already inherent in the legal
system, and only rarely in extreme situations, differences in public policies can be
detected. The reason there is a very limited public policy exception in Sister States
recognition and enforcement in the U.S. is because all these States presumably are
obliged to subordinate their differences to the common interest. The argument provides
that a similar justification can be established with respect to international recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments addressing intellectual property rights, as long as the
involved countries are Members of the TRIPS Agreement, since they also share, to a
great extent, the same common interests associated with the protection of intellectual
property rights and the public domain.
However, even in light of the above analysis, it is hard to imagine that any
international instrument for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment
addressing intellectual property rights can be adopted, or has any potential of being
adopted and implemented, without containing a public policy exception. Logically in
of a sister state. ‘If aid is to be withheld here, it must be because the cause of action in its nature
offends our sense of justice or menaces the public welfare.’” Compare, e.g., the decision of the
U.S. Supreme Court in Baker by Thomas v. General Motors Corp., 118 S.Ct. 657 (1998) holding
that “[a] court may be guided by the forum State'
s ‘public policy’ in determining the law
applicable to a controversy. . . But our decisions support no roving ‘public policy exception’ to
the full faith and credit due judgments.” See also Jaffe v. Accredited Surety and Casualty Co.
Inc., 294 F.3d 584 (2002) holding that “neither a state nor a federal court can refuse to give full
faith and credit to the judgment of a state court because of disagreement with the public policy
basis for that decision.”
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order to ensure the free flow of judgments a narrow public policy exception should have
sufficed.506 However, it seems that at least at the initial stage, it would be more efficient
and appealing to adopt broad grounds for refusal to recognize or enforce foreign
judgments. This would enable more countries to join such an international instrument
knowing that they always have the option to refuse to do so if a requirement should arise
in the future. A broad public policy exception, even though, to a great extent, not
recommended and unjustified, would serve as an incentive to attract as many countries as
possible to join. At a later stage we can always try to convince these countries to narrow
this exception for the sake of free trade.
D.

Parallel Litigation
Another widely recognized and accepted reason for refusing to recognize or

enforce a foreign judgment involves the issue of parallel litigation. It is not uncommon
for adverse parties to engage in several parallel proceedings in different courts and
forums that involve the very same facts and dispute. There are several possible scenarios
that are possible, such as when one party files a claim against another person regarding a
certain dispute, despite the fact that the very same facts are already litigated in another
country due to a lawsuit filed by the defendant. Another possibility is when the plaintiff
in one country initiates a similar claim in a second country against an international
defendant with assets in many countries.
Consider the following example. Two parties – pharmaceutical companies - are in
a dispute as to the rights to a certain patent (drug). One of the parties is an American
company and the other is a German company. The patent is registered in the U.S. Both
506
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companies manufacture the same drug. The American company files a lawsuit in
Germany for the payment of royalties allegedly owed to it by the German company due
to unauthorized use of the registered patent. The German company has all of its assets in
Germany and therefore, it is not unreasonable to file the complaint there. The line of
defense of the German company is that the patent was invalid at the time of registration
because it was not a new invention and it had already been in the public domain for many
years. The American company also files a similar claim in the U.S. because there are also
some assets in the U.S. and the drugs are sold in the U.S. market. The American courts
were more efficient and awarded the American company a permanent injunction and a
monetary award. The American company now asks the German court to enforce the
judgment against the German company that was rendered in the U.S. and collect the
monetary award. Should the German court enforce the American judgment?
The answer to this question is not easy for several reasons. On one hand, we want
to encourage recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments between countries. In
addition, if the dispute is already settled there is no point of continuing the German
proceedings. This can save money, time and additional valuable resources. On the other
hand, if the German court was the first one to assert jurisdiction it would be hard now to
ask this court to waive this assertion of jurisdiction. What, for example, if the German
court believes that the German defendant was right and the American court was wrong?
After all the German court at this stage is already familiar with the details of the case and
knows the defenses already raised. Can we expect the German court to simply ignore
what it knows and enforce a judgment he does not believe in?
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It is well accepted within the international community that in this and similar
situations, the addressed court has a legitimate reason to refuse the recognition or
enforcement of the foreign judgment. Therefore, the addressed court may refuse
recognition and enforcement if proceedings between the same parties, based on the same
facts and having the same purpose: “a) are pending before a court of the State addressed
and those proceedings were the first to be instituted, or b) have resulted in a decision by a
court of the State addressed, or c) have resulted in a decision by a court of another State
which would be entitled to recognition and enforcement under the law of the State
addressed.”507
E.

Lack of Jurisdiction – Minimum Contacts
As previously discussed in detail, the central element in my proposed solution is

the avoidance of addressing the issue of jurisdiction at the stage of the negotiations of an
international convention based on a presumption of enforceability, by eliminating the
need to agree in advance on bases of jurisdiction, such as with double or mixed model
based conventions. In other words, it is for the opposing party to convince the court
addressed that the rendering court should not have rendered the judgment, and thus that it
should not be enforced under one of the exceptions to the presumption.
There may be, however, certain scenarios in which we must grant the enforcing
court a mechanism to avoid enforcing the judgment. These are cases in which there is a
“red flag” waiving over the judgment because it is clear that there was not even a
minimum contact between the rendering court and the parties, or the dispute, so that the
507
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rendering court had no right to grant the judgment. This exception may be used only in
situations in which it is obvious that the rendering court should not have heard the case. If
the judgment survived the “red flag” test, but there may have been a more suitable
jurisdiction to hear the case, the judgment should still be recognized or enforced, as long
as the minimum contacts between the rendering jurisdiction and the parties or the dispute
are still met.
The reason for using this test only in extreme situations is the fact that all the
member countries of such a convention are expected to be Members of the TRIPS
Agreement, under which they are required to adhere to the same minimum standards for
protection of intellectual property rights, thus avoiding any significant gaps in the
provision of protection, which will only be narrowed as time passes.
One may argue that this solution would result in forum shopping. This is true, but
only to a limited extent. Forum shopping can be exercised in such a case, but adjudication
of the dispute must take place in a forum with at least minimum contacts. Since all
potential forums must provide the minimum protection required by the TRIPS
Agreement, the devil is not as scary as it may initially look. Furthermore, as I have
indicated in my critique of the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Proposal, forum shopping is not that
big of a problem when it comes to intellectual property rights, especially in light of the
fact that it happens daily in legal practice all around the world, including in the U.S.
F.

Another Perspective
As indicated, my theory is based on a presumption of enforceability of foreign

intellectual property judgments and a limited number of exceptions to this presumption.
One may argue that the breadth of these exceptions threaten the very existence of the
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presumption in a way that after you take these exceptions into consideration, there is not
much left of the presumption.
I argue that this is only partly true and it does not change the benefits that such a
solution provides. In a nutshell, I argue that what we will be left with after the alleged
erosion of the presumption of enforceability is still much more than what we have today
without the presumption. I believe that the real question is not whether this proposed
solution is a perfect one. It is clearly not. Rather, the question should be what exactly is
the goal that we are trying to achieve? In the first chapter of this dissertation, I discussed
the pros and cons of recognition and enforcement of foreign intellectual property
judgments, and concluded that we have much to gain from such recognition and
enforcement practices. If indeed we think that recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments is a good thing and that individual countries and international trade may
benefit from it, every step in that direction, even a small step such as the one I propose to
take, is by far better than what we have today – namely nothing.
The absence of an international instrument regulating this issue has consequences
that many scholars have attempted to overcome. Since most previous attempts to solve
these problems were extremely ambitious in their scope and coverage and therefore
failed, maybe it is time to move more slowly and gradually in this direction. My proposal
should be viewed more as the laying of foundations and a first step on a very long
journey, than a full-blown comprehensive solution to the problem. It is not that I think
that we would not be better off with a solution that promotes narrow exceptions to the
presumption. In a perfect world such a solution would probably benefit us more. This,
however, is not a perfect world. It is my conclusion that if we want to make any progress
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in this direction, we should do it very slowly and carefully, hoping that time will cure any
current mistrust and suspicion so that we can gradually narrow these exceptions. Even
though my proposed solution is relatively narrow and not as general and comprehensive
as one could have wished for, it is still more than what we have, or to be more precise, do
not have today.
Based on recent history and the failure of previous attempts to solve these
problems, the only alternative to my proposal is simply to give up and leave the situation
as is. I am not sure that this would be an appropriate solution.
9.

Enforcement in Proximity as a Potential Solution
Another set of problems arises when the remedy ordered by the rendering court

does not exist under the laws of the country in which recognition or enforcement is
sought. For example, some countries provide for injunction relief, while others do not.
This problem might be solved if we enable the addressed court that is asked to enforce a
remedy, which does not exist in its legal system, to use its discretion and replace the
remedy that it was asked to enforce with a different remedy that is most likely to achieve
the result intended by the rendering court. In other words, the addressed court will ask the
question what would have been the remedy that the rendering court would give if it were
limited to the remedies available under the legal system in the country of the enforcing
court. The simplest solution would obviously be to replace the injunctive relief with a
monetary award. This may be viewed as “enforcement in proximity.” This was in fact
part of the solution offered by Professors Dreyfuss and Ginsburg in their proposal.508 The
main problem with this idea is that injunctive relief is usually considered an equitable
508
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relief that is traditionally available in those cases where remedies at law, such as
monetary damages, are simply inappropriate or unavailable. In the American legal
system, equitable remedies are unavailable if monetary relief can be used to compensate
the plaintiff for damages suffered. Therefore, this proposed solution really does not solve
anything, simply because if monetary relief would have been available, it would have
been awarded from the beginning. Furthermore, we still need to resolve all these cases
where monetary judgment would be ineffective. The addressed court would obviously
still be able to refuse enforcement, based on the fact that the judgment is manifestly
incompatible with the public policy of the state addressed, or if the judgment was
obtained by fraud.
The TRIPS Agreement addresses this very issue. In Article 44(2) it allows its
Members, in cases where injunctions are inconsistent with national law to provide
“declaratory judgments and adequate compensation.” It is clear that this provision aims at
solving the problem of differences in remedies between national laws, recognizing that
they are not necessarily identical. Therefore, the TRIPS Agreement allows its Member
States to provide other remedies to substitute those that are unavailable. These provisions
should be expanded and applied in those cases where an addressed court is asked to
recognize or enforce a foreign judgment containing a remedy not available in its
jurisdiction and enable the court to substitute this remedy with another one.
10.

The Need for an International Courts System
It has been argued that “[t]he unavailability of a court system to interpret and

apply a global convention so as to bind the national courts of all Contracting States is a
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serious shortcoming in international-convention practice.”509 For example, the relative
success of the Brussels Convention may be partly attributed to the fact that since its
creation, the European Court of Justice has served to interpret and apply its rules.
The need for such an independent and impartial body is quite understandable. Due
to the different interests and cultural differences between the participating countries, there
is no doubt that misunderstandings and conflicts regarding the application of such an
instrument will result. These misunderstandings may have significant effects on the
ability of such an instrument to survive and fulfill its intended role. History has taught us
that whenever international instruments are involved, even when they address private
disputes between nationals of participating countries and not public disputes between
countries, there is a need for an impartial international body that will try to bridge the gap
and resolve such disputes without the participating countries viewing this as a stand taken
against them. Such a body needs to be viewed as reliable and impartial by everyone or it
will lose its authority. Since such a body does not have its own enforcing mechanisms,
such as police forces and sheriffs, its strength and existence derives from the
understanding, recognition and agreement among the participating countries to follow
and abide by its decisions and rulings.
Such a court system would have to serve two main roles. It would have to serve as
an appellate court in private matters between individuals in those special cases in which
the conflict at issue is about the interpretation of the convention by a certain local court in
one of the participating countries. The second role of such a court would be to settle

509

Von Mehren, supra note 369, at 200.

282

disputes between the participating countries in the public international sphere regarding
the interpretation and implementation of the convention.
Creating a new legal system to address these issues is not an easy task. The
greatest risk in the creation of such a system is lack of cooperation from the potential
member countries. Many countries look at international courts very suspiciously out of
fear that these courts interfere with their sovereignty. They do not like the idea of
international courts intervening with their internal affairs and forcing them to take certain
actions. Another reason is that this is a very expensive process, and trying to create it for
only a limited purpose would be probably uneconomical. Another issue that should be
taken into consideration is the fact that the judges in such a court should have the
required expertise in intellectual property, as well as private and public international law.
Unlike many other fields of law, intellectual property litigation is extremely complicated
and requires expertise in others field such as biology, electronics, physics and
mathematics. Not every judge is equipped with such expertise and as a result, many
countries have made the necessary arrangements to assure that only specialized courts or
judges hear these cases. The idea of a special court that deals with a specific subject is
being implemented on a regular basis all around the world, including in the U.S. where
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, is the only court that has the
jurisdiction, in certain situations, to hear cases on appeals that involve patents.510
Creation of a new international court system is not “risk free.” There is a
substantial risk that such a body would be viewed as politicized, and exposed to pressure
from different interest groups and lobbyists. If selection of the judges is left to political
510

35 U.S.C.A. § 141.

283

institutions, there is a risk that the reliability and credibility of such an institution would
be lost. Similar to the allegations sometimes made in the U.S. against the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, there is a risk that the judges would be viewed as
servants of certain political interests, something that the international community should
avoid at any cost.
The way I propose to address this problem is to have the judges be selected by an
independent committee, consisting of members of developing, developed, and least
developed countries, as well as representatives of various consumer groups, and members
of the academia.
Due to economic considerations, it is very unlikely that an international
specialized court would ever be created to address the issue of recognition and
enforcement of intellectual property judgments. Therefore, there are two possible
solutions. The first one is to establish a court that would address the issue of recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments within the scope of a more comprehensive
convention that would also address other subjects such as judgments relating to torts,
contracts, and questions of family relations. In other words, if the attempt to create one
international instrument that addresses the issue of recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments ever succeeds, whether based on the Preliminary Hague Draft or based
on another proposal, the court established under such an instrument to supervise it may
also be used to address intellectual property issues. This probably would have been a
good solution, except to the extent that is not realistic to think that such an instrument has
any chances of being adopted in the near future, as concluded previously. The other
possible solution is to utilize an already existing international court system by expanding
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its subject matter jurisdiction to include intellectual property matters. The candidates to
assume such a role are extremely limited.
Unfortunately, the TRIPS Agreement does not provide an adequate solution. The
TRIPS Agreement provides for an international Dispute Settlement mechanism under the
umbrella of the WTO.511 It does not regulate relations between private parties, but rather
those between the Member States.512 The Preamble to the TRIPS Agreement clarifies that
one of the reasons for the creation of this system is the recognition of a need for
“effective and expeditious procedures for the multilateral prevention and settlement of
disputes between governments.” Despite the limits of the TRIPS Agreement to disputes
between governments, it is important to remember that “under the GATT dispute
settlement system, acts of private parties could be taken into account, particularly where
pressure was exerted by a government to produce a certain result or where private
contractual obligations could adversely affect the rights of other contracting parties.”513
A.

The ECJ
For many years the ECJ has served as the court overlooking and interpreting the

Brussels Convention, mostly with great success. “The Court of Justice ensures that
Community law is uniformly interpreted and effectively applied. It has jurisdiction in
511

See Article 64 of the TRIPS Agreement: “The provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of

GATT 1994 as elaborated and applied by the Dispute Settlement Understanding shall apply to
consultations and the settlement of Disputes under this Agreement except as otherwise
specifically provided herein.”
512

See Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of the Uruguay Round:

Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 275, 282 (1997).
513

Gervais, supra note 203, at 250.

285

disputes involving Member States, EU institutions, businesses and individuals. A Court
of First Instance has been attached to it since 1989.”514 The success of the ECJ can be
explained in several ways. The role of the ECJ is not limited to the interpretation of the
Brussels Convention. It is much broader in scope than that. This Court addresses many
other issues in the European Community and its role in that respect is only a small part of
what it usually does.515 Since its establishment, the ECJ has managed to gain the prestige
and reputation of an impartial court, which makes it easier for the participating countries
to adhere to its rulings. The judges who sit on the bench in this court have been known to
be substantively knowledgeable and have good reputations in the community, something
that makes it easier for their decisions to be viewed favorably. In addition, since the
relations between the Member States are not limited to the recognition and enforcement
of judgments, but rather involve many other economic and political issues, their refusal to
comply with the ECJ’s rulings may have adverse effects on them and the stakes are
simply too high. They may win on this issue, but lose on many others.
There are several problems associated with a proposal to adopt the ECJ as a
potential court to overlook the implementation of the proposed international convention.
The ECJ currently solves disputes only within Europe. As previously discussed, the
European countries share significant cultural, economical and political agendas,
something that is not necessarily true with respect to other potential participants of such
convention. Therefore, there is no way to determine, at this point, how non-European

514

Institutions of the European Union website, available at <http://europahouse.uz/en/inst/>.
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The Court of Justice of the European Communities website, available at

<http://curia.eu.int/en/index.htm>.
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countries would view the role of such a court and how favorably they would treat its
decisions in light of the potential interference with their sovereignty. They may view this
court as “too European-oriented” and fear that it may be prejudice. Also, from a
geographical perspective, this means that under the ECJ system, neither the parties nor
their legal counsels have to travel far to participate in the hearings. This will not be the
case with an international court that may sit in Europe and litigate disputes involving
Australians and Americans. Similarly, at least now, all of the judges in the ECJ are
European, which may be viewed by non-European countries as a problem. The
differences in language should not be considered an obstacle as this issue may be
overcome by utilizing interpreters or by deciding that certain languages serve as the
official languages in such proceedings.
B.

WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center
Another possible solution may be to use the WIPO Arbitrations and Mediation

Center. This body operating from Switzerland was established in 1994 to offer arbitration
and mediation services for the resolution of international commercial disputes between
private parties. “Developed by leading experts in cross-border dispute settlement, the
procedures offered by the Center are widely recognized as particularly appropriate for
technology, entertainment and other disputes involving intellectual property.”516 This
Center was established by the WIPO through a resolution of its Governing Bodies in
response to a charge that WIPO has neglected the enforcement of intellectual property

516
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<http://arbiter.wipo.int/center/background.html>.
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Center

website,

available

at

rights.517 The advantages of utilizing this body are tremendous. This is a very active body
and therefore the infrastructure of the organization is already in place, and judging from
the number of cases it has already dealt with, it enjoys excellent reputation. The already
existing infrastructure would substantially reduce the initial investment in administrative
needs such as secretaries, machines, library and computers. This organization has
significant experience in solving international intellectual property disputes and this
would save the substantial resources that would have to be spent if a completely new
organization is established. Furthermore, the WIPO Center has already created a set of
procedural rules as a guide for conducting its arbitrations and this may be used as the
basis for a set of new rules in this case as well. These rules, however, would have to be
modified and adapted to the new medium in which the procedures are not conducted in a
form of arbitration or mediation. Most importantly, this institution, by definition, has
expertise in intellectual property matters, which grants it a significant advantage over
other similar institutions. The fact that it plays a role of an arbitration center and not a
regular court may be a slight disadvantage, but inserting some modifications in the
procedures that are utilized could cure this. Unlike other institutions, this center is a part
of an international organization (WIPO) in which many of the potential parties of the
proposed recognition and enforcement convention are already members. This fact has
extreme importance in the sense that from a psychological point of view, it would make it
easier for them to rely on this institution and join the convention. It would be less
intimidating for these countries to join an instrument utilizing an institution that they
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already know and with which they have experience. As a result, it seems that this is the
best candidate to fill this role.
11.

No Need for Reciprocity Requirement
Ever since the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Hilton v. Guyot,518 there has been

a continuing debate as to whether a reciprocity requirement is a prerequisite to the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. This debate is not limited to the U.S.
Even today, many courts, admittedly or non-admittedly, look into the question whether
the rendering court would have recognized and enforced a similar judgment if the
enforcing court rendered it, before they agree to do so. Courts are very hesitant to enforce
a foreign judgment if the rendering court is not going to do the same with respect to their
judgments. One court has summarized the situation:
“In a large number of civil law countries, grant of
conclusive effect to money-judgments from foreign courts
is made dependent upon reciprocity. Judgments rendered in
the United States have in many instances been refused
recognition abroad either because the foreign court was not
satisfied that local judgments would be recognized in the
American jurisdiction involved or because no certification
of existence of reciprocity could be obtained from the
foreign government in countries where existence of
reciprocity must be certified to the courts by the
government. Codification by a state of its rules on the
recognition of money-judgments rendered in a foreign
court will make it more likely that judgments rendered in
the state will be recognized abroad.”519
I argue that this obstacle for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments is
removed, however, when we adopt a multinational convention solution as the one that I
propose. If such a multinational instrument is adopted, reciprocity exists by the very
518

Supra note 7.
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Kam-Tech Systems Ltd. v. Yardeni, 774 A.2d 644 (N.J.Super.A.D., 2001).
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existence of such an instrument because members of the convention undertake to
mutually recognize each other’s judgments and therefore, such an obstacle for
recognition and enforcement is eliminated. A court that is asked to enforce a judgment
rendered by a court in another Member country already knows that the rendering court
would also enforce its judgment pursuant to the international obligation it undertook by
joining the convention.
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CONCLUSION
In this dissertation, I tried to explore the roots of the problem of recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments with respect to intellectual property rights, the
underlying policies, the various solutions offered in the past, and the reasons for their
failure. I believe that learning from the past is the best basis for improving the future.
There can be no doubt that this subject is by far one of the most challenging and
complicated bodies of law today. It is not complicated because it requires one to be
smarter or have a greater amount of intellect, but rather because it combines many more
elements that have nothing to do with the dry law. It is complicated because we deal with
sovereignty, politics, and psychology. There are many things that the people of this world
are willing to accept, even reluctantly, but they will not allow interference with their
sovereignty. This is especially true with respect to intellectual property rights that are
territorial in nature. Only fifty-five years after the world was re-divided, ten years after
the Berlin Wall was taken down, and when there are still people in this world killing and
fighting over self determination and land, it is very complicated to talk about enforcing
judgments rendered by a foreign jurisdiction sharing different historical, economical,
political and cultural views. It is not about the law, but rather about emotions, ancient
history, and about “what your great grandfather did to mine” a hundred and fifty years
ago. In other words, the issues are more about the “Days of Our Lives”520 than they are
about “res judicata” or “comity.” This is not to say, of course, that we need to give up
before we even begin. But one should not expect an easy voyage. Like climbing a steep
mountain, we need to do it step by step. We need cautiously to secure our way, and
520
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should not give up, even if we slip down the road every once in a while. Rome was not
built in one day either. The sovereignty problem is not going away, but we can at least try
to lower the friction.
The need for a new international convention on the recognition and enforcement
of foreign judgments with respect to intellectual property matters is now clear, and this
need will grow substantially as more people ignore their fears and increase their use of
the Internet to engage in international commerce. If until not so long ago most
international trade was conducted between organizations and corporations, the
introduction of the Internet made it possible for private parties to engage in direct
business transactions with others around the globe. This changing reality only serves to
amplify the complexity of the recognition and enforcement problem and the need for its
solution.
As indicated at length in the first two chapters of this dissertation, other proposed
solutions to the problems discussed herein, such as harmonization of substantive
intellectual property law, are irrelevant since they cannot provide a comprehensive
solution. At best, they can reduce some of the frictions between different legal systems
and provide ad hoc solutions to specific problems. Like many others before me, I look at
the creation of an international convention as the only viable solution. This assumption is
dictated primarily by reality and history. Put differently, the need for a convention is
clear. The only question remaining is its shape.
There are many underlying policies that were introduced throughout the years to
justify the need for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, including
economic reasons, such as the saving of resources by eliminating the need to litigate the
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same issue twice, the need to litigate the case in the most appropriate forum, and the
doctrine of comity. I argue that the reason or the underlying policy that drives an
individual country to become a member of a comprehensive international solution is
almost irrelevant. We need not address the question “why.” What is relevant is the fact
that each country agrees to adopt the solution, since the more countries that join such a
convention the better are the prospects of such a solution to solve the problem. Such a
solution will only be effective as long as many countries take part in it, and what are the
underlying policies that triggered them to do so is not that important. Countries do not
care if others enforce their judgments for one reason or the other, as long as they do so.
The most important question I have addressed is the shape of the proposed
solution. Analysis of previously attempted solutions and the very limited success of the
regional instruments currently in force lead to the conclusion that the “double” or
“mixed” convention models are ineffective. The reason for the problems with these two
models is the fact that they address not only the recognition and enforcement problem,
but also the question of jurisdiction. Such an instrument would require the participating
countries to agree on a set of rules for the assertion of jurisdiction, and if the rendering
court relied on one of these available bases with respect to a specific dispute, the
enforcing jurisdiction is obligated to recognize and enforce the foreign judgment. If we
expand this idea to a comprehensive international solution, the immediate consequence is
the need for the entire international community to agree on a single set of bases for the
assertion of jurisdiction. Historically, this has never been made possible due to
conflicting economical, historical and cultural interests and perspectives, and the chances
of this reality changing any time soon is in the range of slim to non-existing. In other
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words, all previous attempts were simply too ambitious and tried to achieve too much too
fast.
The alternative solution that I propose in this dissertation is to adopt a “simple
convention” based instrument that is different from most other previously proposed
solutions in the sense that it avoids addressing the jurisdiction question, which was the
primary obstacle to the ability to reach an agreement in the past. I propose to adopt a
simple convention not because it is the best solution, but because I conclude that at least
in the near future, it is the only solution. In a perfect world other more comprehensive
solutions would better resolve the issues involved in the recognition and enforcement of
foreign intellectual property judgments, but we do not live in a perfect world. Despite the
very substantial steps taken by the international community to harmonize intellectual
property law, including the adoption of international conventions such as the TRIPS
Agreement or the Paris and Berne Conventions, very significant differences still remain.
Various countries have different agendas and the interests of developing countries are
usually different from those of the developed countries, and so on. Some countries seek
more intellectual property protection, while others prefer weaker protection so that they
can utilize the available intellectual property for their own needs.
The solution will be preferably an integral part of the TRIPS Agreement, thus
enabling us to take advantage of the already existing procedural mechanisms therein.
Furthermore, it is also proposed, in the long run, to complement it with an international
courts system. In cases where the enforcing court is unable to do so because it does not
share the same remedies as the rendering court, I propose to use the enforcement in
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proximity mechanism, thus replacing the original remedy for one that is available in the
enforcing jurisdiction.
A simple convention is more likely to be adopted by the international community
because less friction as to the issue of the assertion of jurisdiction can be expected. In my
proposal the jurisdiction issue is not absent. Rather, instead of serving as a prerequisite
for the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment, it would simply serve as a
mere exception to a rebuttable general presumption of enforceability. Put differently, a
foreign judgment should be enforced unless there is a good reason to overcome the
presumption. One such reason should be that the rendering court could not have asserted
jurisdiction because it had no minimum contacts with the parties or the relevant facts.
Other exceptions may be used, such as a public policy exception, fraud, and due process
of law. It is also suggested that these exceptions be drafted broadly with the intent that
this would encourage as many countries as possible to join. It is intended that the
knowledge that broad exceptions exist would make it easier for these countries to join,
because the convention would give them the appropriate means to avoid doing so in
certain situation when they believe that such enforcement would be inappropriate. As
time passes, confidence in the other countries would hopefully grow, and we would be
able to narrow the scope of these exceptions. Since trust and reliance are key factors to
the success of such an instrument, I argue that a simple convention created along the lines
previously described is a much better solution than all other previous proposals.
A simple convention is not the “mainstream” solution recognized in the academic
world to the recognition and enforcement problem. However, after researching these
issues for several years, in my view it is the only viable one, at least at this point in time.
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As Robert Frost once wrote,
Two roads diverged in a wood, and I I took the one less traveled by,
And that has made all the difference.521
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Robert Frost, The Road Not Taken, available at <http://www.bartleby.com/119/1.html>.
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APPENDIX A

SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH FINDINGS

RENDERING ENFORCING
RECOGNIZED/ DECISION
ENFORCED
COUNTRY
U.S. COURT
International
France
Court of Appeals Yes
French court’s decision determining
Nutrition Co., v.
for the Federal
who owns a U.S. patent under the terms
Horphag Research
Cir.
of a French contract was enforced based
Ltd., 257 F.3d 1324
on comity. The parties had an
(2001)
agreement that French courts would
decide ownership of the patent and there
was no violation of U.S. public policy.
Cochran
Switzerland
Court of Appeals Yes
Decision of a Swiss court that defendant
Consulting, Inc. v.
for the Federal
is not the owner of a computer program
Uwatec USA, Inc.,
Cir.
and therefore cannot obtain such
102 F.3d 1224
program for discovery purposes in a
(1996)
U.S. court is recognized based on
comity.
Turner
Germnay
Court of Appeals Yes
Dispute concerning broadcasting of
th
Entertainment Co.
11 Circuit
television
programs
in
German
v. Degeto Film
speaking parts of Europe pursuant to a
GmbH, 25 F.3d
license granted by an American
1512 (1994)
corporation. The court decided to
abstain because parallel litigation took
place in Germany and judgment was
rendered on the merits.
CASE

297

SUBJECT
MATTER
Patent

Patent

Copyright

Remington
Rand Netherlands
Corporation
Delaware
v.
Business Systems
inc., 830 F.2d 1260
(1987)

Court of Appeals No
3rd Circuit

Banyan Licensing, Canada
Inc. v. Orthsupport
Intern., Inc., 2002
WL
31059365
(2002)

Northern District Yes
of Ohio

Yahoo!, Inc. v. La France
Ligue Contre Le
Racisme
et
L'
Antisemitisme,
169 F.Supp.2d 1181
(2001)

Northern District No
of Colorado

Decision not to recognize a Dutch
court’s decision allowing the selling of
certain
assets
in
bankruptcy
proceedings, because the decision did
not specifically authorized the selling of
the misappropriated trade secrets, and
because the American plaintiff was not
part of the Dutch proceedings and was
not heard, thus violating the due process
of law principle.
Defendant in a patent infringement case
raised a defense that it was undergoing
bankruptcy proceedings in a Canadian
court and asked that all proceedings
against it will be stayed pursuant to an
order of the Canadian court. The
District court granted the motion and
enforced the Canadian decision.
An order of a French court requiring a
California Internet Service Provider to
block access by French Citizens to Nazi
materials displayed or offered for sale
on a U.S. website, was held to be
violating the First Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution, and therefore cannot
be enforced in the U.S., even though it
may be legal under French law. The
protected speech in this case was
Internet
related
and
therefore
simultaneously took place in the U.S.
and in France.
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Trade
secrets,
Internet

Patent

Internet

Pony
Express England
Records, Inc. v.
Springsteen,
163
F.Supp.2d
465
(2001).

District of New Yes
Jersey

Pariente v. Scott France
Meredith Literary
Agency, Inc., 771
F.Supp. 609 (1991).

Southern District Yes
of New York

In-Tech Marketing Netherlands
Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc.,
719 F.Supp. 312
(1989).

District of New Yes
Jersey

Copyright infringement case. The court Copyright
held that the question of who owns the
copyrighted works had already been
decided by an English court and
therefore the issue cannot be re-litigated
in the U.S. based on the doctrine of
collateral estoppel, even though the
plaintiffs in the U.S. proceedings were
not the defendants in the in the English
proceedings. The court explained that
the plaintiffs knew about English
proceedings and a license agreement
gave them the opportunity to participate
and control the suit, a right that they
neglected to exercise.
Enforcement of a French judgment Copyright
rendered against a “literary agent” for
failing to verify that its client, who was
the author of a novel, had not
previously sold the motion picture
rights in the novel to a third party under
an option agreement. The French court
based its decision on a local custom
requiring literary agents to verify that
heir clients indeed own the literary
rights that they are purporting to sell.
The court decided to recognize a Dutch Patent
judgment holding that the patent
assignment agreement had been
dissolved due to neglect to pay
royalties. Since pursuant to the Dutch
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Carl Zeiss Stiftung West Germany
v. V. E. B. Carl
Zeiss, Jena, 293
F.Supp. 892 (1968)

District of New Yes
York

Murray v. British England
Broadcasting
Corp., 906 F.Supp.
858 (1995)

Southern District Yes
of New York

Leo Feist, Inc. v. England
Debmar Pub. Co.,
232 F.Supp. 623
(1964)

District Court of Yes
Pennsylvania

Globalsantafe
Korea
Corp.
v.
Globalsantafe.Com,
250 F.Supp.2d 610

Eastern District No
of Virginia

decision the agreement was no longer in
force, the U.S. court rejected the claim
for tortuous interference because one of
the elements of such a claim is the
existence of an agreement.
Court awarded res judicata effect to a Trademark
decision of the West Germany Supreme
Court that granted a final judgment on
the merits between the parties with
respect to the question of whether
plaintiff was the successor in interest to
a foundation, which was the owner of
certain U.S. trademarks.
The court agreed to refrain from Copyright
litigating the case based on the forum
non conveniens doctrine. The court
explained that “

Court recognized an English judgment Copyright
that provided that no copying took place
in this case, and therefore a claim for
copyright infringement cannot stand, as
this is an element of such claim.
Court refused to enforce an injunction Trademark
rendered in Korea, which prohibited the
registrar of a “.com” domain name from
transferring the domain name to the
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(2003)

Lenchyshyn
v. Canada
Pelko Elec., Inc.,
723 N.Y.S.2d 285
(2001)

Reading & Bates Canada
Const. Co. v. Baker
Energy Resources
Corp., 976 S.W.2d
702 (1998)

"
$
% #

!
#
&

plaintiff. The court explained that it
refuses to extend comity to the Korean
judgment because it was rendered after
an American court had already issued a
judgment in the very same case.
Court recognized a money judgment Trademark,
rendered in Canada that was the result patent.
of a dispute regarding the payment of
royalties, and trademark and patent
infringement, even though the court had
no personal jurisdiction over the
defendants.
!
'
!
Patent

Yes

Texas Court of Yes
Appeals
–
Houston
(1st
Dist.)

(!)*
+"

!

,

,.
!

.
"

Northlake
Belgium
Marketing
&
Supply, Inc. v.
Glaverbel, S.A., 958
F.Supp. 373 (1997)

Northern District Yes
of Illinois

Films by Jove, Inc. France
v.
Berov,
250

Eastern District No
of new York

Court granted issue preclusion to a Patent
f
/
/

Court refused to grant preclusive effect Copyright
to a French judgment in a lawsuit
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F.Supp.2d
(2003)

156

Gordon and Breach Switzerland
Science Publishers Germany
S.A. v. American
Institute of Physics,
905 F.Supp. 169
(1995)

brought by an American corporation
against
Russian
enterprises
for
copyright infringement that took place
prior to the end of the Soviet era,
because the legal interpretation of
Russian law by the French court was
contradicted by an earlier ruling of the
same court which was later upheld by
the French court of last resort in a suit
involving the same parties and the same
legal issues, and its interpretation was
obviously mistaken in light of later
evidence introduced in the U.S. court.

Southern District No
of New York

!

,

Trademark

.
'

0

'
'

"

$

&

0
1

.
(

V'
Soske, Inc. v. Ireland
Vsoske.com, 2003

Southern District Yes
of New York

Court granted comity to a decision of an Trademark
Irish court providing that the agreement
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WL
(2003)

1747144

Lea v. Deakin, 15 England
F.Cas. 95 (1879)

23
256$
2663&

4

England

between the parties was in effect and
consent to its extension could not be
unreasonably withheld., and refused to
address arguments that had already been
decided by that court based on the issue
preclusion doctrine.

Northern District Yes
of Illinois

"

Trademark

Yes

!

Patent

Court of Appeals Yes
for the 2nd Circuit

!

Philadelphia

4

Omega Importing Germany
Corp. v. Petri-Kine
Camera Co., 451
F.2d 1190 (1971)

7

Trademark
0

-

0
7

0
8
-both

,

causes of action
arose out of the same subject matter,’ . .
. and the East German enterprise had
both the opportunity and the incentive
to litigate the case fully.”
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Ingenohl v. Walter Hong
Kong United
Sates Yes
E. Olsen & Co., 47 (British
Supreme Court
S.Ct. 451 (1927)
colony)

,
!

!
4

9
:

;
,

to
enforce this English judgment for costs,
obtained after a fair trial before a court
having jurisdiction of the parties, when
the judgment is unquestionably valid
and in other respects will be enforced.”
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